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

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From the Editor:

In this issue . . .

RENÉE DE NEVERS explores how "new" wars—ranging from civil wars to asymmetric war—and new warriors, including warlords, private security companies, and children, fit within the Geneva Conventions. Although the nature of warfare and warriors has changed from the time the Conventions were adopted in 1949, she challenges the view that the Conventions should be abandoned. Rather, she argues, the Conventions should be revitalized to address a broader spectrum of war, because this will generate greater international support for U.S. efforts to combat terrorism.

SARAH PRALLE examines the politics of the anti-SUV campaign in light of its similarities to and differences from other moral reform movements in the United States. She argues that the campaign confronts fundamental tensions in American political culture around issues of consumption and the role of the automobile but that it fails to fully resolve them.

YAEL S. ARONOFF analyzes the political conversion of Jimmy Carter from dove to hawk in his relations with the Soviet Union, particularly in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. She concludes that Carter's transformation can be better understood by examining a combination of Carter's religious beliefs, his personality characteristics, and the influence of his advisers. This case illuminates the broader question of what makes some leaders more likely than others to transform their foreign policy.

BRANDON ROTTINGHAUS looks at an important but untold story of the origins, adaptations, and utility of public opinion mail sent to the White House as a political tool. He concludes that the apparatus for gauging public opinion by the mail predates but largely mirrors the institutionalization of opinion polling in the West Wing and serves as a valuable measure of opinion for presidents interested in understanding and managing public opinion.

GAMZE ÇAVDAR discusses the factors behind the political learning of the Justice and Development party (*Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi* [AKP]) in Turkey. She challenges the view that the AKP's political learning can be replicated by Islamist political parties in the Muslim Middle East.

DEMETRIOS JAMES CARALEY

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The Geneva Conventions and New Wars

RENÉE DE NEVERS

Much attention has been given recently to the U.S. government's assertions that suspected terrorists and what it calls "enemy combatants" do not deserve the protections afforded to prisoners of war (POWs) under the Geneva Conventions. Administration officials assert that the nature of the terrorist threat has created a new kind of war. The Geneva Conventions do not apply to this battle, they argue, and, in some respects, the Conventions are "quaint" and "obsolete."[1] These arguments have provoked controversy, as legal scholars and policy analysts have debated the merits and dangers of adopting this approach.

The terrorist threat is but one "new" form of war, however. The U.S. position raises the broader question of how the Geneva Conventions apply, given the changing nature of wars and of those who participate in them. Mass battles between more-or-less evenly matched armies of uniformed soldiers from opposing states, the circumstances for which the Geneva Conventions were devised, are now the exception. Instead, wars today range from wildly unbalanced conflicts pitting highly trained and technologically sophisticated armies like that of the United States against irregular combatants on horseback, to conflicts in which paramilitaries and criminals intermingle and terrorize local populations to achieve their own goals. Moreover, today, war in much of the world takes place against the backdrop of failed states, and is fought by warlords, mercenaries, and children.

This diversity of conflicts is not new. Indeed, many of today's "new" wars hark back to older forms of warfare. What is new, however, is the growing

[1] Alberto R. Gonzales, "Memorandum for the President," 25 January 2002 in Karen L. Greenberg and Joshua L. Dratel, eds., *The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 118–121.

RENÉE DE NEVERS is an assistant professor of public administration in the Maxwell School at Syracuse University.

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recognition that these conflicts may have consequences far beyond the states involved in them.

The Geneva Conventions may indeed be ill-suited, in their present form, to addressing today's challenges, inasmuch as they focus on a narrow spectrum of wars. The remedy to this problem should not be the one proposed by the United States, however, of simply rejecting the utility of the Conventions. Nor should the solution focus solely on the terrorist threat. Instead, the United States and the international community should revitalize the Conventions, to take into account the full range of challenges posed by modern wars.

The United States has a strong interest in extending Geneva-type protections to a broader spectrum of war. Most simply, the Conventions provide the best protection for Americans in conflict zones and beyond. When their protections are eroded or the laws of war are ignored, U.S. soldiers may be at greater risk. Moreover, combating terrorism requires international cooperation, and the Conventions provide a foundation for building this cooperation. Additionally, the United States needs to regain support and moral credibility in a wide range of countries if it is to win the war on terror. Strengthening and broadening the application of the Conventions, rather than rejecting them, will generate greater international support for U.S. efforts to combat terrorism.

Domestically, the United States should reaffirm its commitment to the Geneva Conventions and other international laws pertaining to war, and it should strengthen U.S. laws to ensure that all soldiers and civilians working for the U.S. government will be held to these standards, or be punished. Internationally, the United States should lead efforts to strengthen the framework of protections and to ensure their application to the full scope of conflicts. These protections should be based on the principles of basic human dignity and safety that are at the core of the Conventions themselves.

In this article, I will first briefly describe the Geneva Conventions and the George W. Bush administration's justification for suspending them in the war on terror. I will then examine the nature of modern war and warriors in turn. I will assess how the Geneva Conventions apply to current conflicts, and discuss why it is in the U.S.'s interest to strengthen and expand the existing international legal framework. I will then make recommendations for strengthening domestic and international guidelines to provide greater protections for soldiers and civilians in light of the complexities of modern war.

The Geneva Conventions and U.S. Policy

The Geneva Conventions of 1949 built on several earlier international conventions regarding the conduct of war. Henri Dunant, a Geneva merchant, is credited with providing the impetus for the initial Geneva Convention, signed in 1864. Dunant and several colleagues established an international committee to aid soldiers wounded in battle, which eventually became the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). This group decided that they could only

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effect the changes they sought in the conduct of warfare if governments agreed to provide care for wounded soldiers and protection for medical workers aiding them. Although some states initially resisted the idea as either redundant or an impediment to military operations, twelve states signed the Convention in 1864, and most European states, as well as the United States, had signed by 1868.[2] The Convention provided for the protection of victims in conflicts, gave states a responsibility to aid the wounded, and stipulated that clearly designated medical personnel would not be hindered from aiding wounded combatants. These early principles were expanded in the Hague Conferences around the turn of the century, which extended protections to soldiers at sea and later to POWs.[3]

What we currently recognize as the Geneva Conventions are the four Conventions signed in 1949, which focus in turn on wounded members of the armed forces, naval forces, POWs, and, for the first time, civilians caught up in conflicts. These refine and expand on the protections of the earlier conventions, stipulating who shall be considered members of these groups, and laying out the rights they should be accorded, most of which focus on their protection from harm or humiliation.[4] The Conventions also reinforce the need to distinguish between combatants and civilians.

The 1949 Geneva Conventions reflected the nature of inter-state war that had evolved in Europe, from the Napoleonic Wars to World War II. Indeed, one of the criticisms leveled at the Conventions by the Bush administration was that in detailing provisions such as mail delivery and cigarette rations for prisoners, they were "obsolete."[5] The Conventions have not been static, however. Two Additional Protocols (APs) were signed in 1977 specifically to address the dilemmas raised by civil wars and insurgencies, which were clearly as widespread at that point as inter-state conflicts. Seeking to encourage insurgent groups to comply with the laws of war, the APs extended both the Conventions' protections and responsibilities to armed groups involved in internal conflicts.[6] AP II also modified the conditions required for combatants to be recognized as POWs to ensure that revolutionaries and insurgents could claim this status. This was not without effect; some insurgent groups, such as

[2] On the development of the ICRC and the early Geneva Convention, see Martha Finnemore, *National Interests in International Society* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), 69–88.

[3] "International Humanitarian Law," accessed at www.redcross.lv/en/conventions.htm, 2 May 2005.

[4] The Conventions were accessed at http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/genevaconventions, 2 May 2005.

[5] Alberto R. Gonzalez, "Memorandum for the President," 119.

[6] Additional Protocol I, Article 96 §3, accessed at http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/genevaconventions, 2 May 2005. The United States did not sign the two Additional Protocols to the Conventions, due to concern about extending protections to unlawful combatants. But the U.S. Army's field manual on land warfare uses almost all of the language from the two protocols. U.S. soldiers have regular training on how their actions should be guided by the Geneva Conventions.

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South Africa's African National Congress, publicly affirmed their adherence to the Geneva Conventions, because they wanted international recognition of their struggle.[7] Chechnya's now-deceased president, Aslan Maskhadov, also stated that his troops would abide by the Conventions, although he was unable to enforce this standard.[8]

The Geneva Conventions and the APs are generally viewed as the core documents of international humanitarian law, along with the United Nations (UN) Convention against Torture, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Many of these require signatory states to pass implementing legislation to enforce them. The United States has done so through laws such as the Torture Victim Protection Act, the War Crimes Act of 1996, and the Torture Act of 2000, among others.

The United States and the Geneva Conventions after September 11

The administration's determinations regarding the Geneva Conventions emerged from debates about the appropriate treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban combatants detained by the Northern Alliance forces allied with the United States during the 2001 campaign in Afghanistan. The Bush administration argued that it was not responsible for any abuses of prisoners carried out by the Northern Alliance, a collection of warlords and their followers who had opposed the Taliban during the 1990s. The decision to remove some of these prisoners to Guantanamo Bay put them squarely in U.S. hands, however, forcing the United States to define its own position regarding the status of these prisoners.[9] Concern about future terrorist attacks led the Department of Defense (DOD) to question the Geneva Conventions' constraints on interrogation and the holding of prisoners. Not only did the DOD want greater freedom of action regarding interrogations, but it assumed that many prisoners in the open-ended war on terror must be held indefinitely, whereas the Conventions stipulate that prisoners must be repatriated when wars end. On 11 January 2002, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld announced that the United States would treat detainees at Guantanamo in a way that was "reasonably consistent with the Geneva Conventions," but was not obligated to do so because they did not qualify as POWs.[10]

[7] Cornelio Sommaruga, "Appeal by the International Committee of the Red Cross on the 20th Anniversary of the Adoption of the Additional Protocols in 1977," *International Review of the Red Cross* 320 (October 1997): 471–472.

[8] Elizabeth Fuller, "What Lies Ahead in Chechnya," *In the National Interest* 14 January 2004 accessed at http://www.inthenationalinterest.com/Articles/Vol3Issue2/Vol3Issue2Fuller.html, 27 December 2005.

[9] Holly Burkhalter, "Roundtable on Old Rules, New Threats," 12 December 2002, accessed on the website of the Council on Foreign Relations at www.crf.org/publication/php?id=5313, 2 May 2005.

[10] "Pentagon: Geneva Convention Doesn't Cover Detainees," *Reuters*, 11 January 2002.

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The Bush administration relied on two central arguments to conclude that the Geneva Conventions' protections for POWs did not apply in the war on terror. These are laid out in a memorandum for Alberto Gonzales, then White House Counsel, written by Assistant Attorney General Jay S. Bybee, and reiterated in a memo from Gonzales to President George W. Bush dated 25 January 2002.[11] Bybee argued, first, that the Conventions did not apply to al Qaeda because it is a non-state actor and cannot be party to an international agreement governing war. Such agreements are valid only between state parties to international treaties. Bybee acknowledged that the Conventions are designed to address more conflicts than merely those between two states, but he argued that the nature of the war on terror means that "a conflict with al Qaeda is not properly included in non-international forms of armed conflict to which some provisions of the Geneva Conventions might apply."

Second, Bybee argued that because Afghanistan was a failed state, the President need not apply the Geneva Conventions to the Taliban. He argued that the Taliban did not fully control the territory of the Afghan state, that it was not recognized as the legitimate government of that state by the international community, and that it was incapable of fulfilling Afghanistan's international treaty obligations. The Taliban, therefore, was not a government. He concluded that Afghanistan's failed status was "sufficient ground alone for the President to suspend Geneva III, and thus to deprive members of the Taliban militia of POW status." Moreover, Bybee argued that Taliban detainees did not deserve POW status because they did not fall within the Conventions' legal definition of soldiers.[12]

The Justice Department provided similar legal opinions regarding the Taliban and al Qaeda to the Pentagon in January 2002, but the State Department rejected the argument that Afghanistan's "failed" status justified suspending the Geneva Conventions, noting that the official U.S. position both before and after the Taliban came to power "was that Afghanistan constituted a state."[13] In the end, Bush announced on 7 February 2002 that the United States would apply the Geneva Conventions to the Taliban, but that they did not merit POW status.[14]

The ongoing litigation and debate in the United States on the status of "unlawful combatants," and the abuses that took place at the Abu Ghraib

[11] Jay S. Bybee, "Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, and William J. Haynes II, General Counsel of the Department of Defense," 22 January 2002, in Greenberg and Dratel, eds., *The Torture Papers*, 81–117; Gonzales, "Memorandum for the President," 118–125.

[12] Bybee, "Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales," 81–117.

[13] John Yoo, "Memorandum for William J. Haynes II," 9 January 2002, in Greenberg and Dratel, eds., *The Torture Papers*, 38–79; William Taft IV, State Department Legal Advisor, quoted by Jane Mayer, "Outsourcing Torture," *The New Yorker*, 14 February 2005.

[14] George W. Bush, "Memorandum on the Humane Treatment of Al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees," 7 February 2002, in Greenberg and Dratel, eds., *The Torture Papers*, 134–135.

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prison and elsewhere are beyond the scope of this article.[15] It is important to note, however, that the determinations regarding the Geneva Conventions were part of a broader discussion about how to prosecute and interrogate suspected terrorists after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in New York City and Washington DC. Some of the panels investigating the abuses that occurred during interrogations in the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq have concluded that this combination of policies, starting with the suspension of the Geneva Conventions, contributed to the abuses that occurred.[16]

New Wars and New Warriors

The original Geneva Conventions were designed with a singular vision of war in mind, one fought primarily by the regular armies of established states. Wars of this type are clearly the exception now, not the rule. Wars conducted by conventional forces fall along a broader continuum of conflicts that ranges from world wars involving many state actors to guerilla-style skirmishes within a state's borders. Indeed, only four major interstate wars have occurred since 1990.[17] (See Table 1 for a list of ongoing inter- and intra-state wars in 2004.) The actors involved vary widely as well, since distinctions between soldiers and civilians have eroded in fluid conflict situations.

"New" Wars

Three variants of warfare, which often overlap, have been evident in recent years. First, civil wars broke out or were rediscovered by the international community as Cold War constraints were lifted. Often these resulted when one of the superpowers rescinded support for a leader with fragile domestic legitimacy, and as opposition groups gained newfound freedom to act. Ethnic grievances also have fueled civil conflicts. Their ethnic nature has fed the impression that these were chronic, insoluble struggles, and not subject to rational resolution.[18]

[15] For some recent analyses of these issues, see Jennifer K. Elsea, *Treatment of "Battlefield Detainees" in the War on Terrorism*, Congressional Research Service Report (hereafter CRS Report) RL 31367, 13 January 2005; Srivdhya Ragavan and Michael S. Mireles, Jr., "The Status of Detainees from the Iraq and Afghanistan Conflicts," *Utah Law Review* 2 (2005): 619–675; Jennifer K. Elsea, *U.S. Treatment of Prisoners in Iraq: Selected Legal Issues*, CRS Report RL 32395, 19 May 2005.

[16] Mark Danner, "Abu Ghraib: The Hidden Story," *New York Review of Books* 51 (7 October 2004): 44–50; "The Fay-Jones Report," August 2004, in Greenberg and Dratel, eds., *The Torture Papers*, 987–1131.

[17] The United States was involved in two, the 1991 and 2003 conflicts against Iraq; the others involved India and Pakistan, and Ethiopia and Eritrea. Some smaller conflicts like the Kargil conflict between India and Pakistan also fit this model. For an overview of conflict patterns since 1990, see "Appendix 3A. Patterns of Major Armed Conflicts, 1990-2003," *SIPRI Yearbook 2004* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2004).

[18] The best known statement of this view is Robert D. Kaplan, *Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993). For some critical discussions of the "ancient hatreds"

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TABLE 1

Inter-state and Intra-state Wars, 2005

Inter-state Wars	
Active	*Dormant or Cease-fire*
	Armenia-Azerbaijan
	Cyprus
	Ethiopia-Eritrea
	India-Pakistan
	Israel-Lebanon
	Israel-Syria (Golan Heights)
	North-South Korea
Intra-state Wars	
Active	*Dormant or Cease-fire*
Colombia	Afghanistan
Democratic Republic of Congo	Algeria
Ethiopia	Azerbaijan
Indonesia	Burundi
Iraq	Georgia
Israel	Mexico
Ivory Coast	Rwanda
Liberia	Somalia
Myanmar	Sri Lanka
Nepal	Sudan
Nigeria	Western Sahara
Pakistan	
Philippines	
Russian Federation	
Somalia	
Sudan	
Turkey	
Uganda	

Source: *2006 Chart of Conflict*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2006.

Second, failed states have become breeding grounds for conflict. The term "failed state" is generally used to refer to a state in which the power structure has broken down; the physical shell remains, but no central authority capable of providing law or governance exists.[19] Failed states stand in stark contrast to the Weberian state model, in which political authority is based on a legal system

argument, see V.P. Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia," *International Security* 19 (Winter 1994/1995): 130–166; John Mueller, "The Banality of 'Ethnic War,'" *International Security* 25 (Summer 2000): 42–70. See also Barbara F. Walter and Jack Snyder, eds., *Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999); Michael E. Brown, ed., *Ethnic Conflict and International Security* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).

[19] Daniel Thurer, "The 'Failed State' and International Law," *International Review of the Red Cross* 836 (December 1999): 731–761.

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applicable to all, carried out by a bureaucracy, and in which the government has a monopoly on the legitimate use of force over a given territory.[20] Failed states share several characteristics. They are subject to pervasive and intense violence that occurs at multiple levels: regime against society; rebels against regime; and criminals against all. The state cannot supply political goods, and has few functioning institutions; usually, only the executive branch works, but mainly to serve the ends of the ruler, not the population. The state's infrastructure deteriorates or is destroyed. Collapsed states are the most extreme form of failing states, in which there is almost a complete vacuum of political authority.[21] (See Table 2 for a breakdown of states considered to be failing, failed, or collapsed in 2003.)

Asymmetric wars are a third category of conflict prevalent today. Simply put, these are conflicts in which the capabilities of the warring parties are qualitatively different in nature. By virtue of its military superiority, the United States will find itself confronting less-able adversaries for the foreseeable future. The overwhelming dominance of American military forces was made starkly apparent during the first Gulf War in 1991, when U.S. and coalition forces decimated Iraq's sizable army with ease.[22] This superiority has only grown as the United States increasingly employs sophisticated weapons and communication systems, with the goal of ensuring dominance on the battlefield.[23] Precision-guided munitions were used in Kosovo and the recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq to improve targeting—and to reduce civilian casualties—and drones that can spot battlefield targets were employed for the first time in Afghanistan in 2001.

The consequence of U.S. superiority is that its opponents, both state and non-state actors, will have little choice but to resort to guerilla tactics and urban warfare, because they simply cannot confront U.S. forces head-on.[24] Terrorist tactics may indeed become more widespread, as has been seen in the Iraqi insurgency's campaign against U.S. troops since 2003. The terrorist tactics employed by al Qaeda, however, represent an additional dilemma. By employing both military and nonmilitary means in "idiosyncratic" ways, al Qaeda was able

[20] Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation" in H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds., *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1946), 77–83.

[21] This summary is based on Robert I. Rotberg, "The Failure and Collapse of Nation-States: Breakdown, Prevention, and Repair" in Robert I. Rotberg, ed., *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 2–21.

[22] On the U.S. victory in the Gulf War, see Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *The Generals' War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Co., 1995).

[23] Lawrence Freedman, *The Revolution in Strategic Affairs*, Adelphi Paper #318 (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1998), 33. See also Michael O'Hanlon, *Technological Change and the Future of Warfare* (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 2000).

[24] Groups resorting to guerilla tactics will face the quandary that if they want to claim POW protections under the Geneva Convention, they must be made clearly identifiable as members of a militia by wearing uniforms and carrying arms openly.

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TABLE 2

Failed or Failing States, 2003

Failing States	*Failed States*	*Collapsed States*
Colombia	Afghanistan	Somalia
Cote d'Ivoire	Burundi	
Indonesia	Democratic Republic of Congo	
Iraq	Liberia	
Nepal	Sierra Leone	
North Korea	Sudan	
Zimbabwe		

Source: Robert I. Rotberg, ed., *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004). As Rotberg notes, designating a state's status in this way provides only a snapshot. A state may move closer to failure if conditions worsen, or internal conditions may improve and the prospect of failure will recede.

to orchestrate an attack with catastrophic effects, and it and others will likely resort to such tactics again.[25]

One dynamic that many modern conflicts share is the element of criminality and economic gain involved. Some observers have seen a trend of economic exploitation and perpetuation of conflicts by warring groups seeking to enrich themselves.[26] Both of these occurred in Sierra Leone and Liberia. During the Balkan conflicts of the 1990s, criminals and thugs were recruited into the Serbian Army in Bosnia, and many of the paramilitary groups fighting alongside the army were led by criminals. These groups often resorted to massive violations of human rights as a way to achieve their ends; indeed, their main goals have been characterized as personal enrichment and "war crimes."[27]

As noted earlier, these "new" forms of warfare are better understood as a reversion to very old wars. One parallel may be war in early modern Europe, when warfare was "pervasive but undefined."[28] At the start of the seventeenth century, for example, swaths of territory in Europe were subject to vicious conflict that combined warfare and plunder, with little distinction made between civilian and soldier.[29] Another parallel can be seen in the asymmetries between

[25] Montgomery C. Meigs, "Unorthodox Thoughts about Asymmetric Warfare," *Parameters* 33 (Summer 2003): 4–18.

[26] Mats Berdal and David M. Malone, eds., *Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000).

[27] Mueller, "The Banality of 'Ethnic War,'" 47–58; see also Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999).

[28] Michael Mann notes that "the warlords in Somalia, Liberia or Zaire resemble the vast majority of political regimes throughout premodern history. They are not monsters but reflections of our own past." Michael Mann, "Nation-States in Europe and Other Continents: Diversifying, Developing, Not Dying," *Daedalus* 122 (Summer 1993): 136; quote from M.S. Anderson, *War and Society in Europe of the Old Regime, 1618-1789* (London: Fontana, 1988), 13–16.

[29] Michael Howard, *War in European History* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1976), 50.

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European military forces and those of the countries they colonized during the nineteenth century.[30] Some of the guerilla conflicts in the 1970s and 1980s were also asymmetric in capabilities.

Likewise, the links between economic gain, criminality, and warfare are hardly new. Wars have long been financed and outfitted by a range of entrepreneurs and military contractors, often with unsavory reputations. Indeed, the need to generate resources to sustain wars was one of the factors that led to the development and bureaucratization of states—and of modern standing armies in the service of the state.[31] Moreover, recent analyses suggest that economic motives alone are unlikely to drive a conflict, although they may contribute to the perpetuation of ongoing wars.[32]

The key point about current conflicts is that they represent a present and future form of war that is far removed from the archetype for which the Geneva Conventions were designed. The modern European model of war involving state armies of soldiers meeting on a battlefield is a rarity today. The war between Iran and Iraq in the 1980s may have been the last such major war.

New Warriors

Terrorists are a critical opponent confronting the United States and others, but they are not alone in falling outside the Geneva Conventions' assumptions about who soldiers are. Prominent among the combatants in modern wars are warlords, mercenaries, and children.

Warlords. Warlords often provide what little authority exists in collapsed and failed states—although they also may be to blame for the state's failure. In some cases, a single ruler uses control of a state's government to prey on the population and enrich himself.[33] Mobutu Sese Seko's thirty-two-year rule in Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo) epitomizes this model. Mobutu enriched himself while the state's infrastructure collapsed and the population grew ever poorer, despite the country's immense natural resource wealth.

[30] William H. McNeill, *The Pursuit of Power* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 256–261.

[31] Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1990* (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1990); Howard, *War in European History*, 38–74.

[32] Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman, eds., *The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003); Mats Berdal, "How 'New' are 'New Wars'? Global Economic Change and the Study of Civil War," *Global Governance* 9 (October/December 2003): 477–502.

[33] William Reno refers to this as a "shadow state." William Reno, "Warfare and State-building in Africa" in Diane E. Davis and Anthony W. Periera, eds., *Irregular Armed Forces and Their Role in Politics and State Formation* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 322–345.

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In other cases, tribal or clan leaders become local and regional warlords, and exercise authority in the absence of—or at the expense of—central government. Afghanistan, as a consequence of nearly thirty years of civil war, exemplifies a state in which multiple warlords compete for power. Both before and after the Taliban took control of the capital, Kabul, in 1996, authority over much of the country was divided among local and regional warlords. Prior to the 2001 U.S. invasion, Afghanistan was the regional hub and transit point of a "criminalized war economy" that served the needs of armed groups in several neighboring states.[34] Today, in spite of the Taliban's overthrow and the establishment of a new government, Afghanistan "has become a collection of warlord-run fiefs fueled by a multibillion-dollar opium economy."[35] Afghan President Hamid Karzai made a concerted effort in 2004 to challenge or co-opt the warlords, but his control over the country does not extend much beyond Kabul. In Afghanistan's October 2004 elections, some warlords consolidated their power by controlling the political parties contesting the election, and by intimidating voters.[36] The warlords' continued strength, and their desire to solidify their power was evident in Afghanistan's October 2005 parliamentary elections. About two hundred warlords ran for seats or put forward proxy candidates. Roughly half of the winning candidates are suspected of having links to various armed groups, and several prominent warlords won seats.[37]

The Afghan case is particularly problematic because the United States had a hand in its creation, by supporting different warring factions in their struggle against, first, the Soviet Union, and later, the Taliban. The United States turned to the Northern Alliance for assistance against the Taliban in the fall of 2001, and it continues to rely on local and regional warlords for help in its ongoing hunt for Osama Bin Laden, al Qaeda's leader, who is believed to be hiding in a mountainous region on the Afghanistan–Pakistan border.[38]

Warlords and failed states matter because the lawlessness of such territories—and the self-enrichment goals of these leaders—makes them attractive to terrorists as havens from international law. Liberia's Charles

[34] Barnett R. Rubin, "The Political Economy of War and Peace in Afghanistan," Center on International Cooperation, June 1999, accessed at www.institute-for-afghan-studies.org/ECONOMY/political_economy_of_war_peace.htm, 10 May 2005.

[35] J. Alexander Thier, "Afghanistan I: Back to Warlords and Opium," *International Herald Tribune*, 24 September 2004.

[36] "Human Rights Overview: Afghanistan," *Human Rights Watch World Report 2005*, 13 January 2005, accessed on the website of Human Rights Watch at http://www.hrw.org/, 27 April 2005.

[37] Daniel Cooney, "Afghan Election Staffers Fired for Fraud," *Washington Post*, 16 October 2005; Porter Barron, "Afghanistan Struggles to Keep Warlords Off the Ballot," *Christian Science Monitor*, 8 September 2005.

[38] Laura Neack, "Peacekeeping, Bloody Peacekeeping," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 60 (July/August 2004): 40–47.

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Taylor, for example, was willing to shelter terrorists in the 1990s in return for financial compensation. These included high-level al Qaeda operatives, who also exploited Liberia's diamond market to convert financial resources into untraceable assets.[39] To be sure, completely collapsed states such as Somalia do not provide good terrorist havens, because infighting among clans, and the absence of foreigners in such states, due to their isolation and lawlessness, prevent terrorists from blending in. Collapsed states nonetheless remain potential transit zones, and warlord-run states like Liberia under Taylor, with multi-ethnic communities and thriving criminal economies, remain inviting havens.[40]

Mercenaries and private security companies. Mercenaries, long a staple of warfare, have also reemerged prominently in modern wars.[41] The classic image of the mercenary is the "soldier of fortune," willing to fight in any conflict if the price is right. Mercenaries are active in a wide range of conflicts, and they have been joined by private security companies that offer a range of security services to governments and individuals. Some companies offer front-line troops that could be likened to mercenaries, but the majority provide services ranging from military training to troop support and infrastructure.

Although a broad range of factors fueled the growth in this industry in the 1990s, two are worth noting. First, the Cold War's end and subsequent military downsizing created a large pool of former soldiers with marketable military skills. Second, particularly in the United States, the push toward privatization of "non-core" government functions led to the contracting out of tasks considered outside the military's core mission.[42] Executive Outcomes (EO), a now-defunct company made up of former South African military officers, gained notoriety for the industry, while Great Britain's Sandline International, and Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI), based in Virginia, exemplify the more respectable corporate model. EO gained attention in the 1990s for its work for the governments of Angola and Sierra Leone. From 1993 to 1996, 500 EO employees protected oil fields and trained

[39] Douglas Farah, "A Volatile Mix: Non-State Actors and Criminal States," Center for American Progress, 5 October 2004, accessed on the website of the Center for American Progress at www.americanprogress.org, 2 May 2005.

[40] Ken Menkhaus, *Somalia: State Collapse and the Threat of Terrorism* (New York: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2004).

[41] Prior to the rise of mass armies motivated by nationalism, mercenaries were a regular feature of wars in Europe and elsewhere. See, among others, Anthony Mockler, *The Mercenaries* (New York: Macmillan, 1970); Janice E. Thomson, *Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994).

[42] Deborah D. Avant, *The Market For Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 30–35; P.W. Singer, *Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003), 49–60.

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soldiers for the Angolan army. In Sierra Leone, EO helped the army defend the capital city against attacks by the Revolutionary United Front in 1995. Notably, the Sierra Leone example shows that private security companies, as well as states, can conduct asymmetric wars.[43]

Reliance on private security firms is not merely a third-world phenomenon—or one that is limited to governments. The Croatian government, with U.S. encouragement, hired MPRI to train its army in the 1990s. This aid is credited with helping Croatian forces defeat Bosnian Serb forces in an offensive in the summer of 1995, which helped bring the Serbs to the negotiating table at Dayton. And virtually all parties in the conflict in Colombia, including rebels, drug traffickers, and landowners, are believed to have hired various private military firms.[44]

Nor is the use of private security companies unique to small states; far from it. The United States now relies so heavily on contractors that it "cannot go to war without contractors."[45] Increasingly, the DOD turns to private contractors as a way to free military forces for combat-related tasks. The Pentagon can also bypass congressionally mandated limits on how many military personnel it can deploy to certain regions by hiring contractors. In October 2004, for example, Congress approved an increase in the number of U.S. military personnel that could be deployed in Colombia—and also allowed the number of U.S. citizens working for private firms employed by the military to increase by half, from 400 to 600. U.S. soldiers and private contractors work together in Colombia to develop and analyze intelligence, to conduct surveillance, and to train Colombian troops in counter-guerilla operations.[46] The line between civilian contractors and military forces can be quite blurry. In Colombia, corporations supply pilots for planes tasked with spraying coca fields as part of the war on drugs; they are paid by the State Department and the Pentagon.[47]

The use of contractors is even more widespread in Iraq. Private contractors with now familiar names like Kellogg, Brown and Root and Bechtel do everything from running mess halls to flying planes. They also provide key support for weapons systems, including maintaining and reloading weapons during combat operations. Private contractors have been killed and captured by insurgents in Iraq, raising questions about the protections they are guaranteed under the Geneva Conventions. Moreover, private contractors were at the center of the abuse scandal at Abu Ghraib (see discussion below).

[43] David Shearer, "Outsourcing War," *Foreign Policy* 112 (Fall 1998): 68–81; Singer, *Corporate Warriors*, 4.

[44] Singer, *Corporate Warriors*, 14, 173–74.

[45] Colonel Kevin Cunningham, as cited by Avant, *The Market for Force*, 115.

[46] Juan Forero, "Congress Approves Doubling U.S. Troops in Colombia to 800," *New York Times*, 11 October 2004.

[47] Nelson D. Schwartz, "The Pentagon's Private Army," *Fortune*, 17 March 2003, 100.

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Children. Children also have become combatants in conflicts around the world, with their presence "the rule, not a rarity now."[48] The UN estimates that 300,000 children are serving as soldiers in conflicts in at least thirty-two countries. Girls are almost as likely as boys to be pulled into combat, and not just in support roles.[49] Many of the children currently in combat are under eighteen, the age internationally accepted as the line between children and adults, but some are younger than fifteen or even thirteen.[50]

Children are appearing more frequently in combat for three reasons. First, the chaos that results from failed states, civil wars, and disasters or disease creates a larger pool of available recruits. Indeed, there were reports that insurgents were scouting for potential "recruits" in refugee camps after the December 2004 tsunami that struck Southeast Asia.[51] Second, the weapons of choice in most "new wars" are small arms and light weapons. Not only are these weapons cheap, but they are light enough for children to carry, and simple enough for them to learn to use.[52] Third, the changes in the nature of conflict discussed above encourage the exploitation of children in battle. Warlords and other insurgent leaders often see children as "low-cost and expendable" foot soldiers. They often do not understand the risks they face and, particularly if brutalized as most child soldiers are, are quite obedient and will carry out very dangerous tasks, including suicide missions.[53]

Children are now involved as fighters in almost all of the conflicts where U.S. troops are deployed. Terrorists, too, rely on children to carry out missions. As a consequence, U.S. and other Western troops face the challenge of learning how to fight in conflicts in which they may face children with guns. See Table 3 for a list of conflicts in which children are used as combatants by state or non-state actors.

[48] P.W. Singer, "Too Young to Kill," *Newhouse News Service*, 9 January 2005.

[49] Dyan Mazurana and Susan McKay, "Child Soldiers: What About the Girls?" *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 57 (September/October 2001): 30–35.

[50] The "Convention on the Rights of the Child," Part I, Art. 1, states that "a child means every human being below the age of eighteen years unless under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier." Singer points out that eighteen is a long-standing international legal standard accepted by 190 countries on the basis of historical precedent; Convention accessed at www.unicef.org/crc.fulltext.htm, 25 February 2005; Singer, "Too Young to Kill."

[51] "Tigers Recruit 40 Child Soldiers Since Tsunamis," *Agence France Presse*, 26 January 2005. These reasons are delineated by P.W. Singer, "Western Militaries Confront Child Soldiers Threat," *Jane's Intelligence Review* 17 (January 2005), accessed at http://www.brook.edu/views/articles/fellows/singer20050115.htm, 28 March 2005.

[52] On the trade in small arms, see Kathi Austin, "Hearts of Darkness," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 55 (January/February 1999): 34–37; Jeffrey Boutwell and Michael T. Klare, "A Scourge of Small Arms," *Scientific American* 282 (June 2000): 30–35; Lora Lumpe, ed., *Running Guns: The Global Black Market in Small Arms* (London: Zed Books, 2000).

[53] Mike Wessels, "Child Soldiers," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 53 (November/December 1997): 32–39.

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TABLE 3

*Conflicts Involving Child Soldiers**

Forces Employing Children, 2000–2001

Governments	*Paramilitary Organizations*	*Armed Opposition Groups*	
Afghanistan	Afghanistan	Afghanistan	Papua New Guinea
Angola	Algeria	Algeria	Peru
Burundi	Colombia	Angola	Philippines
Chad	East Timor	Burundi	Republic of Congo
Democratic Republic of Congo	India	Colombia	Russian Federation
Eritrea	Indonesia	Democratic Republic of Congo	Rwanda
Ethiopia	Mexico	*East Timor*	Sierra Leone
Iran	*Sierra Leone*	India	*Solomon Islands*
Iraq	Somalia	Indonesia	Somalia
Israel and Occupied Territories	Sudan	Iran	Sri Lanka
Myanmar	Yugoslavia (former Republic of)	Iraq	Sudan
Republic of Congo		Israel and Occupied Territories	Tajikistan
Rwanda		Lebanon	Turkey
Sierra Leone		Mexico	Uganda
Somalia		Myanmar	Uzbekistan
Sudan		Nepal	Yugslavia (former Republic of)
Uganda		Pakistan	

* If children are employed by more than one type of group, the state appears in multiple columns.

Source: "World Map of Child Soldiers, 2000/2001," http://www.un.org/works/goingon/soldiers/childsoldiermap.html.

Child soldiers must nonetheless be considered victims in these conflicts. Children are not able to "choose" to participate in conflicts in the way that adults do, because they cannot understand the dangers or consequences of their actions.[54] Moreover, often they are not given the choice. Children involved in conflicts have often been abducted and forced to fight, or drugged. The Lords Resistance Army in Uganda, for example, has abducted over 14,000 children over about a ten-year period, and abduction is common in other conflicts.[55] Children may also join rebel groups in order to survive, because they are starving or their parents have been killed. Finally, nearly everywhere that girls are abducted into conflicts, they are raped, and often they are given to commanders as sexual slaves.[56]

[54] The U.S. Supreme Court decision abolishing the death penalty for offenders under the age of eighteen was based in part on medical and scientific evidence that "children" are too immature to understand the consequences of their actions, as adults would be expected to do. Charles Lane, "5–4 Supreme Court Abolishes Juvenile Executions," *Washington Post*, 2 March 2005.

[55] Singer, "Western Militaries Confront Child Soldiers Threat," 2.

[56] Mazurana and McKay, "Child Soldiers," 32.

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The Utility of the Geneva Conventions

Two issues deserve attention in considering the relevance of the Geneva Conventions to today's complex spectrum of war. First, how do the Conventions as they currently stand relate to the challenges of new wars and new warriors? Second, why should the United States care about upholding or expanding the Conventions?

Changing Warfare and the Geneva Conventions

Several points are worth making about the Geneva Conventions and "new" wars. First, the laws of war have no geographic boundaries; they apply in all places and conflicts. The ICRC has also pointed out that "as a matter of law, there can be no wars in which one side has all the rights and the other has none."[57] The 1977 APs were adopted in part to reinforce the universality of the laws of war, and to encourage non-state groups to adhere to the Geneva Conventions. Some states, including the United States, objected to this implied recognition of insurgent groups and worried that Protocol I's language would allow guerillas to operate in civilian populations without distinctive uniforms and still claim combatant status.[58] But the goal of the APs was to reinforce the Conventions' proscriptions on warfare in all conflicts, particularly with regard to non-combatants, and to reaffirm that "even legitimate ends do not justify certain means."[59] The problem is not an absence of legal guidelines protecting those caught up conflicts, but that these are not respected by either states or non-state groups.

Moreover, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, a core human rights treaty, prohibits abuses against "all persons deprived of their liberty."[60] Although in its ratification of the Covenant in 1992, the United States interpreted the clauses about acceptable punishment according to standards in the U.S. Constitution, it accepts that "no derogation is permitted" from key rules regarding the treatment of prisoners.[61] Even "illegal combatants" would be protected by the Covenant.

Second, international law does not support the U.S. government's argument that a state's "failed" status justifies suspending the Geneva Conventions. The very notion of a failed state has no meaning in international law. Even

[57] International Committee of the Red Cross, "International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts," Geneva, September 2003, accessed on the website of the International Committee of the Red Cross at www.icrc.org, 13 May 2005.

[58] Abraham D. Sofaer, "Terrorism and the Law," *Foreign Affairs* 64 (Summer 1986): 901–922.

[59] M. Cherif Bassiouni, "Legal Control of International Terrorism" in Charlotte Ku and Paul F. Diehl, eds., *International Law: Classic and Contemporary Readings* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003), 319.

[60] Accessed at http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm, 12 October 2005.

[61] Elsea, *U.S. Treatment of Prisoners in Iraq*, 12.

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states that are virtually shells retain their international legal rights and territorial integrity.[62] In large part, this reflects the aim of ensuring the stability of the international system based on sovereign state members. Moreover, it is easier to maintain the existing state when trying to sort out the problems that accompany internal collapse, because often, residual national sentiment may help in reviving the state, and preserving the state's borders mitigates the danger of intervention by neighboring states.[63]

Afghanistan is notable in this regard. Throughout the 1990s, the United States, the UN, and other international bodies accorded Afghanistan its rights as a sovereign member of the international community. The UN refused to acknowledge the Taliban, however, although it controlled much of Afghanistan's territory after 1996, and instead continued to recognize Afghanistan's previous President, Burhanuddin Rabbani, as its legitimate ruler. More importantly, UN and U.S. recognition took little notice of the fact that neither the Taliban nor its immediate predecessors were able to provide state services or authority in Afghan territory.

New warriors are also protected by the Geneva Conventions. Authorized civilian contractors supporting military operations are entitled to POW status under Geneva Convention III.[64] This has proven problematic in practice, however, because contractors may fall through the cracks in terms of legal jurisdiction. For example, three U.S. contractors conducting a surveillance mission in Colombia have been held hostage there since late 2003. The guerillas that captured them refer to them as prisoners of war, but the U.S. government calls them simply U.S. citizens.[65]

The Coalition Provisional Authority that governed Iraq from May 2003 until the handover to the interim Iraqi government in June 2004 stipulated that contractors would be subject to the laws of their home country, rather than to Iraqi law. U.S. legislation charged the Secretary of Defense with initiating prosecutions against contractors accused of violating laws. But unlike soldiers, private contractors are not required to uphold the Geneva Conventions, and it has proven difficult to hold contractors accountable for their actions.[66]

Uniform regulatory standards for private security companies do not exist. The United States licenses U.S. firms operating abroad under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), an implementation mechanism for U.S. export control laws. ITAR has proven unwieldy, however,

[62] Ben N. Dunlap, "State Failure and the Use of Force in the Age of Global Terror," *Boston College International and Comparative Law Review* (Spring 2004): 453–475; Thurer, "The 'Failed State,'" 731–761.

[63] Reno, "Warfare and State-building," 342.

[64] Geneva Convention III, Article 4 (4), accessed at http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/genevaconventions, 22 June 2005.

[65] Avant, *The Market for Force*, 233.

[66] Ibid., 231–232.

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because the offices and agencies involved in oversight are case dependent, and because firms have been able to avoid oversight by keeping their contracts under the $50 million threshold at which ITAR approval is required or by splitting larger contracts into smaller pieces.[67] Some other states, including South Africa and several European states, have also begun to regulate private security companies. These regulations differ significantly from country to country.[68]

In theory, the DOD can prosecute civilian employees for crimes under the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA), passed in 2000. MEJA has faced few tests, however, because it took effect only in September of 2004. Moreover, until late 2004, it applied only to DOD employees.[69] In Abu Ghraib, the private contractors supervising interrogations were hired by the Central Intelligence Agency, and other contractors have been hired by the Department of the Interior, rather than the DOD.[70] One contractor was accused of raping a male prisoner, but was not charged because he was not subject to military law. A U.S. military officer investigating the Abu Ghraib scandal noted that "we had no jurisdiction over him. It was left up to the contractor on how to deal with him." Many of the interrogators were employees of companies like CACI International and the Titan Corporation, U.S.-based defense contractors that specialize in information and intelligence. To date, none of these contractors have been prosecuted.[71]

Iraq is not the only place where military contractors apparently violated the Geneva Conventions. The United States hired contractors from DynCorp to train police forces in Bosnia, and some of DynCorp's personnel were accused of owning women and girls as young as fourteen. DynCorp executives

[67] P.W. Singer, "War, Profits, and the Vacuum of Law: Privatized Military Firms and International Law," *Columbia Journal of Transnational Law* 42 (2004): 522–549.

[68] Fred Schreier and Marina Caparini, *Privatising Security: Law, Practice and Governance of Private Military and Security Companies* (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces, March 2005), 103–115; Avant, *The Market for Force*, 143–177.

[69] *Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000*, Public Law 106-523 (22 November 2000, 2488–2492); Jonathan Groner, "Untested Law Key in Iraqi Abuse Scandal," *Legal Times*, 11 May 2004, accessed at www.law.com, 7 April 2005; "Private Military Contractors and the Law," *Human Rights Watch*, 21 October 2004, accessed on the website of Human Rights Watch at http://www.hrw.org/, 8 April 2005.

[70] In light of the scandal, the U.S. Army stopped hiring contractors through the Department of the Interior, and moved these contracts back to DOD. David Phinney, "Torture for Profit," *Guerilla News Network*, 21 September 2004, accessed at gnn.tv/articles/110/Torture_for_Profit, 8 April 2005.

[71] Julian Borger, "US Military in Torture Scandal," *The Guardian*, 30 April 2004. *The Guardian* printed a correction on 15 May 2004, noting that Titan Corporation claims to provide only interpreters to the U.S. military, not interrogators. According to the Fay Report, an Army investigation into the Abu Ghraib scandal, the Department of Defense referred cases of abuse by civilian contractors to the Department of Justice. "The Fay-Jones Report," 989.

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insist that these employees were fired, but there is no evidence that they or the U.S. government was held legally accountable.[72]

Finally, children are accorded all the rights and protections of non-combatants in the Geneva Conventions. Moreover, the Convention on the Rights of the Child commits states to "take all feasible measures to ensure that persons who have not attained the age of fifteen years do not take part in hostilities," and that children under fifteen will not be recruited into state armed forces.[73] The UN General Assembly adopted an optional protocol to this Convention in May 2000 that urged states to raise the minimum age of recruitment to eighteen years and explicitly proscribed the use of children under eighteen by non-state armed groups.[74]

The United States, however, has held juveniles at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. Several children between the ages of thirteen and sixteen were apparently incarcerated at Guantanamo Bay in 2003. One of the victims in the abuse scandals at Abu Ghraib was in his "mid-teens," and an army sergeant pleaded guilty in 2004 to killing a seriously wounded Iraqi teenager.[75]

The Geneva Conventions and the U.S. War on Terrorism

Upholding the Geneva Conventions and other guidelines will help the United States fight terrorism for three reasons. First, the Geneva Conventions protect American soldiers and civilians. Maintaining the Conventions means that those who harm U.S. soldiers or citizens abroad can be arrested and prosecuted. Without this precedent, other states are less likely to accord U.S. soldiers and military contractors the protections the Conventions provide, should they be captured. Tolerating "gray areas" with regard to protection and human dignity, as the administration's judgments about the Geneva Conventions and interrogation techniques do, creates an environment in which others can do the same. The Department of State's representatives emphasized this point in contesting the administration's decision to suspend the Conventions, as did Brig-

[72] One of those accused admitted to having purchased a young woman. The only DynCorp employee who was punished, however, was the whistle-blower, who was fired. Human Rights Watch, "Hopes Betrayed: Trafficking of Women and Girls to Post Conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina for Forced Prostitution," *Human Rights Watch* 14 (November 2002): 17, 62–68; Kelly Patricia O'Meara, "DynCorp Disgrace," *Insight Magazine*, 14 January 2002, accessed at http://www.truthout.org/docs_01/02.24C.DynCorp.Disgrace.htm, 10 May 2005.

[73] Article 38, "Convention on the Rights of the Child."

[74] "Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict," UN General Assembly resolution A/RES/54/263, 25 May 2000. The U.S. was among the first states to ratify this Protocol, and it is also a signatory of the Convention on the Rights of the Child.

[75] "Children in Guantanamo: Letter from Amnesty International to President Bush," 24 April 2003, accessed at www.amnesty.nl/artikelen/NK-ART0331.shtml, 25 February 2005; Borger, "US Military in Torture Scandal"; "More Than 100 Die in U.S. Custody in Iraq," *Associated Press*, 16 March 2005.

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adier General Mark Kimmitt after Abu Ghraib: "If we can't hold ourselves up as an example of how to treat people with dignity and respect, we can't ask that other nations do that to our soldiers."[76]

Second, combating terrorism requires multilateral collaboration, and the Geneva Conventions provide a foundation for building international cooperation. At their core, the Conventions are based on the belief that certain means can never be justified, however important the end goals are believed to be. To win the war against terrorism, the United States must delegitimate the means terrorists use. It can only succeed in making this case if it holds itself to widely accepted standards of behavior. The United States lost the moral high ground in the "trickle down" effect of the Geneva Conventions' suspension in Guantanamo Bay and Afghanistan that led to the images of abuse at Abu Ghraib.[77] To regain at least some of this lost ground, U.S. leaders—and the military—must ensure that prisoners and civilians of all sorts are treated humanely, wherever they are held.

At the local level, defeating terrorists or groups using terrorist tactics requires gaining popular support and trust by creating a stable and secure environment for the communities in which terrorists seek to hide, including chronic war zones and failed states. Only then will local populations help identify potential troublemakers. This demands both scrupulous efforts to adhere to the rule of law and the minimal use of force.[78] The Geneva Conventions provide guidelines for the behavior of occupying powers, which can reinforce domestic laws or stand in for them where no laws exist.

Third, those who are the victims—and even the perpetrators—of the range of wars that abound today deserve the basic protections afforded by the Geneva Conventions and other international laws. This is the underlying logic of the Conventions.

These arguments are both principled and pragmatic. To achieve greater security for Americans, the United States must demonstrate that it cares about the safety of people in states on the front line in the struggle against terrorism. This is most likely to gain their cooperation. Moreover, the United States must affirm the basic values that define "who we are," as Senator John McCain notes.[79] Upholding international standards is one way to make clear that the United States supports security for all.

[76] Colin Powell, "Memorandum to Counsel to the President," 26 January 2002; William H. Taft IV, "Memorandum to Counsel to the President," 2 February 2002; both in Greenberg and Dratel, eds., *The Torture Papers*, 122–125, 129–133; Borger, "US Military in Torture Scandal."

[77] Andrew Sullivan, "Atrocities in Plain Sight," *New York Times*, 23 January 2005; "Abu Ghraib General Says Told Prisoners 'Like Dogs,'" *Reuters*, 15 June 2004.

[78] General Sir Michael Rose, "The Perils of Peacekeeping and Nation Building," (paper presented at Maxwell School, Syracuse University, 26 April 2005).

[79] "Statement of Senator John McCain Amendment on Army Field Manual," 25 July 2005 accessed at http://mccain.senate.gov/index.cfm?fuseaction=NewsCenter.ViewPressRelease&Content_id=1595, 27 September 2005.

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Guidelines for Conflict in the Twenty-first Century

In hearings on his nomination to be attorney general, Alberto Gonzales argued that "we are fighting a new type of enemy and a new type of war," and suggested that it might be appropriate to revisit the Geneva Conventions. At the same time, he acknowledged that the basic principles of the Conventions regarding "decent treatment of human beings" remained unquestioned.[80]

To ensure the cooperation that it needs to pursue terrorists, and to regain the high ground in this fight, the United States should lead the way, as Gonzales suggested, in creating a stronger framework to protect people from the dangers they face in conflict zones and lawless societies. However, the problem of modern war is broader than the administration's focus on terrorism, and it demands a more comprehensive approach. The Geneva Conventions' protections of human dignity should serve as a baseline. As a first step, the United States should ensure that its own policies and actions promote "decent treatment of human beings." It should then encourage the strengthening and extension, where needed, of existing international guidelines for conflict.

U.S. Policies

For the principled and pragmatic reasons noted above, the U.S. government should ensure that its soldiers and civilians adhere to the Geneva Conventions and other laws of war. This will help to preserve the protections provided by the Conventions, and this is the strategy most likely to establish the trust needed to engender cooperation against terrorists. The military consistently trains its soldiers on their obligations, and most uphold these as a matter of course. But Abu Ghraib is one end of a spectrum of ill treatment in Iraq; U.S. soldiers casually breaking Coke bottles over Iraqi citizens' heads also violates "decent treatment," and needlessly alienates the population.[81]

First, the U.S. government must reinforce domestic and international laws protecting basic rights. The U.S. military did not weaken its guidelines regarding the Geneva Conventions in Afghanistan or Iraq, in spite of the policy modifications at the highest levels. The President should affirm this position, and state clearly that the Geneva Conventions apply to all combat situations and to all prisoners in these conflicts. In late 2004, the DOD retracted the more permissive guidelines for interrogation that were established in 2002, and new Army guidelines for interrogation were adopted in April 2005.[82] This is a step in the right direction. The U.S. Congress' passage of Senator McCain's amendment to the 2006 Defense Appropriations Bill, which makes the Army Field

[80] Peter Wallsten, "Geneva Convention Overhaul Considered," *Los Angeles Times*, 7 January 2005.

[81] Bob Herbert, "From 'Gook' to 'Raghead,'" *New York Times*, 2 May 2005.

[82] Eric Schmitt, "In New Manual, Army Limits Tactics in Interrogation," *New York Times*, 28 April 2005.

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Manual the standard guideline for interrogation practices for all DOD detainees and prohibits "cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment" of anyone in U.S. government custody, is another important step. The President diluted the intent of this amendment, however, in a "signing statement" that declared he would honor the amendment only if it did not interfere with his presidential powers.[83] The President and his subordinates must publicly reaffirm the national and international laws that prohibit torture and prisoner abuse. Simply stating that the United States does not condone torture will not ameliorate the damage caused by Abu Ghraib if the United States fails to ensure legal accountability for this abuse.

Legal scholars are currently debating the question of when torture or coercive interrogation techniques may be justified, particularly in situations where a "ticking time bomb" may raise ethical questions about saving lives.[84] I will leave this task to them. It is important to note, though, that easing the regulations on appropriate treatment of prisoners, as the Bush administration did, can have corrosive effects.

Second, the United States should strengthen and, where necessary, modify U.S. laws to ensure that U.S. civilians accused of committing abuses while supporting U.S. war or peace efforts can be investigated and, when appropriate, prosecuted. The MEJA was amended to cover contractors hired by other federal agencies in late 2004. Although questions remain about what the wording of the new law covers, this is a good start.[85] Now the military must use it, and make clear to victims in other countries that the United States will hold its citizens accountable for their actions.

For MEJA or similar laws to be effective, commanders in the field must have the authority to ensure, and take responsibility for ensuring that civilian contractors suspected of violating laws are investigated or prosecuted. This will require clarifying jurisdiction when contractors are working overseas, and follow-up. Contractors cannot be allowed simply to send employees home if they are caught breaking laws, as has happened in the past. The firms should be held responsible; if they obstruct efforts to investigate or prosecute their employees, then they should be fined or made ineligible for future government contracts. The point is that such contractors are the public face of the United States overseas. As one former contractor noted, the local population where some abuses occurred "think we're all trash. It's a shame. When I was there as a

[83] Eric Schmitt, "Senate Moves to Protect Military Prisoners Despite Veto Threat," *New York Times*, 6 October 2005.

[84] See, for example, Philip B. Heymann and Juliette N. Kayyem, *Preserving Security and Democratic Freedoms in the War on Terrorism*, John F. Kennedy School of Government, 2004, accessed at the website of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at www.ksg.harvard.edu/bscia/longterm legalstrategy, 4 April 2005.

[85] Glenn R. Schmitt, "Amending the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000: Rushing to Close an Unforseen Loophole," *Army Lawyer* (June 2005): 41–48.

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soldier they loved us, but [company] employees have changed how they think about us. I tried to tell them that this is not how all Americans act, but it's hard to convince them when you see what they're seeing."[86]

International Guidelines

In addition to affirming the Geneva Conventions, the United States also should lead the development of a broader framework of protections that addresses the full scope of new conflicts. This effort should reinforce the universally shared values that are at the core of the Geneva Conventions and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights.[87] The key to any effort, however, is ensuring enforcement.

A central problem in many conflict zones is the difficulty of distinguishing soldiers from civilians; from the U.S. perspective, this problem is most acute when trying to spot terrorists before they act. Local support is vital to identifying terrorists, so policies to engender local cooperation should be pursued. This is best accomplished by establishing stability, so that people can live normal lives. Three steps will help this effort. First, the United States and the international community should promote respect for the laws of war in all conflict zones, by all parties. As it has done in cases such as Cambodia, the international community should make clear to insurgent groups (like the Khmer Rouge) and governments that violations of basic rights will lead to isolation and sanctions.[88] Indeed, the United States could propose the provision of military assistance to the parties to a conflict that pledge to respect the laws of war, and abide by their pledge.[89]

Notably, regional organizations have an important role to play in enforcing international laws and basic rights. There is a precedent in efforts by some regional organizations to promote good governance. The African Union (AU), for example, has established the African Peer Review Mechanism to monitor whether member states maintain what the AU considers appropriate standards regarding governance and the rule of law.[90] The AU's condemnation of the February 2005 coup that placed Faure Gnassingbé in power in Togo after his father's death helped pressure the new government into holding an election in

[86] O'Meara, "DynCorp Disgrace."

[87] On efforts to ensure that this document reflected universally held values, see Mary Ann Glendon, "Knowing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights," *Notre Dame Law Review* 73 (May 1998): 1153–1189.

[88] Although sanctions are often controversial, they can be effective if narrow and targeted. See David Cortwright and George A. Lopez, *The Sanctions Decade: Assessing UN Strategies in the 1990s* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000); Meghan L. O'Sullivan, *Shrewd Sanctions: Statecraft and State Sponsors of Terrorism* (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003).

[89] I thank an anonymous reviewer for raising this point.

[90] Jakkie Cilliers, "NEPAD's Peer Review Mechanism," *Institute for Security Studies Occasional Paper* 64 (November 2002): 1–9.

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April 2005, which Gnassingbé won.[91] Similarly, Serbia's desire to join the European Union has led to an increase in arrests of war crimes suspects in the last year.[92] The United States should encourage regional organizations to enforce similar standards with regard to the Geneva Conventions.

Second, international regulation of private security firms is needed to protect civilians and contractors; this is a global industry. The United States should take the lead in developing international standards, and in ensuring that its contractors uphold them.[93] These rules should ensure that contractors cannot exploit loopholes in jurisdiction if they commit crimes. Concurrently, the Geneva Conventions' protections for civilian contractors working with militaries should be reinforced.

Two options that have been proposed recently are voluntary codes of conduct for private security firms, and a UN database of private security firms, modeled along the lines of the UN Register of Conventional Arms, that could vet firms according to their professionalism and adherence to international law.[94] Each of these has merit; indeed, private security companies involved in peacekeeping operations created the International Peace Operations Association to promote self-regulation and ensure respect for humanitarian law, including the Geneva Conventions.[95] It is worth noting, however, that codes of corporate responsibility have often been promoted by corporations seeking to avoid state or international regulation. Moreover, the UK recently moved to national regulation after efforts at self-regulation by British private security firms failed.[96] The effectiveness of such codes in the private security sphere will depend on whether the market is truly competitive, and whether states, the main clients for their services, will hold companies to their commitments when national security concerns are at stake.

Third, international law already provides clear rules regarding the use of child soldiers that should be enforced. The United States has ratified the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which requires states to do all they can to keep children from active participation in combat; it should do more to encourage its enforcement. Additionally, enlisting children under fifteen in the military or using them in combat is a war crime under the statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). In spite of U.S. objections to

[91] Lydia Polgreen, "African Nations to Step Up Pressure on New Togo Ruler," *New York Times*, 21 February 2005. The election was marred by violence, but most observers, including the United States, urged all parties to form a unity government after the elections. Bryan Mealer, "Togo Elections Spark Violent Protests," *Associated Press*, 27 April 2005.

[92] Nicholas Wood, "Serbia Acts on War Crimes to Strengthen Ties to West," *New York Times*, 25 April 2005.

[93] Singer, *Corporate Warriors*, 240–242.

[94] Avant, *The Market for Force*, 186–188; Schreier and Caparini, *Privatising Security*, 116.

[95] Accessed at http://www.ipoaonline.org/, 6 October 2005.

[96] Schreier and Caparini, *Privatising Security*, 115.

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the Court, it recently accepted the ICC as an appropriate venue for prosecuting war crimes in Sudan, so long as prosecutions are requested by the UN Security Council.[97] The United States could signal its acceptance in principle of using the ICC against any armed group that employs children in conflicts. Similarly, the United States could promote further measures explicitly to criminalize the use of child soldiers by sanctioning companies or countries that support insurgents that exploit child soldiers.

Failed and failing states present another critical issue. Not only may they provide havens for terrorists, but the wars that arise in failed states such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Afghanistan often degenerate into humanitarian catastrophes that require substantial help from the international community, as the examples of Somalia and Haiti in the 1990s show.[98] The international community cannot resolve the problems facing all failed states, but it should seek creative solutions to the security problems state failure engenders.

A range of options have been proposed to address the problem of failed states, including some that involve establishing at least partial international control over the territory of failed states through shared sovereignty or trusteeships.[99] Alternatively, if a sub-state actor is providing the functions of government, even if its efforts cover only part of the territory of a failed state, the international community might choose to acknowledge this, and work with it.[100] Respect for the Geneva Conventions and other laws of war could be criteria for supporting would-be rulers. Notably, recommendations for reforming UN peacekeeping operations include provisions for developing an interim legal code that could be used to regulate polities in transition, prior to the reestablishment of local legal and constitutional frameworks.[101] Such measures would enhance international security by eliminating lawless territories and creating a more secure environment for local populations.

Confronting Terrorism

Strengthening the Geneva Conventions will not weaken U.S. efforts to fight terrorism; just the reverse. The United States long has sought to define itself in

[97] Warren Hoge, "U.N. Votes to Send Any Sudan War Crime Suspects to World Court," *New York Times*, 1 April 2005; Warren Hoge, "International War-Crimes Prosecutor Gets Lists of 51 Sudan Suspects," *New York Times*, 5 April 2005.

[98] On the costs to the international community of failed states, see Marina Ottaway and Stefan Mair, "States at Risk and Failed States," *Policy Outlook* (September 2004): 1–9.

[99] James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Neotrusteeship and the Problem of Weak States," *International Security* 28 (Spring 2004): 5–43; Stephen D. Krasner, "The Case for Shared Sovereignty," *Journal of Democracy* 16 (January 2005): 69–83.

[100] Jeffrey Herbst, "Let Them Fail: State Failure in Theory and Practice" in Rotberg, ed., *When States Fail*, 311–316; Ottaway and Mair, "States at Risk," 7–8.

[101] "Report of the Panel on UN Peacekeeping Operations," (Brahimi Report), August 2000, accessed at http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/, 23 October 2005.

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foreign policy by the promotion of liberal values, including respect for human rights and basic human dignity, the core elements of the Conventions. President Bush insists that "America will always stand firm for the non-negotiable demands of human dignity: the rule of law; limits on the power of the state; respect for women; private property; free speech; equal justice; and religious tolerance."[102] Unless these declarations are backed up in practice, they will only engender cynicism and resistance.

Terrorist groups such as al Qaeda have repeatedly violated the Geneva Conventions by targeting civilians. Stronger U.S. support for the Conventions will not change this—but it will reinforce the stark differences between the two.

Moreover, the Geneva Conventions recognize that some of those engaged in combat are not entitled to POW status; these are generally referred to as "unlawful combatants," although the phrase does not appear in the Conventions. Such combatants deserve the Conventions' basic rights to decent treatment, but they are also subject to prosecution for their unlawful acts. Moreover, deliberately targeting civilians is a war crime in international law, which provides ample justification for terrorists' incarceration and prosecution.

The United States has taken the lead in developing new international means to combat terrorism through mechanisms such as the UN's Counter-Terrorism Committee, established in late 2001. The administration should build on this effort by supporting UN Secretary General Kofi Annan's efforts to create a comprehensive convention for preventing, controlling, and suppressing terrorism.[103] Linking this to the Geneva Conventions' proscriptions on attacking civilians will underscore the criminal nature of terrorist acts, and terrorists.

Establishing a convention on terrorism also will enable the United States to address some of the problems it sees in the Geneva Conventions' guidelines regarding POWs without rejecting the Conventions' broader utility. Opinions differ on whether the laws of war or criminal law provides the best framework for fighting terrorism. By establishing a convention on terrorism the administration might seek to develop a common approach to terrorist suspects that incorporates elements of criminal law as well as the laws of war, to help distinguish between terrorists and members of an armed group fighting a war, for example. Doing so would not deny terrorists the Conventions' basic protections, but it would enable the United States to legally incarcerate suspected terrorists in a manner similar to the treatment of criminals, as other states fighting terrorist groups have done, rather than as POWs.

[102] George W. Bush, "State of the Union Address," 29 January 2002, accessed at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html, 4 April 2005.

[103] Kofi Annan, *In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security, and Human Rights for All* (New York: United Nations, 2005).

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The Geneva Conventions' core protections for both soldiers and civilians remain vital, but they do not address the full continuum of conflicts that exist today. The United States has an interest in strengthening these conventions so that protections apply to a broader range of conflicts. This will strengthen protections for Americans, and it will indicate that the United States practices what it proclaims, by providing security and protection for others caught up in conflicts.*

POSTSCRIPT

The U.S. Supreme Court's June 2006 decision in *Hamdan v. Rumsfeld*[104] that detainees in U.S. custody have basic rights under the Geneva Conventions supports one of my central recommendations: the United States should sustain the Geneva Conventions even as it prosecutes the war on terror. The Supreme Court's ruling also creates an opportunity for the United States to strengthen both domestic and international laws that protect basic rights. It should use this opportunity to address not just terrorism but the new wars and warriors discussed here, by affirming a law-based approach to conflict and U.S. support for protections against cruel or degrading treatment by all participants in international and inter-state conflicts.

[104] *Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, et al.*, 548 U.S. —— (2006).

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Punctuated Equilibrium and the Dynamics of U.S. Environmental Policy

Edited by ROBERT REPETTO

Foreword by James Gustave Speth



This book examines important environmental and resource issues of today to uncover why and how policy changes do or do not happen. Applying the punctuated equilibrium theory of policy dynamics in diverse case studies, the authors reveal the conditions and tactics that make change possible in policies toward water use, energy, and other critical issues.

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"I'm Changing the Climate, Ask Me How!": The Politics of the Anti-SUV Campaign

SARAH PRALLE

Sport utility vehicles (SUVs) have taken America by storm.[1] Drive around the block or glance at any parking lot and it will become clear that the size of our personal vehicles is expanding almost as fast as our waistlines. Yet the popularity of SUVs has created a backlash among a diverse set of unexpected allies, including Christian evangelicals, Hollywood celebrities, members of a radical environmental group called the Earth Liberation Front, and individual Internet activists. Sport utility vehicles—and their drivers—are accused of being un-Christian, destroyers of the environment, aids to terrorists, road hogs, and just plain ugly and rude. Anti-SUV campaigners are beginning to transform these complaints into requests for policy changes: they are asking auto manufacturers to redesign SUVs so that they are safer and more fuel efficient, lobbying Congress to close tax loopholes that encourage SUV sales, and urging consumers to think seriously about their vehicle choices and needs. Some of these changes are in the works, while others, such as getting Americans to choose smaller vehicles, are difficult to imagine. As one com-

[1] Sales of these large, truck-like passenger vehicles comprise up to 25 percent of total U.S. vehicle sales. David Crary, "Americans both love, hate SUVs," *Daily Iowan*, 30 January 2003, accessed on the website of the Daily Iowan online at http://www.dailyiowan.com/news/2003/01/30/, 21 August 2004. The percentage of total vehicle sales cited depends on whether "crossover" SUV models are included in the calculation. (Crossover models are built on a car chassis rather than a light-truck frame, but are designed in the SUV style.) Half of the vehicles on the road today are SUVs, trucks, and minivans. Mary S. Cooper, "SUV Debate," *CQ Researcher*, 16 May 2003, 449–472. Despite a dip in sales in 2005, sales rebounded in 2006. Keith Naughton, "Griping About Gas Prices ... in a New SUV," *Newsweek*, 22 May 2006, 44.

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mentator said, "What a lot of protestors are missing is that Americans have a deep psychological connection to the SUV. American automotive life is about mobility and freedom. SUVs give you freedom, in a psychological sense, one that isn't necessarily rational, but is emotional."[2]

The anti-SUV campaign is another example of the politicization of private citizen behavior, a topic recently reviewed by Rogan Kersh and James Morone in their analysis of the politics of obesity. The campaign resembles the public health movements investigated by Kersh and Morone and other so-called "moral reform movements."[3] Like the consumption of alcohol, tobacco, and fatty foods, the consumption of SUVs has been problematized in both moral and utilitarian terms by a small group of activists who express alarm at the growing popularity of these vehicles. Just as Temperance activists tried to shame drinkers into abstaining from alcohol in the nineteenth century, some anti-SUV activists use moral claims to urge SUV drivers to give up their "sinful" vehicles. These moral claims are joined by scientific, utilitarian arguments concerning the dubious safety of SUVs and their negative impact on the environment, just as anti-smoking groups marshal evidence about the harmful effects of smoking on human health.

While the similarities between the anti-SUV campaign and other moral reform movements in the United States are several, I argue that the campaign does not fit the typical mold of earlier moral crusades in important ways. First, the anti-SUV campaign reverses the class politics that underlies other efforts to control private behavior. Many accounts of moral reform movements emphasize the class and status politics associated with these campaigns, noting their tendency to demonize the behavior of the lower classes and institute reactionary policies for controlling threatening minority populations. The anti-SUV campaign, however, targets the behaviors and lifestyles of the upper middle classes. Like the anti-fur campaigns of the animal rights movement, the anti-SUV campaign suggests that "morality politics" is not the exclusive terrain of conservative political movements. A second difference between the anti-SUV campaign and other moral reform movements concerns the tactics used to convey the campaign's central moral message. The anti-SUV campaign relies to a great extent on humor, shame, and a sense of play, rather than the politics of fear.

It is too early to evaluate the political effectiveness and policy success of the anti-SUV campaign in any definitive way. Nevertheless, we can assess the challenges the campaign faces as it attempts to change consumer behavior. I

[2] Michael Marsden, quoted in Julie Guthrie, "Car Wars: Growing Coalition Challenges Morality of SUVs," *San Francisco Chronicle*, 20 January 2003.

[3] Rogan Kersh and James Morone, "How the Personal Becomes Political: Prohibitions, Public Health, and Obesity," *Studies in American Political Development* 16 (Fall 2002): 162–175; Alan Hunt, *Governing Morals: A Social History of Moral Regulation* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

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argue that the anti-SUV campaign confronts fundamental tensions in American political culture around issues of consumption generally and the role of the automobile in American life in particular. While critical of consumption, the anti-SUV campaign is situated in a political economy highly dependent on the consumer, and confronts a consumer culture organized around the mantra of "choice." The theme of consumer choice poses an especially potent challenge to the anti-SUV campaign, inasmuch as it targets one of the most powerful symbols of American freedom and individuality: the automobile. An investigation into the politics of the anti-SUV campaign, then, provides a lens with which to examine the challenges that American political culture poses to social movements, particularly those that focus on popular consumption habits.

In the first section of the paper, I provide an overview of the anti-SUV movement.[4] This discussion offers a brief history of the campaign, analyzing its origins and the windows of opportunity that have led to its expansion. Next, I examine the anti-SUV campaign in light of its similarities to and differences from other attempts in American politics to govern private behavior. The paper concludes by using the anti-SUV movement to explore tensions and contradictions within American political culture around issues of consumption.

A Brief History of the Anti-SUV Campaign

The modern-day sport utility vehicle dates to the early 1980s, when General Motors, Ford, and Jeep introduced new models of SUVs to the American consumer, marketing them as sporty alternatives to the family station wagon. But during the 1980s, consumers flocked to minivans rather than SUVs; the 1990s was the decade of the sport utility vehicle. According to one observer, SUVs "fit the bill" during a time when stocks were high, interest rates and unemployment were low, and gas was cheap. Americans, buoyed by the strong economy, "sought vehicles reflecting their optimism."[5] And optimistic they were. SUV sales nearly quintupled from 1990 to 2001; larger SUVs and luxury models, in particular, captured increasing shares of the automobile market.[6] In 2002, for example, sales of luxury SUVs rose 12 percent in an otherwise disappointing automobile market.[7]

As sport utility vehicles transformed the look of America's highways and streetscapes, a small but vocal minority of non-SUV drivers began to raise objections to what they saw as unnecessary, aggressive, and dangerous vehicles.

[4] I occasionally use "movement" to describe the anti-SUV campaign, but do so loosely. The anti-SUV campaign is not a full-fledged social movement in the way that scholars understand the term.

[5] Cooper, "SUV Debate," 463.

[6] Keith Bradsher, *High and Mighty: SUVs—The World's Most Dangerous Vehicles and How They Got That Way* (New York: Public Affairs, 2002), 240.

[7] Gregory White and Joseph White, "The Extreme SUV," *Wall Street Journal*, 19 July 2002.

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The movement arose from two different locations. The first protests were posted on the World Wide Web in the late 1990s, in the form of angry websites with names like "The Ultimate Poseur's Sport Utility Page," "SUV Backlash," and "I Hate Your SUV." This largely individual, anarchic anti-SUV campaign was initiated by drivers who had had negative personal experiences with SUVs and SUV drivers.[8] Internet chat rooms provided a forum in which people could voice their anger and recognize that they were not alone in their aversion to SUVs. The anti-SUV campaign, then, easily tapped into the everyday grievances of potential supporters and provided a way for these individuals to feel solidarity with others.[9]

These individual and spontaneous forms of protest preceded a more organized and public backlash in 1999; at that time, the Sierra Club lent organizational weight to the anti-SUV campaign when it publicly renamed the Ford Excursion (Ford's largest SUV at the time) the Ford Valdez. The Union of Concerned Scientists, the Natural Resources Defense Council, and Friends of the Earth followed suit, connecting SUV issues to their climate change, pollution, and energy campaigns.[10] These organizations have promoted both legislative and technological solutions to the SUV problem, calling on Congress to increase fuel economy standards for light trucks and SUVs, and urging automobile manufacturers to design safer and more fuel-efficient vehicles.

The SUV issue was not only adopted by established environmental organizations, but also gave rise to new groups whose sole focus was on sport utility vehicles. In October 2000, the anti-SUV website, changingtheclimate.com, offered activists an opportunity to deliver their anti-SUV message directly to consumers. Internet activist Robert Lind of San Francisco encouraged opponents of SUVs to download bumper stickers reading "I'm Changing the Climate, Ask Me How!" and affix them directly on offending vehicles. Guerrilla actions against SUVs continued with the founding of Earth on Empty in 2001, an organization that credits itself with ticketing one million SUVs with

[8] I refer to this component of the movement as the "Internet" campaign and its participants as "Internet" activists, to distinguish it from the more organized anti-SUV campaigns of environmental groups and other established interest organizations (who also have Internet websites, of course). Most research on Internet activism focuses on the role of the Internet in political campaigns and elections. See, for example, Steve Davis, Larry Elin, and Grant Reeher, *Click on Democracy: The Internet's Power to Change Political Apathy into Civic Action* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2002).

[9] On the role of anger and emotions in social movement mobilization, see Ronald R. Aminzade and Doug McAdam, "Emotions and Contentious Politics" in Ronald R. Aminzade, Jack A. Goldstone, Doug McAdam, Elizabeth J. Perry, William H. Sewell, Jr., Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilley, eds., *Silence and Voice in the Study of Contentious Politics* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001); and Jeff Goodwin, James M. Jasper, and Francesca Polletta, eds., *Passionate Politics: Emotions and Social Movements* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2001).

[10] Friends of the Earth has a separate website that contains information on SUVs as part of their "Roadhog Reduction Campaign," accessed at http://www.suv.org, 23 June 2006. Keith Bradsher criticizes the environmental movement for failing to lobby against SUVs sooner than they did. See Bradsher, *High and Mighty*, 77–79.

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fake traffic citations in five hundred different cities, charging SUV drivers with contributing to a "hostile and unhealthy environment for everyone."[11]

Reports of more serious vandalism against SUVs started surfacing about the same time as news of these more benign actions spread. In June of 2000, environmental activist Jeffrey Luers was charged with first degree arson for setting fire to three SUVs at a car dealership in Eugene, Oregon.[12] In 2002, forty SUVs were targeted by vandals in Virginia. And in early 2003, a Ford truck dealership in Pennsylvania was set on fire, allegedly the work of the Earth Liberation Front, an underground network of environmentalists known for destroying property.[13]

By 2002, the anti-SUV campaign was in full swing. In February, the Evangelical Environmental Network (EEN) launched its "What Would Jesus Drive?" campaign, adding a religious voice to the crusade against sport utility vehicles. EEN is a member of the National Religious Partnership for the Environment, an umbrella group of Christian and Jewish faith-based groups committed to social justice and environmental protection. While the "What Would Jesus Drive?" campaign was the target of several jokes and parodies, it also attracted significant media attention. According to EEN, over four thousand media stories have featured the campaign, including national television programs such as *60 Minutes*, *Good Morning America*, and CNN's *Crossfire*.[14] By November 2002, EEN had secured a meeting with the CEO of the Ford Motor Company, Bill Ford, as well as with top executives at General Motors.

In September of 2002, *New York Times* journalist Keith Bradsher published a treatise against sport utility vehicles, *High and Mighty: SUVs—The World's Most Dangerous Vehicles and How They Got That Way*. Bradsher's book was akin to Eric Schlosser's *Fast Food Nation*, the bible of the anti-obesity movement published just a year earlier. Both condemned industry for its manipulative marketing strategies and harmful products. Bradsher also turned a critical eye on consumers, using market-based research from the automobile industry to characterize SUV drivers as insecure, vain, self-centered, and individualistic.[15] *High and Mighty* supported both the more organized anti-SUV campaign's claims about the safety and environmental impact of sport utility vehicles, as well as the Internet campaign's focus on the personal failures of SUV drivers.

The California recall election in 2003 shifted the anti-SUV campaign into high gear. Gubernatorial candidate and former conservative columnist Arianna Huffington criticized candidate Arnold Schwartznegger for the fact that he

[11] Earth on Empty, accessed at http://www.earthonempty.org, 6 November 2003.

[12] "Sign-on Letter of Support for Jeff Leurs," accessed at http://www.freefreenow.org/singon.html, 9 July 2004.

[13] Guthrie, "Car Wars."

[14] Evangelical Environmental Network, "What Would Jesus Drive?" accessed at http://www.whatwouldjesusdrive.org/intro.php, 9 July 2004.

[15] Bradsher, *High and Mighty*.

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owned half a dozen military-style Hummer vehicles, the most revered and reviled of all SUVs. Huffington subsequently took advantage of other recent political events: she argued that driving an SUV was tantamount to supporting terrorism. Mimicking anti-drug ads that featured everyday citizens "admitting" their sponsorship of terrorism due to their purchase of illegal drugs, Huffington's ads were similarly scripted. One ad began, "I helped hijack an airplane. I helped blow up a nightclub. So what if it gets eleven miles to the gallon? I helped our enemies develop weapons of mass destruction. What if I need to go off-road? I helped teach kids around the world to hate America. I like to sit up high."[16] President George W. Bush's decision to invade Iraq provided another window of opportunity to anti-SUV activists: one sign seen at anti-war marches read, "If War is Inevitable, Start Drafting SUV Drivers," while bumper stickers found on an anti-SUV website read, "I Drive a ... Weapon of Mass Consumption," "Let the Terrorists Win: Drive an SUV," "Driving a Gas-Guzzler is NOT Patriotic," and "Drive an SUV, Drive With Saddam!"

The two strands of the anti-SUV movement—referred to here as the Internet campaign and the environmental campaign—offer distinct definitions of the SUV problem. Internet activists complain largely about the driving and parking woes associated with the increased numbers of SUVs on the road. Although they pay some attention to safety concerns, their grievances are mainly of a personal nature. Environmental groups, on the other hand, focus on the negative externalities associated with sport utility vehicles. Their most important claim is that the poor gas mileage of SUVs contributes to increased CO_2 emissions, adding to the U.S.'s already high contribution to global greenhouse gas emissions. A second complaint aims at the off-road capabilities of SUVs: land conservation groups in particular object to driving off-road, because it degrades natural habitats and decreases the quality of nonmotorized recreational activities. Because the two wings of the movement advance different claims, their solutions to the SUV problem diverge. Environmentalists focusing on climate change might drop their objections to SUVs if Detroit were to produce more fuel-efficient SUVs. Internet activists, however, are unlikely to be satisfied with such technological changes, inasmuch as their concerns are tied more to the size of the vehicles than to their gas mileage.[17] Where the two strands of the movement overlap is in their condemnation of SUVs as symbols of conspicuous consumption. Both the Internet campaign and segments of the environmental movement adopt populist rhetoric denouncing the consumption habits of SUV drivers. Here, their solutions converge: large, luxury SUVs should be rejected in favor of less ostentatious vehicles.

[16] The Detroit Project, "Talking Heads," accessed at http://www.thedetroitproject.com/ads/default.htm, 5 January 2004.

[17] Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pointing out the different problem definitions and policy preferences of the two strands of the anti-SUV campaign.

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To date, the anti-SUV backlash has been surprisingly successful, given its small size and scant resources. One sign of success is the sheer publicity generated by the campaign. As noted above, the "What Would Jesus Drive?" campaign has attracted mainstream media attention, as have other anti-SUV actions and advocacy groups. The *New York Times*, *USA Today*, *The Washington Post*, *BusinessWeek*, *Time Magazine*, and *The New Yorker* are some of the mainstream media outlets that have covered aspects of the anti-SUV campaign.

A second indication of success is the increasingly organized nature of the campaign. What started out as complaints by individuals on the Internet has evolved into a largely uncoordinated but more organized movement. A number of groups have emerged whose sole focus is on SUVs, while several established environmental groups have tacked an anti-SUV component onto their existing campaigns. In fact, this increased organization led to a counter-campaign by the automobile industry, which launched a pro-SUV organization in 1999. The "Sport Utility Vehicle Owners of America" is organized as a non-profit consumer group, claiming to be "the voice of and advocate for SUV owners from unfounded attacks by special interest groups and unwarranted government regulation."[18]

The issues raised by the anti-SUV campaign have made it onto the public and governmental agendas, albeit not as a priority or as highly salient for either agenda. Mainstream media coverage suggests the anti-SUV campaign's entry onto the public agenda, while the popularity of anti-SUV websites implies some minority attention to the campaign.[19] With respect to the government agenda, several bills have been introduced in the House and the Senate to improve the gas mileage of SUVs, minivans, and pickup trucks, but to date, none have passed. For example, in April of 2003, the House defeated a proposal by Representative Sherwood Boehlert (R-NY) and Representative Edward Markey (D-MA) that would have eliminated the disparity in fuel economy standards between cars and light trucks by 2010. More recently, however, pressure has been building in Congress to raise corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) standards because of rising gas prices in the wake of Hurricane Katrina.[20] The Bush administration, in an apparent attempt to pre-empt further congressional action, proposed to increase the fuel efficiency of SUVs, minivans, and trucks by an

[18] Sport Utility Vehicle Owners of America, "About Us: Driven to Inform, Protect and Serve," accessed at http://www.suvoa.com/about/, 18 June 2004.

[19] The Ultimate Poseur Sport Utility Page (accessed at http://poseur.4x4.org/, 15 July 2004) claims it gets an average of four hundred individual (unique) visits to its website each day. The website has been mentioned on the cover of *USA Today*, in mainstream news magazines, and was featured on *NBC Nightly News* and mentioned on National Public Radio's popular *CarTalk* program. Earth on Empty's campaign received popular recognition when a *Doonesbury* cartoon character began ticketing SUVs.

[20] Under current corporate average fuel economy standards, an automaker's light truck fleet (which includes SUVs) must average 21.6 miles a gallon, compared with 27.5 for passenger car fleets. Even several Republicans once reluctant to change the law support increased corporate average fuel economy standards. Julie Eilperin, "Resistant Lawmakers Now Back Higher Gas Mileage Standards," *Washington Post*, 4 May 2006.

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average of about two miles per gallon over four years. These policy initiatives are no doubt due to a combination of factors, not wholly the result of the anti-SUV campaign. But the anti-SUV campaign's focus on the special status of SUVs and light trucks under the CAFE standards has generated some pressure on Congress and the administration to remove this loophole. At the very least, Democrats have taken notice of the anti-SUV campaign: the 2004 Democratic National Platform Committee Report alludes to the movement when it states, "We support the American people's freedom to choose whatever cars, SUVs, minivans, or trucks they choose, but we also believe American ingenuity is equal to the task of improving efficiency."[21]

In 2003, the safety concerns voiced by anti-SUV activists gained a great deal of legitimacy when the head of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Jeffrey Runge, said that he would not let his son drive an SUV known for a high rollover rate "if it was the last one on earth."[22] The agency later announced nonbinding recommendations to improve SUV safety, in keeping with the Bush administration's preference for voluntary solutions over regulatory ones. Nevertheless, Runge's public condemnation of SUVs worried Detroit automakers. As *BusinessWeek* reported, Runge's criticisms "dovetailed with those of the increasingly vocal anti-SUV crowd."[23] In what was billed as a "historic voluntary commitment," the Detroit automakers later agreed to redesign SUVs to reduce rollover vulnerability and also to minimize harm to other vehicles that collide with SUVs. Although industry has generally taken the safety concerns about SUVs more seriously than environmental matters, Detroit has recently introduced more environmentally friendly SUVs; at the 2004 North American International Auto Show, Chrysler, General Motors, and Ford Motors unveiled hybrid versions of their large trucks and SUVs. As one observer of the auto industry put it, "GM [General Motors] would never admit that its advanced technology plans are a response to outside pressure, but partly they are."[24] The vice president of communications at General Motors admitted that while the anti-SUV campaign does not seem to be affecting sales of the vehicles, "that doesn't mean we aren't taking it seriously."[25]

[21] Further evidence that Washington DC has taken notice of the anti-SUV campaign is that *The CQ Researcher* devoted an entire issue to the SUV debate. See Cooper, "SUV Debate."

[22] Quoted in Lorrain Woellert, "The Sport-Utility Critic Detroit Can't Dismiss," *BusinessWeek*, 17 February 2003, 43.

[23] Ibid. More recently, state attorneys general have launched an ad campaign urging SUV owners to drive more safely. The $27-million-dollar campaign is funded from a settlement with Ford Motor Company, who was charged with running deceptive advertisements about the alleged safety of its SUVs. See Patti Bond, "Ads Aim to Tame Wild and Woolly SUV," *The Atlanta Journal Constitution*, 1 February 2005, 1A.

[24] Daniel Howes, "Quantum Leap to Hybrid SUVs in World Market Will Take Time," 7 November 2003, accessed on the website of *The Detroit News Online* at http://detnews.com/2003/insiders/0311/07/b01-318733.htm, 19 August 2004.

[25] John N. Frank, "SUVs-Automakers Need to Drive Home Information on SUVs," *PR Week*, 3 March 2003.

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Despite General Motors' claim to the contrary, evidence suggests that the anti-SUV campaign may be impacting sales of sport utility vehicles. By 2003, sales of SUVs had leveled off at about 3 million vehicles per year.[26] More recently, sales of large SUVs have been declining, compared to the record-high sales levels in the late 1990s. In January and February of 2005, sales were down 31 percent and 21 percent, respectively, from the same time period in 2004. Even industry analysts admit that higher gas prices are not the only culprit: "Analysts say the era of the big SUV may be over for another, more important reason: The SUV just isn't hip anymore."[27] The excessiveness of the vehicles is not the only problem: as sport utility vehicles have migrated into suburbs, they have been slapped with the derogatory label of "soccer dad" vehicles.[28]

The Anti-SUV Campaign as Moral Reform Movement

At first glance, Todd Bradley, a software engineer living in Boulder, Colorado in the twenty-first century has little in common with the upper middle class women who rallied against liquor consumption in the early part of twentieth-century America. But like the Temperance activists before him, Bradley has attempted to change the personal consumption habits of his fellow citizens. Campaigns aimed at changing consumption patterns have a long history in the United States. The Puritans established sumptuary laws in the seventeenth century that directed people to reject certain goods, both for the purpose of conserving resources as well as for ensuring a stable class system, whereby no one "pretended" to be of a class above them by consuming its signature goods.[29] During WWI and WWII, the government urged citizens to curb their consumption of sugar, shoes, and other products so that resources could be used for the war effort, and rationed some items—like automobile tires and gasoline—outright.[30] Present-day efforts to regulate consumption are most obvious in the anti-obesity and anti-drug campaigns, both of which castigate people's consumption choices and habits.[31]

[26] Cooper, "SUV Debate," 452.

[27] Rick Haglund, "Sales of Bigger SUVs Shrink," 20 March 2005, accessed on the website of *The Times-Picayune Online* at http://www.nola.com/business/t-p/index.ssf?/base/money-2/1111386307275350.xml, 25 March 2005.

[28] Ibid.

[29] Cynthia Harrison, "The 'City on a Hill' Cliché: Puritans' Winthrop Was No Advocate of Liberty," *Los Angles Times*, 21 January 1989, 8. See also Alan Hunt, *Governance of the Consuming Passions: A History of Sumptuary Law* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996).

[30] According to Daniel Horowitz, WWI economic planners hoped that war-time consumer restraints would lead to more permanent changes in consumption patterns, while WWII budget experts considered rationing and economic planning as only a temporary necessity brought on by war-time conditions. Daniel Horowitz, *The Anxieties of Affluence: Critiques of American Consumer Culture, 1939-1979* (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 2004).

[31] Kersh and Morone, "How the Personal Becomes Political," 162–175.

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The regulation of consumption is at the heart of many "moral reform projects," defined by Alan Hunt as practices "whereby some social agents problematise some aspect of the conduct, values, or culture of others on moral grounds and seek to impose regulation on them."[32] Moral reform projects that focus on consumption politicize what is sometimes assumed to be private behavior. Smoking, drinking, and driving a sport utility vehicle can be constructed as personal choices, but moral reform campaigns politicize such activities by arguing that they threaten the moral standing of individuals and society while also contributing to wider public problems. The anti-SUV campaign is a recent example of a consumption-oriented moral reform project: it shares with other campaigns a strong moralizing discourse, a focus on regulating one's own behavior and that of others, and a political strategy that demonizes "users" and the responsible industry. At the same time, the anti-SUV campaign reminds us that moral reform projects are not homogenous. Different strands of a campaign might employ moralistic rhetoric to a greater or lesser degree, advocate mainly for personal restraint over government regulation, and focus more or less on individual versus industry culpability.

The anti-SUV campaign's most direct link to other moral reform movements is its explicit and implicit moral appeals. The underlying moral character of the anti-SUV movement is obvious in the EEN's "What Would Jesus Drive?" campaign. The campaign states outright that "transportation is a moral issue," claiming that the "Risen Lord Jesus cares about what we drive."[33] Even nonreligious anti-SUV groups and activists make moral appeals. The Detroit Project urges drivers to consider the societal impacts of their vehicle choice by asking, "What is your SUV doing to the world?" while Earth on Empty suggests that SUV drivers are morally culpable by issuing phony traffic tickets to SUV owners—a symbol of law-breaking and criminal activity. Randy Cohen, the ethics columnist for the *New York Times Magazine*, was straightforward in his moral condemnation of SUV drivers: "If you're planning to drive that SUV in New York, pack a suitcase into your roomy cargo area, because you're driving straight to hell."[34]

While many environmental campaigns have used moralistic rhetoric to urge citizens to make wise consumer choices, to recycle, and to support wider efforts to improve the environment, rarely has the rhetoric been so pointed in its condemnation of individual behavior. The anti-SUV campaign, especially the Internet wing of the movement, suggests that there is something inherently wrong or bad about purchasing and driving a sport utility vehicle. Not only is the decision to purchase an SUV portrayed as a personal moral failing, but the act of driving one is seen as contributing to the further moral degradation of

[32] Hunt, *Governing Morals*, ix.

[33] Evangelical Environmental Network, "WWJDrive Campaign Summary," accessed at http://www.whatwouldjesusdrive.org/resources/summary.php, 9 July 2004.

[34] Randy Cohen, "Departure Delays," *New York Times Magazine*, 2 May 1999, 29.

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SUV owners. Such claims are reminiscent of other moral reform projects, such as the anti-smoking and anti-drug crusades, which condemn the "users" as well as the consumer item itself. Users are morally culpable for their choices, and these choices further degrade users because of the behavioral effects of the condemned product. Anti-SUV Internet activists imply that the height and size of the vehicles enhance a pre-existent selfishness and arrogance—the tendency to "look down upon others"—on the part of SUV owners.

A second similarity between the anti-SUV campaign and other moral reform movements is the implicit desire to govern or impose regulation on others. Anti-SUV activists hope to change the behavior of consumers through direct moral appeals and through government regulation.[35] Some anti-SUV activists attempt to shame drivers into giving up their SUVs, others appeal more positively to their sense of morality, and organized environmental groups are urging the auto industry and pressuring the government to make SUVs safer and more fuel efficient. Their solutions to the SUV problem, in other words, involve a mix of state-centered and non-state-centered actions. In this way, the anti-SUV campaign resembles other moral reform movements that call for both personal responsibility and state regulation to curb the unwanted and undesirable behavior.

But the anti-SUV campaign is not only concerned with governing the behavior of others: it also seeks to govern the self. Self-governance is a key feature of moral reform projects, concerned as they are with the need for individual self-control and self-mastery over iniquity. The self-governance aspect of the anti-SUV campaign is evident in electronic discussions about SUVs in which individuals applaud their own self-restraint when it came to choosing a vehicle. The confessor might admit to once owning an SUV or reveal that she had considered buying one, but might claim that she soon "saw the light" and decided to buy a smaller vehicle. Another type of confessional story is contributed by an SUV owner himself, who claims that he actually needs an SUV, unlike a "housewife" who uses it to "haul groceries and take her kids to ballet classes."[36]

Making distinctions between different types of SUV owners is a hallmark of both the anti-SUV movement and moral reform movements more generally. The Internet activists admit that there are some "deserving" owners—those who use SUVs for their intended purpose of going off-road, hauling heavy

[35] Michel Foucault claims that both state and non-state actors engage in governing: governing does "not cover only the legitimately constituted forms of political or economic subjection, but also modes of action, more or less considered, which were designed to act upon the possibilities of action of other people. To govern, in this sense, is to structure the possible field of action of others." Michel Foucault, "The Subject and the Power" in Herbert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 221.

[36] Montag, "Liberals Hate SUVs," accessed at http://www.chatarea.com/Votecomers.m2004237, 1 July 2004.

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cargo, or towing boats and trailers. The vitriolic rhetoric is reserved for the alleged majority of owners who have little need for an SUV's large engine, four-wheel drive, and towing capacities.[37] These categories of drivers carry an implicit class and gender distinction—deserving drivers are rural farmers and rugged sportsmen, while the undeserving drivers are suburban "soccer moms."

Finally, the anti-SUV campaign resembles other projects aimed at politicizing private behavior in that it, too, demonizes both "users" and the responsible industry. Kersh and Morone consider the process of demonizing to be an essential part of how private actions become politicized.[38] But who is demonized—users or industry—and to what degree matters a great deal politically. In the anti-SUV campaign, the two strands of the movement emphasize different targets, suggesting some tension within the anti-SUV campaign. Established environmental organizations and other advocacy groups largely focus their criticisms on the automobile industry and the government. Many have gone out of their way to distance themselves from the personalized rhetoric on the alternative anti-SUV websites. For example, EEN states, "We make no judgments about individual decisions concerning vehicles," while Huffington's Detroit Project simply states, "We do not want to demonize anyone."[39] Unlike individual Internet activists, these groups are trying to appeal to as wide an audience as possible. Many of their supporters drive SUVs or have considered buying one: a recent poll of readers of *Sierra*, the magazine of the Sierra Club, shows that 27 percent of its readers own SUVs.[40] Organizational concerns require that established interest groups (particularly membership-based groups) do not assign culpability to individual drivers. Their solutions, therefore, are public ones involving technological and policy changes.

The Internet activists and the less organized, Web-only anti-SUV groups operate under fewer organizational constraints, and are more prone to target the drivers themselves. While they tend to mimic the rights arguments of the mainstream environmental groups—namely, that people have the right to drive what they want—their rhetoric demonizes SUV drivers to a much greater extent than does that of their allies in the environmental movement. In part, this is because Internet activists focus on their personal frustrations with SUVs and SUV drivers.

[37] Many in the environmental wing of the anti-SUV movement would reject the idea of "deserving" owners, as they oppose using SUVs to go off-road. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.

[38] Kersh and Morone, "How the Personal Becomes Political," 164.

[39] Evangelical Environmental Network, "Our Opinion on Recent Vandalism," accessed at http://www.whatwouldjesusdrive.org/opinion.php, 9 July 2004; The Detroit Project, "Frequently Asked Questions," accessed at http://www.americansforfuelefficientcars.org/readmore/faq.htm, 9 July 2004.

[40] Jennifer Hattam, "Sierra Readers, by the Numbers," *Sierra*, January/February 2005, 48. Bradsher also notes that supporters of mainstream environmental organizations are susceptible to the marketing of SUVs as "outdoorsy" vehicles. He quotes Kevin Mills, a campaigner at Environmental Defense, who admitted that some groups felt that "to vilify SUVs was to alienate your members. It feels like you are blaming them instead of the companies." Bradsher, *High and Mighty*, 78.

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This individualistic critique prompts Internet activists to focus on the failings of SUV drivers rather than on government policy or on the activities of the automobile industry. Consequently, the extreme moralizing rhetoric is found more often in the Internet wing of the campaign than in the environmental one.

While the focus on the individual is notable, moral reform movements rarely limit their concern to the harms done by (and in some cases to) the individual "sinner." Rather, moral reformers often catalogue the various externalities associated with individual behaviors. Indeed, this is one of the keys to politicizing private citizen behavior: the condemned activity is dangerous not only to the person engaging in it, but also to society at large.[41] The spillover effects might be the higher national health costs associated with an increasingly obese population, as charged in the anti-obesity campaign, or the decay of our inner cities caused by increasing drug use. Hunt argues that such utilitarian arguments became increasingly common in moral reform movements "as moral discourses became detached from taken-for-granted religious frameworks."[42] The environmental wing of the anti-SUV campaign is particularly explicit about detailing the externalities associated with driving sport utility vehicles, but they are not unique among moral reformers in linking personal behavior to public costs.

How the Anti-SUV Campaign Differs from Other Moral Reform Movements

The anti-SUV campaign, while it shares many of the characteristics of other moral reform projects, is notably different in at least two respects. First, the class and status themes underlying it are reversed. Unlike the public health movements described by Kersh and Morone and the moral reform projects described by Hunt, the anti-SUV campaign attacks the lifestyles and status-seeking behavior of people in the upper middle classes who can afford sport utility vehicles. The anti-SUV campaign, like the anti-fur campaigns of the 1980s and 1990s by animal rights activists, demonstrates that moral reform movements are not aimed only at lower classes and ethnic minorities, but can target the affluent and elite. Indeed, the anti-fur campaign struck an especially powerful moral tone, based on a popular aversion to animal cruelty and the increasingly accepted notion that animals have the right to live free of suffering.[43] Because fur has long been associated with wealth, the importance of the anti-fur campaign extended beyond its implications for animal rights; it

[41] See Kersh and Morone, "How the Personal Becomes Political," 162–175.

[42] Hunt, *Governing Morals*, 7.

[43] In a 1995 public opinion survey, 59 percent of respondents agreed that it was "always wrong" to use animals for fur, while 38 percent strongly agreed that animals have as much a right to live free of suffering as humans. David Masci, "Fighting Over Animal Rights," *CQ Reseacher*, 2 August 1992, 673–696. For more on the moral claims of the animal rights movement, see Lawrence Finsen and Susan Finsen, *The Animal Rights Movement in America: From Compassion to Respect* (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1994), especially chapter six.

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was also a critique of the lifestyles of those who could afford and chose to wear fur.[44] Critics saw fur, like SUVs, as an ostentatious display of wealth and as an unnecessary (and cruel) purchase for which many substitutes were available.

A second distinguishing characteristic of the anti-SUV campaign is its use of humor, sarcasm, and ridicule to stigmatize sport utility vehicles and their owners. Many moral reform projects rely on fear, anxiety, and racial or ethnic prejudice to mobilize the public and policymakers. Even the anti-fur campaign, while innovative in its framing of the issue and in its direct action strategies, struck a sober tone. The anti-SUV campaign, in contrast, melds serious discussions of the environmental and safety problems associated with SUVs with more lighthearted repartee. The widespread use of humor in the anti-SUV campaign suggests that moral reform projects can communicate a serious moral message in ways that do not exaggerate the danger posed by a certain activity or segment of the population.

Class and Status in the Anti-SUV Campaign

Movements aimed at regulating personal behavior, such as Prohibition, the anti-abortion movement, and the drug wars are typically associated with conservative ideologies. Moral reform movements, preoccupied as they are with "decency, diligence, gravity, modesty, orderliness, prudence, reason, self-control, sobriety, and thrift"[45] easily become platforms from which to denigrate particular ethnic groups, women, and the less well off. They also provide opportunities for disciplining these groups through official and unofficial means. Kersh and Morone find enduring American tensions around race and class in several of the public health cases they investigate: "At least three of the cases (drugs, drink, and sex) feature a powerful racial component. Add class and ethnicity to the mix and it is difficult to find any exceptions to the rule: American prohibitions demonize the poor and weak."[46] While such movements might originate with everyday citizens, these citizens are often in the middle or upper classes. And their targets are not people in their own class or ethnic group, but "outsiders" whose behaviors need modifying. Hunt also highlights the class-based nature of many moral reform movements and related projects aimed at reforming popular culture: "There is rarely a period in which the recreations and pastimes of the poor, of the working population, or of some socially visible minority have not been the target for the moralization and projects of governance by some other section of the population."[47]

[44] On the history of fur and anti-fur campaigns, see Julia B. Emberley, *The Cultural Politics of Fur* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997).

[45] Hunt, *Governing Morals*, 13–14.

[46] Kersh and Morone, "How the Personal Becomes Political," 164.

[47] Hunt, *Governing Morals*, 14. Examples of efforts to reform popular culture can be found in previous eras as well as the present one. Hunt mentions efforts in early modern England to repress pagan rituals and festivals; current examples include suppression of urban cultural forms such as rave parties.

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The anti-SUV movement does not mirror the class and race politics described above. While anti-SUV activists appear to be mainly white and from the middle classes, their targets are other relatively well-off Americans. Put simply, it is not the "recreations and pastimes" of the poor that are at issue, but those of the wealthy. For the Internet activists, class and lifestyle criticism is overt. References to "latte sipping" executives, sitting in traffic on their leather seats with cell phones in hand, are common. One opponent, "Bad Jim," writes in an E-mail exchange that "SUVs are primarily yuppie-mobiles. It isn't the average working-class type who buys a Ford Expedition or Lincoln Navigator."[48] The "recreations" of SUV drivers are also a target for criticism. Anti-SUV activists castigate owners for using their SUVs to go to the mall or to commute from their subdivision; several Internet opponents of SUVs promote more "rugged" recreational activities while scorning the consumption-oriented, suburban activities of mainstream America.

Class and status themes are also voiced by owners of SUVs, some of whom defend their consumer choices on Internet chat rooms. For proponents, the anti-SUV activists are simply envious; one contributor to the Ultimate Poseur website chat room charges, "I think you [responding to a previous message] may just be bitter because you probably cannot afford even an entry level SUV."[49] Pro-SUV activists also comment on the lifestyle preferences of their opponents: Karen De Coster, author of an Internet article titled "I Hate SUV Haters," claims that "SUV Haters are likely the impractical types that have prissy 'for looks only' furniture in the house that is too darn uncomfortable to sit or lay [*sic*] on."[50] Lifestyle choices become the stand-in for a variety of other divisions: among rural, urban, and suburban sensibilities, partisan and ideological leanings, and socioeconomic standing. The focus on lifestyle choices might be due to what many social scientists claim is a uniquely American aversion to framing issues in class terms.[51] It is also the case that since both critics and users come from the same general socioeconomic class, class provides an incomplete way of distinguishing the reformers from those who need to be reformed. Lifestyle choices provide a means of drawing boundaries and are grounds for criticizing the habits and sensibilities of upper middle class suburbanites.

[48] Bad Jim, posted E-mail, 19 February 2004, accessed at http://calpundit.com/archives/003310.html, 1 July 2004.

[49] Ultimate Poseur Sport Utility Page, "Hate Mail," accessed at http://www.poseur.4x4.org/Negative.html, 18 June 2004.

[50] Karen DeCoster, "I Hate SUV Haters," accessed at http://www.lewrockwell.com/decoster/decoster70.html, 1 July 2004.

[51] On the lack of class conflict in the U.S. and the prevalence of status politics, see Joseph R. Gusfield, *Symbolic Crusade: Status Politics and the American Temperance Movement* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1963).

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Humor and Sarcasm in the Anti-SUV Campaign

Moral reform movements are serious business. According to Hunt, supporters of these campaigns are "mobilized and drawn into action by the passionate conviction that there is something inherently wrong or immoral about the conduct of others."[52] Because moral discourses advocate clear standards of right and wrong, campaigns based on them can be rigid and doctrinaire. Such campaigns, in demonizing both the users of the offending product and the industry behind it, evoke images of dangerous classes and deceitful business people. As Kersh and Morone note, the American drug wars are rooted in racial and ethnic fears: "a sinister 'other' lurks behind reform efforts, fuelling regulatory and prohibitionist efforts."[53] Reformers consciously draw on such fears to mobilize the public and policymakers. It is no wonder that repressive policies are born from such efforts: public fears are best allayed by harsh criminal sanctions.

The anti-SUV movement, while it uses moralizing rhetoric and demonizing imagery, is less reliant on the politics of fear than other moral reform movements. Anti-SUV activists are passionate, but they have embraced a rather different political strategy and orientation to express their convictions: they use humor, sarcasm, and ridicule to convey their message about sport utility vehicles. As "The Ultimate Poseur Sport Utility Page" states outright, "The goal of this page is to expose the ridiculous SUV trend to help stop it, and have some laughs while we're at it!" Several websites mock particular SUV models, dubbing the Land Rover "The Land Runover," branding the Hummer, "Dummer" and the Hummer2 "HummerDinger2." Another example comes from Huffington's Detroit Project, which produced a humorous animated cartoon during the California recall election showing then-candidate Schwartznegger running out of gas as he drives his Hummer to Sacramento. In short, anti-SUV websites contain cartoons, humorous bumper stickers and slogans, comical T-shirts, and even songs and poems parodying SUVs, even as the text on the sites solemnly catalogues the health and environmental impacts of SUVs. While both wings of the anti-SUV campaign use humor, environmental groups more often combine the humor with serious discussions of the negative environmental impacts of SUVs and our transportation system more generally.

Humor, sarcasm, and ridicule have long been used in politics. Political candidates and politicians, political parties, and social movements use humor to disarm critics, establish an ideological or partisan position, and expose an opponent's biases, ineptitudes, oppression, and pretentiousness, among other things.[54] Certainly, the anti-SUV campaign is not unique in its use of humor.

[52] Hunt, *Governing Morals*, ix.

[53] Kersh and Morone, "How the Personal Becomes Political," 164.

[54] Don L.F. Nilsen, "The Social Functions of Political Humor," *Journal of Popular Culture* 24 (Winter 1990): 35–47. See also Hans Spier, "Wit and Politics: An Essay on Laughter and Power,"

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But the strategy is notable when viewed in the context of moral reform movements generally, many of which mobilize fear and threats rather than employing humor to convey their message. The anti-SUV campaign's ability to use humor rests in part on the class dynamics described above. Because critics of SUVs and their targets are both from the middle or upper middle classes, sarcasm, ridicule, and humor aimed at SUV drivers is politically acceptable. The lack of an obvious racial component to the SUV debate also sanctions this strategy: minorities are not the target of ridicule, but the majority white population.

In sum, the anti-SUV campaign, because it differs from the typical moral reform movement in terms of its class dynamics and its communication and mobilization strategies, is more progressive in its politics than the moral reform movements described by Hunt and the public health movements examined by Kersh and Morone. The anti-SUV campaign does not carry the ominous racial and class connotations found in other reform movements. It does not, in Horowitz's words, "rest ... on self-righteous judgments of people who are simply trying to make ends meet."[55] While some anti-SUV activists might properly be accused of being self-righteous, they turn their attention to people who are doing far better than just making ends meet. And by employing humor in the service of making their criticisms and appeals, anti-SUV activists minimize the possibility that draconian policy measures will be enacted to address the SUV problem. But the anti-SUV movement confronts important tensions and contradictions in American political culture, posing a challenge to the campaign.

American Political Culture and the Anti-SUV Campaign

Sarah Jain, professor of anthropology at Stanford, argues that sport utility vehicles represent "the inability of Americans to make a connection between consumption decisions and their social impact."[56] Jain, like many of the anti-SUV activists, suggests that most Americans have tunnel vision, consuming products with little thought to how their individual decisions, when combined with those of millions of others, create public problems such as dirty air, clogged highways, and climate change. One goal of the anti-SUV movement is to point out these connections to consumers, hoping that knowledge will lead to behavior changes. Todd Bradley, in explaining why he created his anti-SUV

American Journal of Sociology 103 (March 1998): 1352–1401; Diane Martin, "Balancing on the Political High Wire: The Role of Humor in the Rhetoric of Ann Richards," *Southern Communication Journal* 69 (Summer 2004): 273–288.

[55] Horowitz, *Anxieties of Affluence*, 3.

[56] Quoted in Patricia Leigh Brown, "SUV Road Warriors Fight Back Backlash," 8 February 2003, accessed on the website of the *International Herald Tribune Online* at http://www.iht.com/articles/86098.html, 5 January 2005.

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website (one of the original Internet sites), said that he hoped it would prod people to think about the implications of their consumer choices and help them make better ones.[57]

The anti-SUV campaign faces a much greater problem when trying to spread their message to consumers, however. American political culture has long been ambivalent about consumption, and the anti-SUV campaign reflects this ambivalence. On the one hand, it contains critiques of consumption, affluence, and luxury that have their roots in earlier eras and in prominent intellectual traditions. At the same time, the anti-SUV campaign is embedded in an economy driven by consumption, a politics that equates citizenship with consumption, and a culture that encourages individuals to create their identities through the purchase of consumer products. The anti-SUV campaign does not resolve or overcome the tensions it confronts; rather, it tries to walk a thin line between these ambiguous traditions.

The Anxieties and Assurances of Affluence

American unease with consumption has a long history, evident in early American religious, political-cultural, and economic thought. Puritan thinkers in the eighteenth century shunned gratuitous consumption and luxury goods for their incompatibility with Christian teachings about modesty and humility before God. Secular anxieties about consumption revolved around themes of the virtuous citizen, whose time should be spent doing hard work and pursuing meaningful activities that enhanced the self and the community. Conspicuous consumption and the pursuit of luxury items were seen as threatening one's personal virtues and a society's public spirit.[58] The economic arguments against consumption were voiced in classic American liberal thought, which considered excessive consumption to be detrimental to the economy because it took capital away from production.[59] Most people in the nineteenth century shared this producerist worldview; the consumer and consumption were treated as necessary evils, something to control so that production—the chief driver of the economy—would not suffer. In the late nineteenth century, Yale sociologist William Graham Sumner epitomized this thinking, denying the consumer a legitimate political identity by equating "consumer" with a nonproductive citizen.[60]

These anti-consumerist themes were echoed in the twentieth century. During the World Wars, limited consumption was once again considered

[57] Todd Bradley, in a telephone interview with the author, 8 August 2004.

[58] Horowitz, *Anxieties of Affluence*, 2–3.

[59] Kathleen Donohue, *Freedom from Want: American Liberalism and the Idea of the Consumer* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003).

[60] Ibid., 15–16.

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a civic duty and the sign of a virtuous citizen. One government campaign urged citizens to "Produce & Conserve, Share & Play Square," a testament to the lingering influence of the producerist worldview.[61] In the 1960s, anti-consumption sentiments reached their pinnacle, as counter-cultural movements rejected mass consumer culture and the mindless pursuit of material goods. Their critique had the intellectual backing of writers like John Kenneth Galbraith, who made a connection between private affluence and public poverty. The more money people spent on "mauve and cerise, air-conditioned, power-steered, and power-braked automobiles" the fewer resources were available for public goods such as schools, parks, and clean air.[62] Galbraith called on the government to enact public policies to curb consumption and increase public spending, including a national tax on consumption. At the end of the twentieth century, anti-consumption movements were still alive and well: Horowitz cites the voluntary simplicity movement, the World Trade Organization/anti-globalization protests, and "culture jammers" who reject "hype, commercialism, and commodity fetishism" as some of the most "impassioned, morally charged critiques of consumer culture" in our times.[63]

While anti-consumption themes have a long tradition in American political, economic, and cultural thought, much of the time they have been overshadowed by a celebration of the consumer and consumption. The producerist worldview gave way to a consumerist one beginning in the late nineteenth century, when several economists proposed that it was the consumer, not the producer, who was the driving force in the economy.[64] In the 1940s and in the decades following WWII, consumers enjoyed an exalted place in American political and economic thought, as post-war mass consumption validated consumer-centered economic theories and promised an end to scarcity for many Americans. Market researchers George Katona and Ernest Dichter praised the affluent consumer for her contribution to "economic growth, democracy, and social stability."[65] The consumer not only ensured an expanding economy, but allegedly protected it from wildly fluctuating inflation and other economic ills. The act of consuming, moreover, represented a positive psychological experience for the individual who expressed himself through material goods. Such consumers were optimistic and forward-thinking, and thus essential to a democracy that relied on individual initiative and rested on a collective hope for the future.[66] Cohen has dubbed the second half of the

[61] Lizabeth Cohen, *A Consumer's Republic: The Politics of Mass Consumption in Postwar America* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003), 62.

[62] John Kenneth Galbraith, *The Affluent Society*, 3rd ed. (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1976), 192.

[63] Horowitz, *Anxieties of Affluence*, 252.

[64] Donohue, *Freedom from Want*, 41–72.

[65] Horowitz, *Anxieties of Affluence*, 48–49.

[66] Ibid., 60.

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twentieth century the "Consumer's Republic," an era in which our economy, culture, and politics were "built around the promise of mass consumption, both in terms of material life and the more idealistic goals of greater freedom, democracy, and equality."[67]

In post-September 11 America, this pro-consumerist outlook has changed little. While there was some hope immediately after the terrorist attacks that Americans might reevaluate their lifestyles and opt for a more simple life in which family, volunteering, and civic engagement trumped the individual pursuit of material well-being, such a sea change has not happened. President Bush's call to the nation to go shopping in the wake of the attacks was in keeping with the idea that consuming was a patriotic act; to contribute to societal well-being, a person needs to do little more than satisfy his or her individual material desires. In this respect, the President echoed theorists from the 1930s who equated consumption with the public interest, setting the stage for a definition of citizenship based on our consumer identities. As Kathleen Donohue explains, "The equation of *consumer* with *public interest* ... went a long way toward rooting civic identity in the consumer. Once the public interest had been defined in terms of a consumer interest, it did not require much of an intellectual stretch to define *the people* in terms of their consumer identity."[68]

Confronting the Contradictions: Ideas about Consumption in the Anti-SUV Campaign

The anti-SUV campaign has arisen from these varying ideas about the consumer and consumption, and reflects both of these traditions. Although an anti-consumerist ideology prevails, the campaign has not entirely wrested itself from the pro-consumerist society in which it is rooted. The anti-SUV campaign has had to contend with ambiguities found *within* anti-consumerist thought, in addition to addressing pro-consumerist values and institutions. In trying to distinguish between appropriate and inappropriate uses of SUVs, the campaign has encountered a problem in anti-consumerist thought more generally: How do we draw the boundary between acceptable and unacceptable consumption? Is "inappropriate" consumption mainly a quantitative concept, or a qualitative one?

Appropriate and inappropriate consumption. The anti-SUV campaign contains an explicit critique of luxury, affluence, and conspicuous consumption.

[67] Cohen, *Consumer's Republic*, 7.

[68] Donohue, *Freedom from Want*, 105. For an excellent analysis of how the basis for citizenship in America during the twentieth century became grounded in consumerism, see Gary Cross, *An All-Consuming Century: Why Commercialism Won in Modern America* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000).

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As noted above, many Internet activists reference the affluent lifestyles of SUV owners, the luxury features of the latest SUV models, including leather interiors and heated seats, and their high price tags. As one contributor to an anti-SUV chat room writes (responding to a pro-SUV posting), "*The masses* are getting SUVs because they need to haul stuff? Since when are SUVs the vehicles of the people?"[69] Another website refers to SUVs as "gluttonous trophy cars," while an E-mail posting calls SUV owners "profligate wasters."[70]

Anti-SUV activists are most uncomfortable with people who buy vehicles with features that they do not need and do not use. The four-wheel drive capacity of many SUVs is a particular point of contention for Internet activists. These activists point to marketing research that indicates only about 5 percent of SUV owners take their vehicles off-road. Some individuals complaining on the Internet appear personally offended by this statistic, charging it makes a "mockery of the off-roading sport." Others note that few SUV owners actually use them to tow boats or trailers: "I rarely see any SUVs towing trailers except jumbo utes like Expedition and Suburban," writes one contributor to an anti-SUV chat room.[71] Todd Bradley, creator of SUV Backlash, agreed that the problem is that for the majority of people, SUVs are the "wrong tool for the job."[72]

The anti-SUV activists do not condemn all or even most consumption. Rather, they focus on buying more than one needs, understood in practical and functional terms (not quantitative terms). Yet Americans routinely buy computers with far more capacity than is needed, houses that are larger than necessary, and other consumer items that have little functional value at all. These consumer items have not generated a reaction on the scale of the SUV backlash, and in fact they seem to worry most people very little. Anti-SUV activists would argue that SUVs produce more negative externalities than these other consumer items, and thus are properly singled out.[73] But critics of the campaign note a lack of attention to other luxury cars and gas guzzling vehicles, such as heavy pickup trucks and even minivans.

One answer as to why the anti-SUV movement does not address vehicles other than SUVs is that they have largely adopted a qualitative definition of

[69] Curtiss Leung, E-mail posting 19 February 2004, accessed at http://www.calpundit.com/archives/003310.html, 1 July 2004.

[70] Stop SUVs.org, accessed at http://www.StopSUVs.org, 8 July 2004; Montag, E-mail posting, 4 March 2004, accessed at http://www.chatarea.com/Votecomers.m2004237-2, 1 July 2004.

[71] Ultimate Poseur Sport Utility Page, "Love Letters," accessed at http://poseur.4x4org./Positive.html, 18 June 2004.

[72] Bradley, interview, 8 August 2004.

[73] Of course, our housing choices also create significant environmental externalities. According to *Sierra* magazine, "More than half of the materials consumed worldwide are used in construction, and 45 percent of the world's energy is used to heat, light, and ventilate our buildings." Homes in the United States were 38 percent larger in 2002 than in 1975. Marilyn Berlin Small, "Better Homes and Garbage," *Sierra*, January/February 2005, 28–30.

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inappropriate consumption. In other words, they are not worried about *how much* is consumed but by *what* is consumed. And in this respect, the "what" is a very specific consumer item; the campaign singles out a particular class of vehicles and even specific makes and models. The lack of attention to quantitative aspects of consumption limits the scope of the anti-SUV critique, which in the end is somewhat narrow. After all, many of the problems attributed to SUVs—clogged highways, dirty air, and climate change—are affected most significantly by the *amount* of miles driven by Americans, not by the particular cars we choose to drive. At least one commentator on the anti-SUV movement recognized this limitation upon the recent unveiling of hybrid SUVs:

> Unfortunately, while greater fuel efficiency is certainly welcome, such modifications do little to counteract the many other negative consequences of our driving addiction. Even a zero emissions Sports Utility Vehicle will continue to contribute to urban sprawl, social alienation and resource depletion. ... Sure, it's easy to place all the blame on SUV's [*sic*] but does it really matter all that much how big or wasteful an individual vehicle really is? ... Excess is excess.[74]

The singular focus on sport utility vehicles masks a much greater transportation problem in the United States. The transportation "problem" encompasses a host of issues, including a lack of mass transportation alternatives, urban and suburban sprawl that guarantees our dependence on automobiles, and inequalities in transportation choices. A more comprehensive critique would embrace a broader understanding of the transportation problem. And these critiques do exist. The "de-vehicularization" movement is advanced by several advocacy groups that focus on weaning Americans from dependence on the automobile. These groups include the World Carfree Network, an "international network of carfree proponents from around the world"; the Surface Transportation Policy Project, which works to ensure "safer communities and smarter transportation choices"; the National Alliance of Public Transportation Advocates, an organization seeking increased federal funding for mass transportation; and a variety of state and local transit groups who advocate car-free cities and better local transit.[75] This movement has not captured the imagination of the public to the same extent as has the anti-SUV campaign, whose very allure might depend on its narrow focus and potent symbol.

[74] "Weapons, Death & Tofu: Finding Nirvana in an SUV," *New Renaissance* 11 (Spring 2003), accessed at http://www.ru.org/114-SUV.htm, 23 June 2006. To be fair, many environmental organizations express broader concerns about our transportation problems and the related issue of urban sprawl. The environmental movement has also lobbied for higher gas mileage standards for all vehicles, not only SUVs. My point here is that the popularity of the anti-SUV campaign at times drowns out these larger critiques.

[75] See the World Carfree Network at http://carbusters.org, the Surface Transportation Project at http://www.transact.org/who.asp, accessed 30 June 2006; and the National Alliance of Public Transportation Advocates at http://www.napta.net, accessed 30 June 2006.

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The anti-SUV movement does have the potential to raise broader issues associated with our transportation problems. The sport utility vehicle, after all, is merely a symbol of our dependence on the automobile and of the supremacy of America's car culture. But the danger in building a movement around a compelling symbol is that the symbol itself may become the primary focus of the campaign, while the broader concerns it represents fade into the background. In condemning only the SUV, we risk overlooking America's deeper transportation problems. For example, the anti-SUV campaign has little to say about the transportation problems of the poor. A car-centered society perpetuates the cycle of poverty by limiting the mobility and thus the job opportunities of those who cannot afford to own a vehicle. As Jane Holtz Kay remarks, "The car culture has ... become an engine of inequity, raising high the barriers of race and class. Transportation that is difficult at best, nonexistent at worst, darkens their lives in myriad ways and adds to the financial and social inequity that they suffer."[76]

In short, the anti-SUV campaign confronts a long-running problem in anti-consumerist thinking: how do you distinguish between appropriate and inappropriate consumption? The campaign has largely relied on a qualitative definition of inappropriate consumption, and has had difficulty drawing a bright line between acceptable and unacceptable consumption. But the anti-SUV campaign's shortcomings are not solely the result of ambiguities within anti-consumerist thought: pro-consumerist thinking, so ubiquitous in our society, has found its way into the anti-SUV campaign.

Pro-consumerist ideas in an anti-consumerist movement. One reason the anti-SUV campaign struggles with defining appropriate and inappropriate consumption is that pro-consumption values have permeated American society. Indeed, the consumer has reached an unprecedented position of power in the American economy, politics, and society. Fully two-thirds of our gross domestic product is attributable to our aggregate consumption. The automobile industry in particular has long been an important engine in the domestic economy, and SUV sales now produce half of the profits that automakers earn. The American consumer has been credited with spending our way out of the 2001 economic recession, due in part to the automobile industry's post-September 11 interest-free loans. (Ford's "Keep America Rolling" advertisements directly played to the idea that consumers were at the heart of the economic recovery.) Consumers also have a good deal of political clout. The consumer movement of the 1960s and 1970s provided consumers with a powerful new discourse—that of rights—and a potent set of political tools, including boycotts and lawsuits. Finally, our society has been built around and

[76] Jane Holtz Kay, *Asphalt Nation: How the Automobile Took Over America and How We Can Take It Back* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 36.

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caters to the consumer. Our car culture, in fact, is directly tied to consumption: a third of our miles traveled go to consumption-related activities and to family chores.[77]

Given the exalted place of the consumer in American political culture, it is not surprising that the anti-SUV movement is unable to escape the discourse and values embodied in pro-consumption ideology. Consumption not only carries positive connotations, but is intimately tied up with fundamental American political values and principles. Madison Avenue has capitalized on America's love of liberty by promoting a connection between freedom and consumer choice. Industries that have come under attack by anti-consumption campaigns often counter with appeals based on the principle of choice. For example, in the mid-1980s, the fur industry established an industry trade group, the Fur Information Council, whose main counter-message to the anti-fur campaign one year was "Freedom of Choice." The Council attempted to raise public fears by linking the anti-fur campaign to a broader agenda aimed at banning other consumer items, such as meat and wool products.[78] More recently, the Center for Consumer Freedom has attacked the animal rights and anti-obesity movements through a media and Internet campaign centered on the notions of consumer choice and freedom. Their website warns that a "growing cabal of 'food cops,' health care enforcers, militant activists, meddling bureaucrats, and violent radicals who think they know 'what's best for you' are pushing against our basic freedoms."[79]

The anti-SUV campaign is engaged in a framing contest that is common to other movements that politicize private behavior. One set of frames emphasizes choice, freedom, and personal responsibility. This frame argues that it is a matter of individual choice to drive a sport utility vehicle, drink alcohol, or eat fatty foods and a matter of individual responsibility to accept the repercussions of these choices. The alternative frame emphasizes the wider societal costs of these individual decisions. In the case of buying and driving a sport utility vehicle, anti-SUV activists emphasize the costs to other drivers who are unlucky enough to get into an accident with an SUV, the costs to children in the form of higher asthma rates from increased pollution, and the costs to the environment from increased greenhouse gas emissions, among other externalities. While their message has resonated with some portions of

[77] Ibid., 22.

[78] Jenny C. McCune, "Consumer Activism Means Big Business," *Management Review* 79 (December 1990): 16–19. In the late 1980s, the fur market experienced a downturn. Pelt prices dropped, several furriers declared bankruptcy, and a few American department stores stopped selling fur coats. The animal rights movement claimed a victory, while the fur industry blamed the lackluster sales on other factors. See Finsen and Finsen, *Animal Rights Movement in America*, 115–116.

[79] The Center for Consumer Freedom is sponsored by the restaurant and food industry. See "What is the Center for Consumer Freedom?" accessed at http://www.consumerfreedom.com/about.cfm, 25 July 2005.

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the public and with select policymakers, the frame of personal choice and responsibility is difficult to overcome.[80]

Indeed, the anti-SUV campaign confronts even more serious challenges when it comes to combating the frame of individual choice than do other consumer campaigns, inasmuch as automobiles are a preeminent symbol of freedom in America. America's interstate highway system, combined with high rates of automobile ownership, offers an unprecedented level of mobility to many Americans. And the ease of mobility, combined with the value of individual freedom, has translated into what many perceive as a *right* to mobility.[81] Popular culture—the films *Easy Rider* and *Thelma and Louise* come to mind—romanticizes life on the road and suggests that the personal motorized vehicle offers an escape from oppressive societal mores and personal circumstances. For women, the automobile promised a certain kind of geographical liberation. No longer would women be confined to the home, but would be able to leave behind—both literally and figuratively—their domestic confinement.[82]

Limiting Americans' consumer choices and our freedoms is never a popular stand to take, and anti-SUV activists take pains to acknowledge the right of people to drive any vehicle they choose. As noted, the 2004 Democratic National Party Platform supports "the American people's freedom to choose whatever cars, SUVs, minivans, and trucks they choose ... " while the Ultimate Poseur Sport Utility Page offers this disclaimer: "We are not trying to tell you what to buy; that's your freedom and your decision." The leader of a San Francisco area group called "Don't Be Fueled! Mothers for clean and safe vehicles" goes so far as to call herself "pro-vehicle choice," mimicking the rhetoric of the pro-choice movement regarding abortion.[83] Anti-SUV activists seem unable to embrace a solution that would limit the freedom of the consumer. One exception is a group of activists in Los Angeles who are trying to prohibit driving SUVs on local residential roads by using an existing city bylaw that bans vehicles over six thousand pounds.[84] Most anti-SUV activism, however, offers only a limited set of policy tools. Activists promote stricter fuel efficiency standards and additional regulations to improve the safety of SUVs, but outright bans or heavy taxes to discourage the consumption of SUVs are rarely considered. Rather, solutions—such as consumer education and

[80] For an analysis of how these frames play out in public health politics, see Rogan Kersh and James A. Morone, "Obesity, Courts, and the New Public Health," *Journal of Health Politics, Policy, and Law* 30 (October 2005): 839–868.

[81] See Joseph F. Coughlin, "The Tragedy of the Concrete Commons: Defining Traffic Congestion as a Public Problem" in David A. Rochefort and Roger E. Cobb, eds., *The Politics of Problem Definition: Shaping the Policy Agenda* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1994), 138–158.

[82] See Virginia Scharff, *Taking the Wheel* (New York: Free Press, 1991).

[83] Quoted in Mark Clayton, "To Boost U.S. Security, An Energy Diet," *Christian Science Monitor*, 23 September 2004.

[84] P.J. O'Rourke, "'Axels of Evil': The Backlash Grows," *Sunday Times* (London), 17 October 2004.

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technological advances—that do not impose on the right of the consumer to freely choose what to drive and that do not limit her personal mobility are advocated.

CONCLUSION

In May 2003, British Member of Parliament Norman Baker asked leaders in the car industry to stop advertising SUVs as appropriate urban and suburban vehicles. According to Baker, he was "besieged by angry constituents" who were frustrated because the large vehicles blocked the narrow streets in his district.[85] The Mayor of London, Ken Livingstone, soon joined the anti-SUV chorus, describing SUVs as "bad for London" and calling SUV owners "complete idiots." His recent proposal was to double the daily congestion fee (the equivalent of nine U.S. dollars) for sport utility vehicles. In Paris, the City Council recently passed a nonbinding resolution threatening to ban "the scandalous vehicles" from parts of the city. French Green Party politicians are proposing to affix stickers on the doors of SUVs that read "This is dangerous for the planet," or "I am stupid, I have an SUV."[86] And the French government has tried to levy a heavy "sin tax" on the vehicles in order to stem the increase in sales of SUVs. The anti-SUV movement, originating in the United States with a handful of Internet activists, has spread across the Atlantic in the matter of a few years.

The expansion of the anti-SUV movement both here and abroad suggests that it has hit a nerve with the public. It has tapped into people's everyday experiences, and has linked these grievances to larger moral and political concerns. Its supporters include evangelical religious clergy, mainstream environmental organizations, and self-described "non-activists" who argue against SUVs on the Internet.[87] Like other projects aimed at politicizing private behavior, the anti-SUV campaign uses a mix of moral and utilitarian arguments to question the consumption choices of a class of individuals in society. It is aimed at the affluent, and castigates an upper-middle class suburban lifestyle, suggesting that "morality politics" is not the exclusive terrain of the Republican Party or the Christian right. Indeed, moral claims, long a part of American politics and discourse, are made on both the political right and left and can target the elite as well as the marginalized. The recent campaign on college campuses to reduce the use of sweatshop labor, and efforts in the 1980s

[85] Nicholas Rufford, "Stop the 4 x 4 Heavy Mob!", 25 May 2003, accessed on the website of *The Times Online* at http://www.timesonline.co.uk, 7 August 2004.

[86] National Public Radio, *Weekend Edition*, 25 July 2004.

[87] Todd Bradley, creator of the "SUV Backlash" website, said in a telephone interview with the author that he did not consider himself an activist, and that when it comes to politics, he is a rather passive voter. Telephone interview, 24 August 2004. Creators of the Ultimate Poseur Sport Utility Page explain that they started the website in 1997 "as a fun hobby site, not to fight for a cause or force some agenda." Ultimate Poseur Sport Utility Page, accessed at http://poseur.4 x 4.org, 18 June 2004.

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to urge colleges and universities to divest from South Africa are additional examples of what we might call "liberal moral reform projects." Further research might compare the politics of liberal and conservative moral reform projects, with an eye toward understanding their similarities and differences.[88]

The anti-SUV campaign has successfully raised questions about the growing trend toward larger and more polluting vehicles, and is prompting auto manufacturers to redesign SUVs to make them safer and more fuel efficient. But the campaign confronts an ambiguous set of ideas, rooted in a history and a political economy that both valorize consumption and raise concerns about the potential for excessive, unnecessary, and dangerous consumption habits. Given the central role of the automobile in our economy and society, and its importance as a symbol of freedom and choice, any policies in the United States aimed at sport utility vehicles are unlikely to involve the sort of bans, fines, and taxes being considered in some European countries. This stands in contrast to other campaigns that politicize private behavior, such as anti-drug and anti-smoking movements, which often result in "all-out prohibitions and zero-tolerance policies."[89] Such policies are almost unthinkable when applied to sport utility vehicles. The drivers of SUVs, after all, may be inconsiderate and selfish, but have yet to be seen by the general public as endangering society in a significant way. Class and race once again are relevant here: SUV drivers are largely middle and upper middle class whites, whose behaviors are rarely subject to such draconian or criminalizing policies.*

[88] For an analysis of how liberals and conservatives conceptualize morality, see George Lakoff, *Moral Politics: How Liberals and Conservatives Think*, 2nd ed. (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2002).

[89] Kersh and Morone, "How the Personal Becomes Political," 175. Keith Bradsher, author of *High and Mighty: SUVs—The World's Most Dangerous Vehicles and How They Got That Way*, is one of the few to advocate more draconian policies aimed at SUV drivers. He suggests that stiffer penalties should apply to drivers who hurt others in accidents because of negligence: "Prosperous families might think twice about choosing the Suburban over the minivan," he writes, "if they thought that a jury would be more likely to send them to prison for manslaughter after a deadly crash if they were in an SUV that they did not need." Bradsher, *High and Mighty*, 417.

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







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In Like a Lamb, Out Like a Lion: The Political Conversion of Jimmy Carter

YAEL S. ARONOFF

Fundamental and sometimes abrupt change in the direction of a nation's foreign policy is a crucial but insufficiently understood driving force in international politics. One determinant of such change is the alteration in the worldview of a key national leader. Obvious examples are the transformations of the vehemently anti-communist Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan into peacemakers with China and the Soviet Union in the course of their presidencies. A less familiar but equally important conversion is that of the leader who changes from a dove to a hawk. Such a transformation is the focus of this article on President Jimmy Carter. Carter's policies toward the Soviet Union underwent a dramatic change in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on 27 December 1979. As Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein put it, in the assertion that provides the title for this article, Carter "came in like a lamb and went out like a lion."[1] He began his presidency in 1977 full of optimism that he could reduce international tensions by entering into a major arms reduction agreement with the Soviet Union. He sought to reform the Soviet Union by trying to influence it to end human rights abuse, reduce its armed presence outside its borders, reduce expenditure on the military, and eventually end communism. However, Carter grew more skeptical of Soviet motivations and less sure of his ability to change Soviet behavior when Soviet Chairman Leonid Brezhnev rebuffed his nuclear arms proposal and his proposed summits, and then intervened in the Horn of Africa in January of 1978. Carter's skepticism was further reinforced and magnified by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

[1] Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, "Afghanistan, Carter, and Foreign Policy Change: The Limits of Cognitive Models" in Dan Caldwell and Timothy J. McKeown, eds., *Diplomacy, Force, and Leadership: Essays in Honor of Alexander L. George* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), 95–127.

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The central question of this essay is what were the causes of Carter's radical transformation? I argue that Carter's change in attitude cannot be explained solely by neorealist accounts of rational actors responding logically to changing circumstances. The "facts" of geopolitical events and Soviet actions were filtered through differing ideological prisms that shaped the extent of the perceived threat and proposed policies to meet the threat. For instance, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski disagreed on whether the Soviets had a grand offensive strategy and whether arms control should be linked to Soviet behavior in other realms. Many presidents would probably have punished the Soviet Union after its invasion of Afghanistan. However, those with a more entrenched and elaborate foreign policy framework than Carter, such as Vance, did not undergo a significant reevaluation of approach, as did Carter. In contrast, even after the invasion of Afghanistan, had Vance been president or had he had greater influence over Carter than did Brzezinski, the White House would have continued to negotiate with the Soviets, would have tried to get the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) ratified, would not have articulated the Carter Doctrine (since Vance did not think the Soviet Union had grand offensive designs), and would have opposed Presidential Directive 59.[2] Therefore, even with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, not every president would have undergone such a political conversion, practically cutting off relations with the Soviet Union, as well as dramatically influencing U.S. policy in the Persian Gulf for decades to come.

Just as Carter's change and consequent policies were not dictated by systemic forces, they were also not primarily determined by domestic ones. Although Carter's policy shifts were reinforced by the changing mood of the country in a more conservative direction, and Senator Henry M. Jackson led the opposition to SALT II, these were not the instigation for the changes.[3] Many of Carter's advisers attest that the last way to get his support on something was to say it was politically advantageous.[4] Brzezinski claims that Carter "rarely, if ever, thought of foreign policy in terms of domestic politics," and Vance agrees that to Carter, "those who argued politics were really coming in on the cheap and he would often lament, oppose, and show anger toward those who would do so."[5] Carter admits that his imposition of the

[2] Interview with Marshall Shulman, the State Department's principle Soviet affairs adviser under Cyrus Vance, 24 March 2000, New York.

[3] Jerel A. Rosati, *The Carter Administration's Quest for Global Community: Beliefs and Their Impact on Behavior* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1994), 103.

[4] Interviews with Robert Pastor, director of Latin American and Caribbean Affairs, NSC, under Carter and Jody Powell, Carter's press secretary, 30 March 2000, Washington DC; James Schlesinger, Miller Center Interviews, Carter Presidency Project, XXII (19 July 1984), 65, Carter Library; "Whatever Became of Jimmy Carter?" *Esquire*, July 1984, 81.

[5] Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser 1977-1981* (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1983), 35; interview with Vice President Walter F. Mondale in

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grain embargo and the boycott of the Olympics after the invasion of Afghanistan were politically damaging.[6]

Carter not only eschewed making foreign policy decisions based on public opinion, but took many unpopular positions on issues such as reducing energy consumption, pursuing the Panama Canal Treaty, risking direct involvement in the Middle East negotiations, and boycotting the Olympics. Right before the Iowa primary, he imposed a grain embargo that would hurt farmers in Iowa—something to which Walter Mondale, Hamilton Jordan, and his wife objected vehemently.[7] Carter favored registration for the draft after the invasion of Afghanistan, even though Mondale and Stuart Eizenstat were in "near-rebellion" over the potential political damage to the reelection campaign. Rosalynn Carter repeatedly urged the President to avoid an issue or postpone an act or statement that might be politically costly.[8] For instance, she pleaded in vain to resist announcing during the week before the New York primary federal budget cuts that directly affected the Democratic constituency in New York City. All politicians are concerned with reelection, but this clearly was not a driving factor in Carter's changed orientation toward the Soviet Union.

To account fully for Carter's shift in attitude, one cannot rely solely on systemic and domestic forces. One must turn to political psychology, particularly the combination of Carter's religious beliefs, his personality characteristics, and the influence of his advisers. I examine Carter's political conversion with a view to illuminating the general question of what makes some leaders more likely than others to fundamentally transform their political worldviews.

In the following analysis of Carter's transformation, I draw from a rich array of sources, including Carter's memoirs and those of the other members of his national security team, the extensive secondary literature on the Carter presidency, and primary sources including fifteen interviews with former Carter associates conducted largely in the spring of 2000. I also draw on Carter's own utterances, particularly in contexts in which he was not delivering prepared texts, such as interviews and meetings.[9]

Kenneth W. Thompson, ed., *The Carter Presidency: Fourteen Intimate Perspectives of Jimmy Carter* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1990), 243.

[6] Jimmy Carter, *Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President* (New York: Bantam Books, 1982), 482, 544, 568.

[7] Ibid., 156, 315, 474; telephone interview with Vice President Walter Mondale, 24 April 2000; Rosalynn Carter, *First Lady from Plains* (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1984), 315.

[8] Carter, *Keeping Faith*, 482, 544, 568; Carter, *First Lady from Plains*, 165.

[9] Margaret G. Hermann and Thomas W. Milburn, *A Psychological Examination of Political Leaders* (New York: The Free Press, 1977), 460; NSC meeting that included the President, 2 January 1980, 21, vertical file, Carter Library.

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I proceed first by spelling out my analytic approach. I go on to employ my analytic perspective to examine in detail Carter's changing views of and responses to the Soviet Union. The article concludes with reflections on the larger implications of my analysis, noting certain similarities between the Carter experience and the presidency of George W. Bush.

Analytic Approach

My analysis of Jimmy Carter's transformation from dove to Cold War hardliner has its roots in cognitive psychology. In particular, I examine his political psychology in terms of certain assertions about political cognition made by Fred Greenstein, Alexander George, Robert Jervis, and Richard Betts. Fred Greenstein suggests that certain factors—ambiguous environments, strategic placement of the actor, and the emotional involvement of the leader in politics—will allow for the heightened effect of personal variability in leadership decision making.[10] The case of Carter fits all of these criteria: Carter faced an ambiguous environment in which Soviet motives were unclear and the United States was unsure of its true military capabilities; he was certainly emotionally involved, and his fury with the Soviets after their invasion of Afghanistan was, according to witnesses, palpable. This situation, then, fits Greenstein's criteria quite well, making Carter's image of and response to the Soviet Union a case in which it was likely that beliefs and cognitive style had a great impact on leadership decision making.

From Alexander George, I take that ideology—a general belief system about the nature of politics, the political environment, and the predictability of the future—is key in explaining the different goals pursued by leaders, which, in turn, influence the extent to which each leader changes.[11] Since Carter was not rigidly tied to a political ideology, I use religion as a comparable framework for addressing general philosophic guidelines otherwise provided by political ideologies.

In addition to ideology, cognitive style has a significant impact on a leader's capacity for changing images of and policies toward an adversary. Under cognitive style, I analyze three individual attributes: time orientation, cognitive flexibility, and risk propensity. Although under-analyzed in the scholarly litera-

[10] Fred I. Greenstein, *Personality & Politics: Problems of Evidence, Inference, and Conceptualization* (New York: Norton, 1975), vii, 144; Fred I. Greenstein, "The Impact of Personality on Politics: An Attempt to Clear Away Underbrush," *The American Political Science Review* 61 (September 1967): 629–641; Fred I. Greenstein, "The Study of Personality and Politics: Overall Considerations" in Fred I. Greenstein and Michael Lerner, eds., *A Source Book for the Study of Personality and Politics* (Chicago, IL: Markham, 1971), 14–20.

[11] Alexander George, "Ideology and International Relations: A Conceptual Analysis," *The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations* 9 (March 1987): 1–21; Myron J. Aronoff and Yael S. Aronoff, "Explaining Domestic Influences on Current Israeli Foreign Policy: The Peace Negotiations," *The Brown Journal of World Affairs* 3 (Summer/Fall 1996): 83–101.

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ture, an individual's perception of time is a core element of cognitive style.[12] Several scholars have demonstrated the effect that focusing on the past has on decision making. Robert Jervis, in his classic analysis of perception and misperception, argues that a perception of the past that does not recognize changed circumstances can lead to "the tyranny of the past upon the imagination." Similarly, Richard Betts concludes, from his analysis of surprise attacks, that focusing on past behaviors can lead to miscalculation: as he puts it, "extrapolations from past behavior ... are poor bases for anticipating dramatic shifts." While a focus on the past can inhibit change, a present or future orientation is more likely to facilitate change. Finally, Roy Licklider's analysis of peacemaking argues that forgetting is necessary for reconciliation after civil wars.[13] This study builds on these findings by suggesting that those leaders who see a conflict-ridden past as repeating itself are less likely to forge a new image of a past enemy. Taking this a step further, I argue that leaders who focus on the present, receiving information in small increments, are slow to perceive overall shifts. This builds on Jervis's notion that information arriving gradually is likely to be dismissed or lead to only slight modifications. Finally, a future orientation enables a more rapid revision of one's image of an adversary.[14]

In conjunction with time orientation, I examine individual cognitive flexibility as a variable that facilitates or hinders change. Cognitive flexibility refers to the degree to which leaders group ideas and people into "black and white" categories, and how receptive they are to differing views. A leader who is cognitively rigid will tend to dismiss information that challenges prior categorizations, and thus is less likely to change attitudes than one who is more flexible.[15] A great number of experiments, including many conducted by Philip Tetlock, provide evidence of this phenomenon, which is true of both experts and nov-

[12] Milton Rokeach and Richard Bonier, "Time Perspective, Dogmatism, and Anxiety" in Milton Rokeach, ed., *The Open and Closed Mind: Investigation Into the Nature of Belief Systems and Personality Systems* (New York: Basic Books, 1960), 366–375; Philip G. Zimbardo and John N. Boyd, "Putting Time in Perspective: A Valid, Reliable Individual-Differences Metric," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 77 (December 1999): 1271–1288.

[13] Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 217, 308–309; Richard K. Betts, *Surprise Attack: Lessons for Defense Planning* (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1982), 96; G. Roy Licklider, "Memory and Reconciliation After Civil Wars: The U.S. and Nigerian Cases" (paper presented at the Center for Historical Analysis at Rutgers University, 14 February 1995).

[14] Barbara Farnham, "Reagan and the Gorbachev Revolution: Perceiving the End of Threat," *Political Science Quarterly* 116 (Summer 2001): 225–252; Yael Aronoff, "When and Why Do Hard-Liners Become Soft? An Examination of Israeli Prime Ministers Yitzhak Shamir, Yitzhak Rabin, Shimon Peres, and Benjamin Netanyahu" in Ofer Feldman and Linda O. Valenty, eds., *Profiling Political Leaders: Cross-Cultural Studies of Personality and Behavior* (London: Praeger Publishers, 2001), 188.

[15] Rokeach, *The Open and Closed Mind*, 57; Margaret G. Hermann, "Handbook for Assessing Personal Characteristics and Foreign Policy Orientations of Political Leaders," *Occasional Paper*, Mershon Center, Ohio State University, 12 May 1987, 1–35.

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ices.[16] A leader's position on this spectrum of cognitive rigidity and flexibility is determined by analysis of a broad range of his attitudes, which reveals a general pattern.

Finally, I analyze a leader's risk propensity as a predictor of the probability of a strong shift in foreign policy direction. While Daniel Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack hypothesize that risk-tolerant leaders are more likely to cause wars, I argue that the willingness to take risks can lead *either* to more-coercive strategies *or* to greater accommodation, depending on the beliefs of the leaders and their advisers.[17]

This study is part of a larger research project that seeks to establish the general conditions under which leaders undergo fundamental transformations in belief or strategy. That project focuses particularly on Israeli prime ministers, contrasting hard-liners who later became peacemakers, such as Yitzhak Rabin, with prime ministers who remained intractable in their attitudes and policies toward the Palestinians.[18] These cases, along with the present analysis of Carter's transformation from dove to hawk, illustrate that the following determinants may make it more probable that a leader will initiate dramatic changes in foreign policy in either direction: a weak commitment to a political ideology, cognitive flexibility, a focus on the present or future as opposed to the past, risk propensity, and the influence of an adviser who has a contrasting image of an enemy. Indeed, these elements of cognitive style make it more likely that a leader will be more susceptible to being influenced by an adviser. An adviser's level of influence is determined by his/her access to the president and chemistry with the president, as well as the unfolding of events on the ground.[19] The direction of the change is determined by the behavior of the enemy, and the particular beliefs of leaders and their influential advisers.

Upon his election to office as President, none of Carter's prior experiences as a naval officer, peanut farmer, state legislator, or governor lent themselves to establishing strong foreign policy convictions. He therefore relied heavily on his Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, and his National Security Adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, who were each guided by significantly different orientations. Brzezinski was increasingly successful in marginalizing Vance and in guiding Carter's interpretation of Soviet motives and behavior.

[16] Philip Tetlock, "Theory-Driven Reasoning About Plausible Pasts and Probable Futures in World Politics: Are We Prisoners of Our Preconceptions?" *American Journal of Political Science* 43 (April 1999): 335–366.

[17] Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, "Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing the Statesman Back In," *International Security* 25 (Spring 2001): 107–146.

[18] Yael S. Aronoff, "When and Why Do Hard-Liners Become Peace-Makers?" in *When Hard-Liners Opt For Peace: The Political Psychology of Israeli Prime Ministers* (forthcoming).

[19] Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (New York: Longman, 1999).

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Weak Adherence to Ideology Leads to Greater Adaptability

President Carter lacked a well-defined ideology that shaped his views of foreign affairs. Carter's weak adherence to ideology allowed him a high degree of flexibility in his interpretation of and reaction to events—in this case, in his interpretation of actions taken by the Soviet Union, and his policy decisions in reaction to them. Since Carter did not fit each piece of information into a preexisting ideology, he was more likely to use new pieces of information to question his own policies and to quickly turn in a different direction in response to a new fact. For example, Carter changed his mind three times in one day on whether to invade Panama. His advisers thought that Carter made decisions too quickly.[20]

Carter was widely seen, as his Chief of Staff Hamilton Jordan put it, as a leader whose "approach to his Presidency and the country's problems was non-ideological."[21] He was often characterized as straddling the divide between Republicans and Democrats, and combined the policies of these parties in unusual ways. Carter suggested that he straddled the conservatism of his father and the liberalism of his mother, and claimed that he often felt more at home with the conservative Democratic and Republican members of Congress—an assessment shared by the editors of *Time* magazine, who labeled him "a Democrat who often talks and thinks like a Republican."[22] As Fred Greenstein argues, Carter "advanced a blend of domestic liberalism and economic conservatism that cut across traditional ideological divisions."[23]

Carter neither rigidly adhered to the dictates of a political party nor was he committed to a single foreign policy orientation—neither *realpolitik* nor Wilsonian idealism. These two orientations might be defined, as Brzezinski put it, as on the one hand, "the inclination to ... emphasize the primacy of power," and on the other, to "[stress] moralism and morality as the central factors that ought to shape American foreign policy."[24] Carter attempted to combine these foreign policy approaches. He initially reacted against the *realpolitik* of the Nixon administration, and emphasized morality in foreign policy. Carter did not focus on the ideological conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union, and attempted to normalize relations with Cuba.[25]

[20] Interview with Pastor; Bruce Mazlish and Edwin Diamond, *Jimmy Carter: A Character Portrait* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979), 159; Thompson, *Carter Presidency*, 163.

[21] Hamilton Jordan, *Crisis: The Last Year of the Carter Presidency* (New York: Putnam, 1982), 316.

[22] Jimmy Carter, *Why Not the Best?* (Nashville, TN: Broadman Press, 1975), 20, 74; Carter, *Keeping Faith*, 102; "Man of the Year: I'm Jimmy Carter," *Time* 3 January 1977, 14.

[23] Fred I. Greenstein, *The Presidential Difference: Leadership Style from FDR to Clinton* (New York: The Free Press, 2000), 132.

[24] Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Twin Strands of American Foreign Policy" (speech made before the Baltimore Council on Foreign Affairs, 9 May 1980).

[25] Carter, *Keeping Faith*, 65, 142, 143; Gaddis Smith, "Carter's Political Rhetoric" in Thompson, ed., *Carter Presidency*, 207; "The Intervention in Afghanistan and the Fall of Detente," Nobel Sym-

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President Carter's non-ideological outlook included his approach to the Soviet Union. Unlike some other Cold War presidents, Carter did not have strongly held views about the character of the Soviet Union.[26] While, as Betty Glad suggests, "Carter never talked as if he thought the Soviet Union was a peace-loving, moderate state," neither did he have a deeply ingrained hostile image of it.[27] Carter's writing before his presidency—his Annapolis diary, the papers of his governorship in the Georgia state archives, and his book, *Why Not the Best?* written during his campaign—make no mention of the Soviet Union.[28] According to Brzezinski, "Carter would be the first to admit that he came to the White House without a detailed plan for managing U.S.–Soviet relations."[29] This attitude, however, shifted dramatically by the end of his presidency: he entered office viewing the Soviets as an adversary—a state with some competing interests and goals—but left viewing them as an enemy, or one who, as Alexander George puts it, represented "the antithesis of one's own core values" and a threat to "one's preferred political and international order."[30]

Carter's principal national security advisers, Brzezinski and Vance, contrasted with him in that they both had well-developed and largely unchanging views of the Soviet Union. But they were in sharp disagreement with each other. They disagreed on whether the Soviets had a grand strategy, on whether their motives were offensive or defensive, on whether arms control would pave the way for wider accommodation, and on whether accomodation should be linked to Soviet behavior in other realms. Vance thought that increased contact through exchanges and trade would change Soviet behavior and did not see the conflict predominantly as communism versus democracy.[31] In contrast, Brzezinski argued that the Soviet Union would only change once it abandoned communism; he favored confrontation, believing that accommodation only increased Soviet expansionist ambitions.[32] Brzezinski was deeply committed to his foreign policy orientation and maintained a strongly embedded, hostile view of the Soviets.[33] Brzezinski refers to these two approaches as an "ideological" divide within the administration between Vance and himself.[34]

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posium, Lysebu, Norway, 17–20 September 1995 (Oslo: The Norwegian Nobel Institute, 1996), 136; interview with Robert Pastor.

[26] Interview with Pastor; interview with Jody Powell, 30 March 2000, Washington DC; Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, 18. Cyrus Vance, *Hard Choices: Critical Years in America's Foreign Policy* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), 33.

[27] Betty Glad, *Jimmy Carter: In Search of the Great White House* (New York: Norton, 1980).

[28] Carter, *Why Not the Best?*

[29] Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, 147.

[30] George, "Ideology and International Relations," 6.

[31] Rosati, *Carter Administration's Quest*, 112; Vance, *Hard Choices*, 21, 28.

[32] Lebow and Stein, "Afghanistan, Carter, and Foreign Policy Change," 98–99; interview with Zbigniew Brzezinski, 29 March 2000, Washington, DC; "The Intervention in Afghanistan," 225.

[33] Interview with Samuel Huntington, NSC staffer under Carter, 10 March 2000, Boston.

[34] Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, 6–7, 36–37, 43, 57, 146–148.

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Religion Rather Than Ideology Frames Foreign Policy Perceptions

Carter's particular interpretation of Christianity, rather than a rigid adherence to any political ideology, framed his foreign policy choices. Religion is at the very core of Carter's belief system. As Greenstein puts it, "Carter stands alone among the modern presidents in the centrality of religious principles to his political leadership and, indeed, his very being."[35] In his most recent book, *Our Endangered Values: America's Moral Crisis*, Carter continues to argue that "my own religious beliefs have been inextricably entwined with the political principles I have adopted," and that he analyzes moral values from a religious point of view.[36] Religion was a dominant presence in his youth and childhood. Carter began every school day with a chapel service in the auditorium. Although religion had always been part of his life, its influence grew more fervent when Carter became "born again" at age forty-two. After having lost the race for governor of Georgia in 1966 to an overtly racist and segregationist candidate, Carter was deeply disillusioned. By his own account, Carter took his evangelist sister Ruth Carter Stapleton's advice to strive for a transcendent religious experience, and it reshaped his life.[37]

Carter not only attended church every week but also taught Sunday school and was a deacon of the church. He was flattered by Tip O'Neill's comment upon reaching a peaceful agreement between Egypt and Israel that "you're not just a deacon anymore, but a pope!" (In discussing complimentary statements he received from congressional leaders, this is the only one he specifies in detail). He often referred to religion, wrote books interpreting his religion, and gave speeches resembling sermons in their language and style. Carter argued that the purposes of religion and politics are the same, to establish "justice in a sinful world."[38]

For Carter, the idea of change itself was central to his religious ideals. He argued that we should all make a commitment to change, and that he was on an "unending quest for self-improvement." He read a chapter of the Bible every night, and wrote that Paul advises us to read the Bible with "reproof," which he interpreted as constructive self-analysis and improvement of our behavior. According to Carter, the word *reformation* implies "to reform, to change in a way that is dramatic and total, closer to revolution than to evolution."[39]

Carter not only wanted to improve himself, but also strove to change others. The most direct expression of this belief was his personal missionary work. He

[35] Greenstein, *Presidential Difference*, 128.

[36] Jimmy Carter, *Our Endangered Values: America's Moral Crisis* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2005).

[37] Jimmy Carter, *An Hour Before Daylight* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001), 219, 264.

[38] As quoted in Glad, *Jimmy Carter*, 478; Carter, *Keeping Faith*, 426.

[39] Brzezinski, *Power and Principle,* 32; Jimmy Carter, *Sources of Strength: Meditations on Scripture for a Living Faith* (New York: Times Books, 1997), xvi, 34, 133–134.

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traveled with fellow evangelists, knocking on doors to "save" those who were not Christians and to spread the Gospel.[40] Because of his religious conviction that he could change others, he also strove to reform foreign leaders by reaching out to reconcile with adversaries. He trusted leaders around the world whom others did not, and met with many of them after leaving office. He suspended judgment as he sat across the table from them—whether it was Ethiopia's Halle Mariam Mengistu, Somalia's Mohamed Farah Aideed, Nicaragua's Manuel Ortega, or Cuba's Fidel Castro. Carter claimed that "unless we are attempting things that might fail, we have too little faith in ourselves or in God."[41] The Soviets noticed Carter's religiously inspired motivation to reform them, and Andrei Gromyko told Vance (referring to Carter), "Is he really the only one to tell the truth, like Jesus Christ for the Bible legend?"[42] However, Carter did become angered when his efforts with these leaders failed. After his presidency, Carter intended to give greater support to missionary work and perhaps become a missionary himself. Carter's religious belief in transformation was also reflected in his emphasis on human rights.[43] When asked whether he had changed toward the Soviet Union, Carter claimed that he had always been "hard line" toward the Soviet Union concerning human rights, which they resented deeply.[44]

Although religion influenced Carter to hope that all nations could improve, it also led him to brand some of those who did not reform or who violated human rights as atheists and anti-religious tyrants. While seeking to reform notorious despots, Carter prayed for the punishment of human rights oppressors, and applied the language of evil when referring, for example, to the Iranian captors of the hostages.[45] After the invasion of Afghanistan, Carter and his administration increasingly portrayed the Soviet Union as an atheistic government that was subjugating fellow people of faith. For instance, in his State of the Union Speech following the invasion, Carter referred to Soviet subjugation of the "deeply religious people of Afghanistan."[46] The moral condemnation as

[40] Jimmy Carter, *Sources of Strength*, 3.

[41] Telephone interview with Vice President Walter Mondale, 24 April 2000; Carter, *Sources of Strength*, 3–7; Frye Gaillard, *The Unfinished Presidency: Essays on Jimmy Carter* (Charlotte, NC: Wingate College, 1986), 57; Jim Wooten, "Meddler, Moralist or Peacemaker," *New York Times Magazine* 29 January 1995, 33–34.

[42] "Record of the Main Content of the Conversation Between A.A. Gromyko and the U.S. Secretary of State C. Vance," 31 May 1978, Special Commission on Archives under the President of the Russian Federation, Protocol No. 37 of 24 February 1994, V-58, Carter Library.

[43] Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, 49; interviews with Powell and Shulman.

[44] In answer to my question posed, *On the Line*, WNYC, 20 October 1997.

[45] Carter, *Keeping Faith*, 143; Jimmy Carter, *Always a Reckoning and Other Poems* (New York: Random House, 1995), viii.

[46] Memorandum to David Aaron from Thomas Thornton, "The Seriousness of the Soviet Attack on Afghanistan," 10 January 1980 and text of the President's State of the Union Address to the Second Session of the 96th Congress, 23 January 1980, NSA-Brzezinski Material, Country File, Afghanistan Folder 9–31 January 1980 and February 1980, Carter Library.

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"evil," or "atheists who subjugate followers of God," could be regarded as the corollary to his belief in reformation. He believed that all sinners are capable of change, but when one refused to change, or betrayed his faith, his anger and disappointment was that much greater. When he felt betrayed by someone, Carter turned on them. For instance, when Lopez Portillo, the President of Mexico, reneged on his promise to allow the Shah of Iran asylum in his country, Carter was enraged and immediately requested the preparation of a list of sanctions against Mexico. Carter had helped Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe and felt betrayed and angered when he became more oppressive.[47]

Since Carter believed so strongly in his capacity to dramatically transform the Soviet Union, his expectations fell harder than those of his advisers, and he became angrier than his advisers when these expectations remained unmet.[48] Lebow and Stein give great weight to Carter's anger in their explanation for Carter's conversion. They explain that this anger prompted Carter to evaluate the invasion of Afghanistan in terms of Soviet dispositions as opposed to circumstances, but do not discuss the source of that anger. I argue that this anger was fueled by Carter's religiously inspired conviction of his ability to change the Soviets and by his damnation of them as atheist murderers of believers once he failed to do so.

Cognitive Style

The particular elements of Carter's cognitive style reinforced the framework provided by a weak commitment to a political ideology and a strong commitment to religion, allowing for dramatic change in attitudes and approaches toward an enemy. Carter's orientation toward the future, his propensity for risk taking, and his moderate cognitive flexibility contributed to his dramatic change toward the Soviet Union. They also contributed to a greater openness to advice from aides than others who did not exhibit these traits would have had.

Future Time Orientation

Carter's primary orientation was toward the future. His belief in progress assumed that the future would be different from the past. Betty Glad has demonstrated how, as a businessman, farmer, and governor, Carter "embraced the concept of planning as the primary tool for improvement, a manifestation of an increasing rationality that is central to historical progress."[49] Carter engaged in long-range planning as a state legislator, as governor, and as president. He sought to make a long-term impact on a wide range of foreign and domes-

[47] Jordan, *Crisis*, 416; interviews with Powell and Pastor.
[48] Lebow and Stein, "Afghanistan, Carter, and Foreign Policy Change."
[49] Glad, *Jimmy Carter*, 476–477.

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tic policies ranging from the Middle East to energy and the environment.[50] Carter's cabinet prepared a book on "Goals for America," which defined targets for twenty years and established a national commission to consider the nation's agenda for the 1980s.[51]

Carter's focus on the future and long-term planning also influenced his policy preferences for bold, comprehensive initiatives, rather than incremental or piecemeal ones. He argued for comprehensive energy plans and "drastic changes" in the federal bureaucracy that would abolish hundreds of agencies. Carter's propensity for dramatic change was evidenced by his admiration for Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's historic visit to Jerusalem and his compliments of other leaders for being "bold." Conversely, this led him to be angry that the Soviets wanted to move slowly and incrementally with arms control.[52]

This future orientation, in turn, shaped Carter's initial attitude toward the Soviet Union. Focused on the future and believing in the possibility of reformation, Carter initially expected change on the part of the Soviets. Furthermore, because he was not emotionally involved in the historical conflict with the Soviet Union, it did not heavily shape his perception of the present. Carter made few historical references and did not have a deep knowledge of Russian history. Both of these—his religious belief in reform and his lack of emotional involvement in the present conflict—facilitated his notion that the Soviets' behavior could change over time.[53]

Propensity for Risk Taking

Carter's initial dramatic overtures to the Soviet Union can also be explained by his propensity for risk taking. Throughout his life, Carter's actions reveal a high tolerance for risk. Before entering politics, he was the only white male in his town who refused to join the White Citizens' Council, despite the threat of a boycott of his business. Carter ran for a Georgia senate seat even though threats were made on his life by the local political boss whom he challenged. Carter's run for governor itself revealed a propensity for risk taking: against the advice of his best friends, "he bypassed a sure congressional seat for a long-shot try at the governorship."[54]

[50] Interviews with Powell, Mondale, and Brzezinski; Carter, *Why Not the Best?* 131–158; Carter, *Keeping Faith*, 91–92.

[51] Cabinet meeting minutes, 24 October 1979, 3 and 21 February 1977, 6. Subject file, cabinet minutes 5 January 1977 through 1980, box 18, Carter Library.

[52] Carter, *Why Not the Best?* 120–191; Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, 25; Carter, *Keeping Faith*, 123, 219–299, 416.

[53] Interview with Brzezinski; Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, 173; Schlesinger, Miller Center Interviews, 102; interview with Huntington; Smith, "Carter's Political Rhetoric," 203; Carter, *Sources of Strength*, 94; Gaillard, *Unfinished Presidency,* 57.

[54] Glad, *Jimmy Carter*, 489; Carter, *Why Not the Best?* 69, 79, 94; Carter, *First Lady*, 51–52.

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During his presidency, Carter exhibited this same propensity to take risks. He decided to accept the risks of going to the Camp David summit against the advice of Democratic Party leaders, and despite his own belief that success was unlikely, and the risk that failure might result in the alliance of most Arab nations with the Soviet Union. After Camp David, Carter went to the Middle East to establish a follow-up agreement, going against Mondale's warning that failure would risk his presidency. Carter was also a risk taker in his bargaining style.[55] He claims that when his bid for reelection was in trouble, "Rosalynn and I had a kind of blind faith that we would be successful in overcoming great political odds, as we had done so many times before."[56]

Carter's propensity to take risks has continued since his presidency. He did not hesitate to go to Argentina in 1984, even though the U.S. ambassador told him that his presence could precipitate a military coup. And Robert Pastor claims that "the only way I can be sure to have him [Carter] approve something is to say it is dangerous." Pastor knew that if he told Carter that observing elections in Panama in April 1989 would be dangerous, he would agree to it. Carter claims that his willingness to face risk helped resolve the Haitian crisis in September of 1994, averting a planned U.S. invasion.[57] Carter's propensity for risk taking helps explain his comprehensive arms control proposals to the Soviets upon taking office. Not fully realizing the extent of the anger and suspicion these would engender in the Soviet government, he was warned by many of his advisers of the risk of the venture and the improbability of its success.[58]

Moderate Cognitive Flexibility

Carter had a moderately open mind, shaped by a rich variety of interests and experiences. He exposed himself to a broad variety of topics and ideas. Carter was a prolific reader and writer, the author of nineteen books on a wide variety of topics—politics, religion, aging, fishing, his own poetry, and a novel. Carter was open to learning and confident in his ability to master any subject.[59] He preached that everyone should have an open mind about new ideas and messages.[60]

This moderate openness enabled Carter to change his mind, albeit reluctantly, on issues such as the development of the neutron bomb (first supporting it and then opposing it). He issued and then withdrew a plan to stimulate

[55] Glad, *Jimmy Carter*, 436; Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, 97; interview with Mondale.

[56] Carter, *Keeping Faith*, 315–316, 324, 392, 533.

[57] Interview with Pastor; Carter, *Sources of Strength*, 240.

[58] Strobe Talbott, "Who Conceded What to Whom? How Carter and Co. Negotiated the Strategic Arms Treaty," *Time*, 21 May 1979, 25–35.

[59] Carter, *Why Not the Best?* 12, 31, 131; interview with Pastor.

[60] Carter, *Keeping Faith*, 118, 126; Carter, *Sources of Strength*, 93–94, 150.

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the economy with a $50-per-person tax rebate.[61] Yet, at the same time, Carter had a more rigid, black and white interpretation of character. He was quick to judge, and could drastically revise his assessment of a person. Carter admitted, "I am pretty rigid. ... It's been very difficult for me to compromise when I believe in something deeply."[62] Although he could be indecisive in trying to reach a decision, once he made one, it was very difficult for him to change it, and he became stubborn.[63] Carter went against the advice of many of his advisers in his initial comprehensive arms cut proposal to the Soviets in 1977, as well as in his early decision as president-elect to withdraw U.S. troops from Korea. Mondale reported back to Carter that Japanese Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda "gave him hell" about the American intention to withdraw troops, and Mondale expressed his own disagreement with Carter's position. Eventually, Carter reluctantly decided to keep troops in South Korea. Carter was especially open to advice on issues such as relations with the Soviet Union on which he did not have deeply held views. However, once he made a decision, he was reluctant to change it.[64]

Competitors for the President's Ear

Since Carter's foreign policy views were not yet strongly formed when he took office, and because he had a moderately flexible mind, he was open to learning from advisers. Brzezinski, whom Carter described as ambitious, aggressive, and competitive in trying to gain influence, was a key factor in Carter's changed policies toward the Soviet Union. Carter described himself as an "an eager student" of Brzezinski on foreign policy, and he enjoyed Brzezinski's briefs more than Vance's. Brzezinski's office was thirty feet away from Carter's, which contributed to his access to Carter.[65]

Brzezinski was so persistent and forceful in pushing his views that Carter once sent him a note, saying "Zbig, don't you ever know when to stop?"[66] Close in age to the President, Brzezinski felt freer to criticize him than did the much younger Hamilton Jordan and Jody Powell, and Carter took his criticism more seriously.[67] By recommending that he give the President the daily intelligence briefing, Brzezinski acquired by far more private time with the President than

[61] Interviews with Brzezinski and Shulman; "Carter's 18 Months: What Went Wrong," *U.S. News & World Report* 24 July 1978, 18.

[62] Carter, *Why Not The Best?* 173, 179; Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, 31; interview With Pastor; "Man of the Year: I'm Jimmy Carter," *Time* 3 January 1977, 14.

[63] Carter, *First Lady,* 36.

[64] Greenstein, *Presidential Difference*, 143; interviews with General William Odom, military assistant in the NSC staff under Carter, 24 November 1998, New York and 29 March 2000, Washington DC; interviews with Mondale, Brzezinski, Pastor, and Powell.

[65] Greenstein, *Presidential Difference*, 141; phone interview with Fritz Ermarth, NSC staffer under Carter, 21 March 2000; Carter, *Keeping Faith*, 51–54, 450; interview with Pastor; Jordan, *Crisis*, 46.

[66] Interview with Mondale; interview with Brzezinski.

[67] Schlesinger, Miller Center Interviews, 4.

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any other foreign policy adviser. He used these meetings to prod the President on issues he felt needed attention, and to plant basic ideas. In contrast, Vance had no regularly scheduled private time with Carter, which is why Carter suggested the Friday breakfasts with Vance, Mondale, and Brzezinski. However, it was Brzezinski who helped create the agenda for these breakfasts earlier in the morning with Carter. Brzezinski's influence grew over time as he gained control over the interpretation of interagency meetings to the President and persuaded Carter to give him jurisdiction over committees formerly headed by Vance. For instance, Brzezinski reported to the President on the Policy Review Committee meetings, and introduced a policy in the Special Coordination Committee sessions whereby anyone who disagreed with his interpretation of a consensus was required to appeal to the President, so that National Security Council (NSC) staff members who disagreed either changed their views or resigned. Vance regrets not "insisting that the draft memoranda be sent to the principals before they went to the president," because the summaries did not reflect all views.[68] In late 1978, Brzezinski also persuaded Carter to transfer jurisdiction over the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) from the Inter-Agency Policy Review Committee, headed by Vance, to the NSC's Special Coordination Committee, which Brzezinski chaired. This enabled him to initiate a more aggressive anti-Soviet Afghan policy without State Department knowledge.[69]

Compared to Brzezinski, Vance was far less aggressive and competitive in attempts to gain the President's ear. Vance was reserved and had an aversion to controversy.[70] Brzezinski encouraged Carter's growing mistrust of the State Department. According to Mondale, Brzezinski was "sandpapering the State Department" by describing its members as filled with Vietnam guilt and portraying himself as the only tough guy.[71] Vance was thus increasingly marginalized. This illustrates what Alexander George has described as a malfunction in the advisory process, in which advisers with less access are "unheard," giving lopsided advantages to others.[72]

Attempts to Reform the Soviet Union

Carter's religiously driven belief in his capacity to change the Soviet Union, combined with his propensity for risk taking and desire for dramatic change, led him to attempt to reform the Soviet Union. He pressured the Soviets to

[68] Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, 10–13, 61–66; interview with Huntington; Vance, *Hard Choices*, 37–38.

[69] Diego Cordovez and Selig S. Harrison, *Out of Afghanistan. The Inside Story of the Soviet Withdrawal* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 32–33.

[70] Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, 37; interview with Shulman.

[71] Interview with Mondale; Thompson, ed., *Carter Presidency*, 147.

[72] Alexander L. George, *Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980), 131, 163, 200.

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respect human rights, to communicate with him through summits, and to make dramatic cuts in nuclear weapons. One of Carter's first moves was a sudden and public proposal for deep cuts in the nuclear arsenals of both sides. Those cuts went far beyond the Vladivostok Agreement almost concluded by the previous administration, and included new stances on issues already agreed upon. Vance would have preferred working from this previous agreement, but argued that "in this, as in other foreign policy matters, he [Carter] was always to prefer a bold, 'comprehensive' approach rather than a more modest 'incremental' building on past agreements."[73]

The Soviets were suspicious, finding it incomprehensible that Carter said he could not be bound by past strategic arms limitation negotiations, and, predictably, rebuffed Carter's new proposal.[74] Despite his deep disappointment at this rebuff and the rejection of his summit requests, Carter downplayed the Soviet threat and remained hopeful. The budget for defense spending he approved for fiscal year 1979, a 3 percent increase, was much smaller than it would be by the end of his administration and was $8 billion below the defense budget that had been projected by the previous administration.[75]

Growing Disenchantment with the Soviet Union

Carter grew increasingly more skeptical of Soviet motivations and less sure of his ability to reform the Soviets as he interacted with them personally and witnessed their actions in the Horn of Africa. Carter's shift in attitude was solidified by the invasion of Afghanistan, which he came to see from Brzezinski's viewpoint.

Dashed Hopes for Dramatic Reform

Carter was deeply disappointed over the negative Soviet responses to his human rights overtures, his efforts at comprehensive, drastic arms reductions, and his attempts to initiate summit meetings. In September 1977, Carter met with Gromyko over SALT II and was "surprised at how uncooperative Gromyko was." He argued that Soviet leaders were "heavy-handed, abrupt, rude, and argumentative" in their dealings with visiting American senators.[76]

[73] Vance, *Hard Choices*, 31, 48; Raymond L. Garthoff, *Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan* (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 1985), 626.

[74] Telephone interview with Roger Molander, chairman of the SALT II working group of the NSC under Carter, 4 April 2000; record of conversation of A.F. Dobrynin with A. Harriman from the journal of Dobrynin, 1 December 1976, V-1, Carter Library.

[75] Rosati, *Carter Administration's Quest*, 40, 54–55, 132; Carter, *Keeping Faith*, 188.

[76] Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, 155; Carter, *Keeping Faith*, 221–236; interviews with Brzezinski, Powell, and Mondale.

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Brzezinski increasingly influenced the way in which events were framed and policies were made. Carter took Brzezinski's advice and announced normalization with China on the eve of a critical SALT meeting, thereby giving priority to the Chinese over the Soviets. Other advisers had warned that scheduling Deng Xiaoping's visit right before Brezhnev's would delay SALT for several months, but Brzezinski's advice won the day. Brzezinski continued to steer events surrounding SALT by controlling access to the President. As Vance was finishing the last details of the agreement in Geneva, Brzezinski opposed the few concessions that the Soviets had requested. Vance, furious, called Brzezinski and wanted to consult the President—a move Brzezinski opposed. When they agreed to call Jody Powell to seek his advice, Brzezinski successfully insisted that he be the one to speak to Powell. Under his persuasion, Powell sided with Brzezinski, and Carter was never consulted. Subsequently, the agreement fell through.[77]

Vance was unhappy that SALT was being scrapped. Gromyko interpreted Brzezinski's refusal to make concessions and the announcement of the China visit as a humiliating slap in the face and delayed the treaty for a half a year to ensure a delay between Deng's visit and Brezhnev's attendance at the summit.[78] This delay was crucial: SALT was not signed until the summer, and by then the Soviet brigade in Cuba, as well as the invasion of Afghanistan, discouraged Carter from pursuing Senate ratification. Brzezinski's interpretation of these events encouraged Carter's growing skepticism of the Soviet Union. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and Cyrus Vance were not similarly provoked to increasingly question Soviet motives.

Soviet Intervention in Ogaden

Soviet adventures abroad added to the disillusionment Carter felt over the failure of his arms reductions initiatives. Carter increasingly saw the conflict with the Soviet Union through Brzezinski's ideological lens. In 1977, Somalia invaded Ethiopia in order to capture the Ogaden region. From January through March of 1978, Ethiopia was able to defend the region with Soviet military assistance. Brzezinski reacted much more strongly to Soviet involvement in Africa than did Carter or any other adviser, seeing a larger pattern behind Soviet activities. Emphasizing the *arc of crisis* in the Persian Gulf, from Iran to southern Africa, Brzezinski was the only one to recommend the deployment of an aircraft carrier near Ethiopia in order to send a strong message to the Soviets.[79]

[77] Interview with Molander.

[78] Interviews with Huntington and Shulman; "Global Competition and the Deterioration of U.S.-Soviet Relations, 1977-80," 129 (Conference of U.S. and Russian Policymakers, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, 23–26 March 1995) Transcript (I) vertical file, USSR-US Conference, March 1995, Carter Library; Vance, *Hard Choices*, 113.

[79] Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, 180–189.

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In contrast, Vance's opinions of SALT and his assessment of the balance of power were not altered by the Ogaden controversy. He thought that the Soviets were bound to fail in that region and that negotiation, not military involvement, would win the hearts of African leaders. Vance tried to persuade Robert Pastor, National Security Adviser on Latin America, and through him Brzezinski, that given America's greater strength, the administration could be patient and should give the Soviets the benefit of the doubt in Africa. Anthony Lake, Vance's director of policy planning in the State Department, agreed that admitting to such a competition with the Soviet Union would backfire by incurring the resentment of African leaders.[80]

After a year of resisting Brzezinski's desire to link Soviet behavior in the third world to arms control agreements, Carter was led by the Ogaden incident to informally accept this linkage. Had it not been for Brzezinski's influence, the events in the Horn of Africa probably would not have led Carter to see Soviet expansion in the way that he did. Harold Brown, Cyrus Vance, Ambassador Donald McHenry, and Director of the CIA Stansfield Turner were less worried by Soviet behavior in the third world than was Brzezinski. They did not perceive a connection to the Middle East or any Soviet grand strategy.[81] Brzezinski reinforced Carter's growing skepticism, and Carter, in turn, increasingly relied on the NSC as he adopted a more hard-line stance. Samuel Huntington, NSC staffer and consultant, drafted Carter's Wake Forest speech of March 1978, which was much tougher on the Soviets and the need to rebuild the military than Carter's previous speeches had been. The State Department was not shown the speech before it was delivered. Carter met with Gromyko on 27 May 1978 and stressed that the developing differences between the two countries in various places in the world were affecting progress on SALT. Carter was furious with Gromyko when he denied Soviet involvement in the Horn of Africa.

Although Carter became more skeptical of Soviet intentions, his optimism was not yet shaken to the point where he favored Brzezinski's military option in Africa. He ultimately was convinced by Vance that it was a local conflict and that eventually, the Ethiopians would turn to the West.[82] Carter's growing skepticism and his remaining optimism were reflected in his Annapolis speech on 7 June 1978. That speech stitched together two previous versions—one produced by Vance emphasizing the need for lowering political tensions, and one by Brzezinski that was much more confrontational. Carter's image of the Soviet Union was becoming more negative, and he wrote Brezhnev that Soviet inter-

[80] "Global Competition," 9; interview with Pastor; telephone interview with Anthony Lake, director of policy planning in the State Department under Carter, 15 May 2000.

[81] Interviews with Brzezinski and Pastor; interviews with Harold Brown, 2 June 2000, and John Despres, intelligence officer for nuclear proliferation, 27 April 2000; Thompson, ed., *Carter Presidency*, 172.

[82] Vance, *Hard Choices*, 74, 103; interviews with Huntington and Mondale.

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ventionism could precipitate a serious confrontation in the future. However, he remained unconvinced of Brzezinski's argument that the Soviets had a "grand strategy." Carter continued to pursue arms control, even instructing his advisers to set maximum goals for future arms reductions after SALT II. At the signing of the SALT II Treaty in June 1979, Carter and President Brezhnev embraced each other warmly and Carter, against Brezinski's advice, kissed Brezhnev. Carter then made a toast to "my new friend, President Brezhnev."[83]

Iran

Although the revolution in Iran and the taking of the U.S. hostages did not directly involve the Soviets, those events provided an important context for Carter's reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan only a few weeks later. On 4 November 1979, the American Embassy in Tehran was overrun by 3,000 militants, and 90 staff members were captured. Since this crisis preceded the invasion of Afghanistan by only six weeks, Carter's sense of threat and anxiety over the subsequent Soviet invasion was heightened.[84] Carter thought the Soviets were doing everything possible to aggravate the situation in Iran and was concerned that they would be tempted to move into Iran itself. He exchanged warnings with President Brezhnev. Besides fueling Carter's anger, the hostage crisis led to Vance's resignation, because he was convinced that a military attempt to rescue the hostages risked the national interest. Thereafter, Brzezinski had even greater influence over subsequent policies toward the Soviet Union.[85]

The Invasion of Afghanistan: The Final Catalyst for Carter's Transformation

By 27 December 1979, the Soviets had moved 8,000 to 10,000 advisers and soldiers into Afghanistan. Brzezinski convinced Carter of the severity of the invasion and the need for a firm response. On 9 January, he sent Carter a memo, along with an attached letter, written on 9 February 1954 by President Dwight Eisenhower to Winston Churchill. Brzezinski claimed the letter had a familiar ring to it: in the letter, Eisenhower refers to the "stupid and savage individuals in the Kremlin," and "the Russian menace," and argues that if countries such as the United States are not successful "there will not be a history of any kind, as we know it ... there will be only a concocted story made up by the Communist conquerors of the world." Eisenhower continues

[83] Carter, *Keeping Faith*, 230–261; Vance, *Hard Choices,* 102; interview with Shulman; Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation,* 811; "Warm Embrace," *The Atlanta Journal/The Atlanta Constitution*, 26 April 1995, A7.

[84] Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation*, 1077; "The Intervention in Afghanistan," 147.

[85] Thompson, ed., *Carter Presidency*, 166; Vance, *Hard Choices*, 410.

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that they must sharpen their swords for the struggle and throw back the Russian threat.[86]

Angered by the actions of "his new friend," and emboldened by Brzezinski's depiction of Soviet expansionist designs, Carter wanted to severely punish the Soviet Union, even though he had done nothing a few months earlier when China had invaded Vietnam. A few days after the invasion, Carter said that "the action of the Soviets had made a more dramatic change in my opinion of what the Soviets' ultimate goals are than anything they've done in the previous time that I've been in office."[87] He called the invasion the "most serious threat to peace since World War Two"—despite the Berlin blockade, the Korean War, and the Cuban missile crisis. Marshall Shulman and Jody Powell argue against taking these statements literally, because he was angry and had a tendency to speak in superlatives.[88] Carter had already undergone a gradual shift in attitude due to previous developments, but the invasion of Afghanistan was the final catalyst that ended his attempts at cooperation. Outraged, Carter sent Brezhnev "the sharpest message of my Presidency, telling him that 'unless you draw back from your present course of action, it will inevitably jeopardize the course of United States-Soviet relations throughout the world.'" He wanted to make the Soviet venture as costly as possible.[89] After his initial vision of a dramatic change in relations with the Soviet Union, the invasion of Afghanistan betrayed Carter's eroding trust and convinced him that the Soviets posed a threat to the region and to the oil in the Persian Gulf. Carter gave up on reforming the Soviets and was convinced that they would not pull out of Afghanistan, despite all the measures that he took to punish them.[90]

Carter finally agreed with Brzezinski that the Soviets had a "grand design," even though this was disputed by the State Department, the secretary and undersecretary of defense, and by the CIA. All claimed that Brzezinski had greatly exaggerated the Soviet threat to the region and that a Soviet attack on the Persian Gulf was unlikely.[91] In fact, Stansfield Turner sent a memo to Carter and to the NSC on 16 January 1980, claiming that it was unlikely that the Soviet invasion was a first step in a grand design to establish control over Southwest Asia and that it probably was a reluctant response to

[86] Memo from Brzezinski to Carter, "Eisenhower Letter to Churchill on Soviet Conduct," 9 January 1980, Carter presidential papers, staff offices, office of staff secretary–Presidential handwriting file, box 163, Carter Library.

[87] Carter, ABC, *World News Tonight*, 19 January 1980; Terence Smith, "The World Has Changed and So Has Jimmy Carter," *New York Times* 20 January 1980.

[88] Glad, *Jimmy Carter*, 461, 465; Smith, "Carter's Political Rhetoric," 207; "The Intervention in Afghanistan," 118; interviews with Shulman and Powell.

[89] Carter, *Keeping Faith*, 471–472.

[90] National Security Council Meeting that Carter attended, 2 January 1980, 7.

[91] Rosati, *Carter Administration's Quest*, 81–87; "The Intervention in Afghanistan," 192; telephone interview with Arnold Horelick, national intelligence officer for the Soviet Union under Carter, 28 April 2000; interview with Brown.

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what they perceived as a deteriorating position in their own sphere of influence. The State Department agreed that the United States had long perceived Afghanistan as being in the Soviet sphere of influence and argued that the Soviets were motivated by concerns over Islamic fundamentalism rather than expansionist designs.[92] In fact, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Soviet declassified documents show that this interpretation was correct.[93] Carter had authorized support for insurgent psychological operations in Afghanistan six months before the Soviet invasion. Arnold Horelick, national intelligence officer for the Soviet Union, had argued that American assistance would induce the Soviets to intervene more directly and vigorously than had originally been intended. This led George F. Kennan to suggest that the administration was overreacting because Soviet motives were defensive.[94] Had the collective influence of other advisers been as strong as that of Brzezinski, the invasion of Afghanistan might not have had as dramatic an effect on Carter.

Carter's Wrath: Punishing the Soviets

Carter's growing disillusionment with the Soviets erupted into anger after the invasion of Afghanistan. Consequently, he gave up on reforming the Soviet Union through negotiation and relied instead on punitive measures. There was disagreement within the administration about Soviet motives, the extent of the threat and punishment, and whether further arms control negotiations should continue. Carter's more severe reaction can be attributed both to his strong religious beliefs—leading him to see the Soviets as "atheists who subjugate followers of God"—and to Brzezinski's influence. Brzezinski persuaded Carter that if the Soviet Union was not made to pay heavy costs, it would repeat this behavior elsewhere with larger consequences.[95]

Carter was so infuriated by the Soviet invasion that he instituted a series of draconian measures. Carter ended communication with the Soviets, asked Congress for a 5 percent real increase in the defense budget, strengthened plans for a rapid deployment force, and withdrew SALT II from Senate consideration. Eleven working groups on trade, cultural exchanges, and arms control talks were all terminated. Carter also recalled the American ambassador from Moscow, which, in its analysis of measures taken against the Soviet Union, the State Department noted, the United States had not done even

[92] Robert M. Gates, *From the Shadows* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 147; interview with Shulman; "The Intervention in Afghanistan," 37–117.

[93] "Global Competition," 7; Cold War International History Project, Issue 4, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington DC, Fall 1994, 75. Vertical file, USSR 1980–1995, Carter Library; "The Intervention in Afghanistan," 73, 92, 99, 109.

[94] Interviews with Odom and Despres; George F. Kennan, "Washington's Reaction to the Afghan Crisis: 'Was This Really Mature Statesmanship?'" *New York Times* 1 February 1980.

[95] Carter, *Keeping Faith*, 476, 585.

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after the Soviet invasions of Hungary or Czechoslovakia.[96] Vance tried to convince Carter that it was in the national interest to keep lines of communication open, asking Carter if he could meet Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, and requesting that Shulman be sent as a special emissary to meet with Brezhnev. Vance believed that especially at a time of tensions and suspicion, it was risky not to allow the lines of communication to remain open. Brzezinski convinced the President to refuse these requests.[97] Although Vance was still optimistic about Senate ratification of SALT, Carter decided to tie SALT to Afghanistan. Vance did not perceive the Soviet threat to be as great as did Brzezinski and continued to meet with Gromyko after resigning from office.[98] In contrast, on 9 January 1980, Brzezinski sent Carter a memo stating that the administration should not strive to improve U.S.–Soviet relations, because it would look like it was "zigzagging." Carter wrote "I agree," next to this.[99]

Carter represented the more hard-line perspective. He publicly branded the Soviets as outlaws and boycotted the Olympics in order to punish the Soviets for having invaded the "deeply religious" country of Afghanistan.[100] The Soviets' lack of religion was now a factor in explaining their increasing threat. Carter's decision to boycott the Olympics, again against Vance's recommendation, was encouraged by Brzezinski, who even compared the Soviet invasion to Hitler's actions in the 1930s.[101]

Over Vance's objections, Brzezinski persuaded Carter that the Soviets had grand designs that were threatening to the Persian Gulf. On 23 January 1980, Carter announced the Carter Doctrine, which stated that "an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force."[102] According to Richard Betts, this doctrine was undertaken

[96] Memorandum for Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, "U.S.-Soviet Relations and Afghanistan," by Peter Tarnoff, 31 December 1979, NSA—Brzezinski material, country file Afghanistan 1–8 January 1980, Carter Library.

[97] Interview with Mondale; "The Intervention in Afghanistan,"138–139; Vance, *Hard Choices*, 395; interview with Shulman; "Global Competition," 279.

[98] Interview with Shulman; "The Intervention in Afghanistan," 140; "Meeting the Challenge in Southwest Asia," Current Policy No. 135, 1 February 1980, U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, 3. Vertical file, USSR 1980-1995, Carter Library; Vance, *Hard Choices*, 17.

[99] Memo from Brzezinski to the President, "A Long-Term Strategy for Coping with the Consequences of the Soviet Action in Afghanistan," 9 January 1980. Vertical file, USSR 1980-1985, Carter Library.

[100] President's Remarks at Meeting with Representatives of the Summer Olympics Teams, The East Room, 21 March 1980, 1, 2. Brzezinski material, subject file, box 39–49, Carter Library.

[101] Interview with Mondale; memo to the President from Brzezinski, "Olympic Boycott," 11 January 1980, Carter presidential papers–staff offices, NSA-Brzezinski material, subject file, box 39–49, Olympics, June 1979–February 1980, Carter Library; NSC Meeting, 2 January 1980, 14.

[102] Gates, *From the Shadows*, 113.

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unilaterally and represented "an active innovation."[103] Gary Sick, who was responsible for Iran in the NSC during the Carter administration agrees, stating, "You simply could not have had a Carter Doctrine before the invasion of Afghanistan."[104] Brzezinski thought that the next confrontation with the Soviet Union would be in the Persian Gulf and that if the United States withdrew, Arab states would align with the Soviet Union, thus leaving it with control over oil. Brzezinski succeeded in expediting the growth of the Rapid Deployment Force despite resistance from the Departments of State and Defense.[105]

Conclusions and Implications

Carter has stated his conviction that reformation of either a society or one's heart takes both a crisis and inspiration from another person.[106] Carter's explanation of reformation bears directly on the transformation of his own stance toward the Soviet Union. In the case of Carter's transformation, the crisis was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the inspiration for interpreting that crisis was Brzezinski. Brzezinski inspired Carter to link the invasion of Afghanistan to the Soviet obduracy on arms control and to see the Soviet Union as having grand regional designs. Carter's changed views in turn led him to alter his administration's policies toward the Soviet Union drastically, virtually breaking off relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The political conversion of Jimmy Carter sheds light on the larger concern of how leaders change their foreign policy, and who is more likely to change in one direction or another. Extrapolating from this analysis of Carter, the following determinants may make it more probable that a leader will initiate dramatic changes in foreign policy in either direction: a weak commitment to a political ideology, cognitive flexibility, a focus on the present or future as opposed to the past, risk propensity, and the influence of an adviser who supplies an alternative view of the enemy.

Carter lacked a clearly defined foreign policy orientation with which to frame Soviet behavior, and therefore it was easier for him to adapt to new information. It was also the case that his cognitive flexibility enabled him to change his views. Both qualities enhanced the influence of his advisers. Initially, Carter leaned toward Vance's more accommodating approach toward the Soviet Union. His religious belief in the capacity for change in individuals and nations, and in a future different from the past, in combination with his pre-

[103] Richard K. Betts, *Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance* (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1987), 131.

[104] Gary Sick, transcript of the conference The Intervention in Afghanistan and the Fall of Détente, Lysebu, Norway, 17–20 September, 1995, 185.

[105] Interviews with Odom and Brown.

[106] Carter, *Sources of Strength*, xvi, 34, 133–134.

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dilection for risk taking and bold gestures, influenced him to push for deeper arms cuts with the Soviet Union than his advisers recommended. That belief also then led him to become more disillusioned and angered than Vance when the Soviets did not act according to his high expectations. After the invasion of Afghanistan, Carter refused to deal with "the perpetrators of such an evil deed."[107]

This analysis—which suggests that advisers are influential teachers for presidents who lack foreign policy experience and strong foreign policy orientations, and for whom, instead, religion provides an orienting framework—has several interesting parallels to President George W. Bush's shifts in foreign policy. Both Carter and Bush began their presidencies with little foreign policy experience and were not strongly wedded to political ideology.[108] Bush, like Carter, is reputed to be highly reliant on advisers.[109] Even while governor, Bush relied heavily on the advice of others, for example, in capital punishment cases, spending only fifteen minutes reviewing each death sentence and accepting his aides' recommendations.[110]

At the same time, the religious framework through which President Bush sees the world has become a matter of public record. Both Carter and Bush became born-again Christians in their middle years after becoming discontented with the course of their lives. Bush, according to several accounts, has stated that God called on him to become president, and religion forms a regular part of the day-to-day routine of his White House: the President reserves time for daily prayer and Bible study in the White House and encourages everyone to participate, and opens meetings with prayer.[111] Thus, the strategies and tactics suggested by Bush's advisers mediate the philosophical framework provided by religion. Brzezinski, for example, has characterized Bush's approach to foreign policy as theological, and Bush's media adviser, Karen Hughes, has commented that his decisions are grounded in his faith.[112] For both Carter and Bush, advisers' recommendations have been incorporated into frameworks of good versus evil through which they interpret world affairs. One might plausibly characterize Bush's foreign policy as a crusade to eradicate evil in the world.

As with Carter, a crisis—the tragic events of September 11 filtered through the "inspired" interpretation of trusted advisers—catalyzed a dramatic shift in foreign policy, from a neo-isolationism to the new Bush doctrine underwriting an

[107] Garthoff, *Detente and Confrontation*, 1067, 1077.

[108] Hugh Heclo, "The Political Ethos of George W. Bush in Fred Greenstein, ed., *The George W. Bush Presidency: An Early Assessment* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), 37.

[109] Fred I. Greenstein, "George W. Bush and the Ghosts of Presidents Past," *PS: Political Science and Politics* 34 (March 2001): 77–80; Fred I. Greenstein, "The Leadership Style of George W. Bush" in Greenstein, ed., *The George W. Bush Presidency*, 1–16.

[110] Fred. I. Greenstein, "The Leadership Style of George W. Bush," 5.

[111] Tom Freiling and Robert Woodson, Sr., *George W. Bush: Faith in the White House*, Good Times Home Video, 5 October 2004; Richard Land, National Public Radio, *Fresh Air*, 29 April 2004.

[112] Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Public Radio, *The Diane Rehm Show*, 31 March 2004; Karen Hughes, National Public Radio, *Fresh Air*, 31 March 2004.

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open-ended "war on terror" around the globe. Bush, like Carter, had a history of risk taking (his previous business ventures) and therefore was also prone to making changes in foreign policy. Like Carter, he also has preferred bold, dramatic policies.[113] Further information, as it becomes available, will reveal who in the President's staff became the primary lens through which the meaning and implications of the crisis were interpreted. Brzezinski, as if he were alluding to his own triumph over Vance, suggested that Secretary of State Colin Powell was overshadowed by more hawkish advisers in the Bush administration because Powell was insufficiently firm in meetings and did not have a cluster of people who could articulate an alternative strategy.[114] This view is echoed by Bob Woodward, who argues that Powell was frozen out by the White House, while Cheney—who was much closer to the President and who has been called the most powerful vice president ever—steamrolled over Powell's initial opposition to war with Iraq.[115] These emerging similarities between the presidencies of Bush and Carter suggest that the variables employed in my analysis might be generalizable to other leaders and could provide a framework through which we can watch the remainder of the Bush presidency unfold.*

[113] Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, "Bush's Foreign Policy Revolution" in Greenstein, ed., *The George W. Bush Presidency*, 103.

[114] Brzezinski, National Public Radio, 31 March 2004.

[115] Bob Woodward, *Plan of Attack* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004), 4, 79; Karen M. Hult, "The Bush White House in Comparative Perspective" in Greenstein, ed., *The George W. Bush Presidency*, 70.

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"Dear Mr. President": The Institutionalization and Politicization of Public Opinion Mail in the White House

BRANDON ROTTINGHAUS

One of the interesting parts of this job is some of the mail you get. And it gives you a certain trust in the American people. It's a way a President can get a feeling for what people are thinking.

—*George H.W. Bush*[1]

The American public, it seems, is unwilling to write to the president. Statistics on participatory rates of correspondence with the president are low—surveys suggest that only 13 percent of the public contacted an elected official (or staff) in the preceding twelve months and only 2 percent of those who contacted an elected official contacted the president.[2] The public is only *occasionally* motivated to write letters to federal officials when aroused by congressional policy activism or when specifically asked to do so by the president.[3] Ironically, this type of information does have value for presidents in political decision making, much as public opinion polling is shown to have. Specifically, the strength of motivated opinion has been shown to be powerful, and presidents have been wise to take advantage of this information.[4] How-

[1] *Public Papers of the President, George H.W. Bush*. "Remarks at a Republican Fundraising Breakfast in Des Moines, Iowa," 16 October 1990 (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992), 1286.

[2] Sidney Verba, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry E. Brady, *Voice and Equality: Civic Volunteerism in American Politics* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), 56.

[3] Steven J. Rosenstone and John Mark Hansen, *Mobilization, Participation and Democracy in America* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1993), 72.

[4] See Melvin Small, "Influencing the Decision Makers: The Vietnam Experience," *Journal of Peace Studies* 24 (Issue 2 1987): 185–198; Bruce J. Evensen, *Truman, Palestine and the Press: Shaping Conventional Wisdom at the Beginning of the Cold War* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1992); Anthony Lewis Dexter, "What Do Congressmen Hear: The Mail," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 20 (Spring 1956): 16–27; and David P. Thelen, *Becoming Citizens in the Age of Television: How Ameri-*

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ever, historical and empirical gaps in our knowledge concerning how presidents gauge public opinion impede a complete scholarly discussion about presidential accountability and responsiveness to such public opinion. This article introduces the untold story of the origins, adaptations, and utility of public opinion mail sent to the White House as a political tool and contributes to the burgeoning literature on public opinion gauging in the White House.

Although it is fertile ground for analysis, little has been written in the academic literature about the opinion mail sent to the White House. Leila Sussmann describes the characteristics of the incoming White House mail, but is limited to describing trends for only a few presidents.[5] She pieces together an inclusive analysis of the mail operation of the Franklin D. Roosevelt White House, yet relies heavily on secondary sources for descriptive information.[6] Historians have also cobbled together public opinion letters to smelt a historical narrative of Presidents Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman, yet these works are focused more on public rather than administration reactions.[7] More recently, Taeku Lee adeptly employed public opinion mail sent to Presidents Truman, Dwight D. Eisenhower, and Lyndon B. Johnson on civil rights to demonstrate that public opinion has a "bottom up" characteristic in social movements.[8] However, Lee's primary focus is on opinion and agenda setting rather than on the value of mail to presidents.[9] Several scholars have also listed opinion mail as one of many factors in White House decision making, but a comprehensive, structural description of the uses of opinion mail within the White House has yet to be done.[10] This article begins this historical, inves-

cans Challenged the Media and Seized Political Initiative during the Iran-Contra Debate (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1996).

[5] Leila Sussmann, "Mass Political Letter Writing in America: The Growth of an Institution," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 23 (Summer 1959): 5–16.

[6] Leila Sussmann, "FDR and the White House Mail," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 20 (Spring 1956): 203–212.

[7] Ira Smith, *Dear Mr. President* (New York: Julian Messner, 1949); Donald W. Whisenhunt, *Poetry of the People: Poems to the President 1929-1945* (Bowling Green, OH: Bowling Green State University Popular Press, 1996); Lawrence W. Levine and Cornelia R. Levine, *The People and the President: America's Extraordinary Conversation with FDR* (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 2002); D.M. Giangreco and Kathryn Moore, *Dear Harry ... : Truman's Mailroom, 1945-1953* (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1999).

[8] Taeku Lee, "The Sovereign Status of Survey Data" in Jeff Manza, Fay Lomax Cook, and Benjamin I. Page, eds., *Navigating Public Opinion: Polls Policy and the Future of American Democracy* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2002); and Taeku Lee, *Mobilizing Public Opinion: Black Insurgency and Racial Attitudes in the Civil Rights Era* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2002).

[9] Lee, *Mobilizing Public Opinion*, 240 (footnote 3) also claims that Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy did not appear to keep summaries. As this article demonstrates, this is probably true of Truman but not true of Eisenhower and Kennedy.

[10] See Elmer E. Cornwell, Jr., *Presidential Leadership of Public Opinion* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1965), 245–246; John C. Geer, *From Tea Leaves to Opinion Polls: A Theory of*

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tigative process with an eye toward analytical developments of the public opinion apparatus in the White House.

Our goal in this article is to explore the development and collection of White House mail through the first half of the modern presidency, similar to other preliminary scholarly work investigating development of the public opinion apparatus in the White House.[11] Our description begins with the earliest archival records available—the administrations of Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman, where mail counting was largely a party-based enterprise.[12] The significant point of demarcation is the administration of Dwight Eisenhower, which was the first White House to keep an internal running summary total of the volume and direction of public opinion mail sent to the president along with a staff charged with understanding the trends. Importantly, the Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy White Houses implemented procedures to institutionalize public opinion as a resource before public opinion polling proliferated in the White House. Presidents Johnson and Richard M. Nixon thereafter politicized the process by using opinion mail to identify key election constituencies, to define pressure mail, to track salient, contentious political issues, and for public relations purposes. To undertake this analysis, we present these three episodic periods in chronological order, after an introduction to the White House mail room, along with selected notations of how opinion mail relates to polling in the White House.

Ultimately, the development of opinion mail as a political resource did not occur in the abstract—rather it occurred in combination with an awareness of the need to understand trends in public opinion and the concurrent rise of internal analysis of public opinion polling. Scholars have properly documented the development and institutionalization of the public opinion polling apparatus in the modern White House.[13] They find that the gradual march from party-based gauging of opinion to a more autonomous system within the White House was essential to understanding the full range of options available to a White House intent on managing (or manipulating) public opinion. Within

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Democratic Leadership (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 51; Michael J. Towle, *Out of Touch: The Presidency and Public Opinion* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2004), 116.

[11] Lawrence R. Jacobs and Robert Y. Shapiro, "The Rise of Presidential Polling: The Nixon White House in Historical Perspective," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 59 (Summer 1995): 163–195.

[12] Eisinger notes that President Hoover's internal gauging of opinion was interpreted as a desire to gauge opinion independent of the Republican Party, with which the Hoover administration did not have the best relationship. Robert M. Eisinger, "Gauging Public Opinion in the Hoover White House: Understanding the Roots of Presidential Polling," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 30 (December 2000): 643–661.

[13] Lawrence R. Jacobs and Robert Y. Shapiro, "Presidential Manipulation of the Polls and Public Opinion: The Nixon Administration and the Pollsters," *Political Science Quarterly* 110 (Winter 1995): 519–538; Jacobs and Shapiro, "The Rise of Presidential Polling," 163–195; Robert Eisinger and Jeremy Brown, "Polling as a Means Towards Presidential Autonomy: Emil Hurja, Hadley Cantril and the Roosevelt Administration," *International Journal of Public Opinion Research* 10 (Issue 3 1998):

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each period of opinion mail development described below, temporal comparisons of the polling and mail apparatuses reveal a parallel pattern of emergence and growth. Analyzing these processes together provides for a more comprehensive exploration of the public presidency and of the importance of public opinion to the modern presidency.

The White House Mailroom

Although little is known about the public opinion side of the White House mailroom, sporadic history of the White House mail operation exists. As early as George Washington, presidents were rumored to be influenced by public opinion mail in political decision making; President Abraham Lincoln, in particular, was argued to have paid attention to communications from a "resourceful, self-assured and informed group" of letter writers.[14] The modern White House mail room was established by President William McKinley, who assigned staff to the mail room and a "Chief of Mails," who was eventually responsible for "receiving, sorting and routing all classes of mail received at the Executive Office, opening, reading, marking and routing communications addressed to the President and opening, recording and caring for, and as directed, disposing of gifts to the President."[15]

Under the administration of Franklin Roosevelt, when the volume of mail rapidly and exponentially increased, twenty-two people worked in the White House mailroom—up from only a handful in previous years.[16] By the Nixon administration, the White House had created its own zip code (20500) and was receiving four separate deliveries of mail from the Post Office daily.[17] The expanded correspondence unit also retained separate subgroups dedicated to particular functions within the mailroom, including electronic mail, gift office, student correspondence, presidential messages, and mail analysis.[18]

237–256; Melvin G. Holli, *The Wizard of Washington: Emil Hurja and Presidential Leadership* (New York: Palgrave Press, 2002); Robert Eisinger, *The Evolution of Presidential Polling* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Brandon Rottinghaus, "Reassessing Public Opinion Polling in the Truman White House," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 33 (June 2003): 325–332.

[14] Sussmann, "Mass Political Letter Writing," 203.

[15] Records of this were ironically found in the Truman Archive. See Harry S. Truman Library, official file, "The White House as a Business Office," copy for President Harry S. Truman, delivered 16 May 1945.

[16] Merlin Gustafson,"The President's Mail (Is It Worthwhile to Write to the President?)" *Presidential Studies Quarterly* (Summer 1987): 36–44; Sussmann, "Mass Political Letter Writing," 6; Levine and Levine, *The People and the President*, 10–11.

[17] Henry Scarupa and William Klender, "What Happens to Your Letters to the White House?" *The Sun Magazine*, 24 July 1977, 5, 8–9.

[18] Bradley H. Patterson Jr., *The White House Staff: Inside the West Wing and Beyond* (Washington DC: Brookings, 2000), 383–384.

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FIGURE 1
Average Issue-Based Mail Sent to Presidents: 1953 to 1974



Note: Data compiled by the author. The White House mail summaries began during the Eisenhower administration, marking a departure from the Roosevelt and Truman administrations, which periodically summarized issue mail. See text for discussion.

Figure 1 tracks the average amount of policy- or issue-based mail received by Presidents Eisenhower to Nixon during their terms in office from 1953 to 1974.[19] The trend line reveals a continuously upward volume of mail received at the White House over this time. Sussmann describes several causes for the "explosion" of political letter writing in the 1930s: rising educational levels, growth of the mass media, New Deal programs giving greater visibility to government, and encouragement of political leaders to write letters.[20] Over the modern presidency, presidents became more visible, making them healthier targets as opinion receptors. As time passed, these developments became more pronounced and letter writing continued to proliferate.[21] We explore the political value of this growth chronologically by president in the subsequent sections.

[19] Data compiled by the author from weekly opinion mail summaries taken from each presidential archive. Specific archival locations are listed in the analysis of each president below. The mail counted in these averages is listed across administrations as "Presidential Mail," which excludes mail sent to the first family, gifts, and requests for presidential paraphernalia. This is the most direct measure of mail addressing popularity and policy available. The unit of measure is the average *per president*, not time period.

[20] Sussmann, "Mass Political Letter Writing," 6–7.

[21] Patterson, *The White House Staff*, 383–384.

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The Roosevelt and Truman White Houses: Establishing a Trend

As with public opinion polling, the early modern White Houses intermittently linked their measurement of opinion mail to the party system. The two presidential administrations explored in this section root the origins of the White House mail apparatus in the Democratic Party. Robert Eisinger and Jeremy Brown posit that public opinion polling ultimately expanded in the White House because of a desire to ascertain public opinion independent of the party structure.[22] In the early evolution of the White House mail operation, we see a similar pattern—the party and the president were linked but growing apart. Presidents subsequent to Roosevelt and Truman would move away from party-based opinion mail gauging, demonstrating that the early polling and mail apparatuses have similar historical trajectories.

Roosevelt

President Roosevelt was the first modern president to seriously analyze the collection of letters sent to the White House and aggregate these letters into specific issue topics to determine the salience and direction of opinion in the White House mail. Although this practice established a trend, it was sporadic.[23] This development seems to mirror the collection and utilization of polling in the White House—both the polling and the mail information networks resembled a "wheels to the spoke" staffing arrangement for distributing data, in which multiple advisers called particular public opinion information within their purview to the attention of the president.

President Roosevelt was interested in both the volume and opinion direction of the mail, and contemporary accounts reported that he saw "in the volume evidence of an increasing and wholesome reawakening of public interest in the affairs of government."[24] The President should not have been terribly

[22] Eisinger and Brown, "Polling as a Means," 237; Eisinger, *The Evolution of Presidential Polling*.

[23] See Levine and Levine, *The People and the President*, 10–11; Leila Sussmann, *Dear FDR, A Study of Political Letter Writing* (Totowa, NJ: Bedminster Press, 1963). Sussmann, "FDR and the White House Mail," 9. The Guide to Historical Materials (both in hard copy and online) from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Archives shows that some fragmented attempts were made to summarize the incoming White House mail. Only a few actual summaries of incoming mail were discovered after searching the Library's holdings, and a search of the internal database at the Roosevelt Library produces no consistent viable results. Visits to the Library produced only selected summaries of incoming White House mail, usually on a salient political issue. Selected letters, apart from summaries, were chosen from the White House mail and shown to the President, particularly when he was away from Washington at his home in Hyde Park. For example, the papers of William Hassett, the mail chief in the White House, include several forms outlining the mail sent to President Roosevelt while he was at Hyde Park. These letters are subdivided into categories: "for President's signature," "for President reading," "Letters from ... " and "secret," box 13.

[24] Quoted from *New York Times*, 17 December 1933, in Sussmann "FDR and the White House Mail," 10.

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surprised by the increasing volume; after all, Mail Chief Ira Smith noted that he was asking for such mail in his "Fireside Chats":

> When he advised millions of listeners in one of his fireside chats to "tell me your troubles," most of them believed implicitly that he was speaking to them personally and immediately wrote him a letter. It was months before we managed to swim out of *that* flood of mail.[25]

The senior staff would occasionally brief the President on the broader "pro" and "con" trends on controversial public policies, typically in the days following a policy speech.[26] This comports with findings suggesting that President Roosevelt read polls in a similar manner after major policy issues were decided.[27] The President also liked to read "typical" letters sent by ordinary Americans and "always insist[ed] that he be sent a daily batch of letters picked at random from the miscellaneous mail. These [were] letters which might well [have been] handled by departments directly, but the President like[d] to see a cross section of the daily mail."[28]

Louis Howe (chief adviser to the President) developed intermittent summaries of the mail that was sent to the President, although it could not be determined with certainty where these records officially began and ended.[29] The issues summarized tended to be diverse, and there was no discernable centralization to the presentational format. Select issues were chosen for analysis; for instance, in the 2 May 1933 summary, a letter from Arthur R. Kervin of Oteen, North Carolina (from the United States Veterans Hospital) is summarized:

> Thinks the veteran has received the rough end of the Economy program. Cites cases in the hospital beds have been cut off entirely and will suffer. Asks why it is that the pets of Senators and Congressmen get the breaks while unknown vets get nothing. Urges payment of the [World War I Soldier's] bonus now while the men need it.[30]

Several days of mail summaries on the issue of the early payment of the Soldier's Bonus was clearly a concern to the White House and they sought to capture the opinion trends accordingly.

The Democratic National Committee (DNC) was also creating mail abstracts for the Roosevelt campaign in 1932, primarily as a way to find out what

[25] Smith, *Dear Mr. President*, 156.

[26] Thomas McGreer, *What Roosevelt Thought: The Social and Political Ideas of Franklin Roosevelt* (Lansing: Michigan State University Press), 101; Sussmann, "FDR and the White House Mail," 8; and Cornwell, *Presidential Leadership of Public Opinion*, 135–136.

[27] Holli, *The Wizard of Washington*, 69–73.

[28] Louis Howe, "The President's Mailbag!" *The American Magazine*, June 1934, 23.

[29] These daily abstracts are continuous for every date in 1933, but no similar documents were located to offer a contiguous stream of data. See Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library, Louis Howe papers, editorial and mail abstracts, "Abstract of the President and Mr. Howe's Mail," miscellaneous dates in 1933, box 43.

[30] Ibid., 2 May 1933 summary, box 43.

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the party faithful were concerned about. Letters were summarized by week and were subdivided by state of origin and generally reported the status of delegates, an important endorsement in a local newspaper, poems or songs created in honor of Roosevelt, thoughts on cabinet and vice presidential nominees, suggestions for platform planks, or simply words of encouragement. For instance, a letter from Charles E. Prettyman from Neosho, Missouri is summarized: "Calls himself a 'crazy dry' and urged FDR to uphold 18th amendment [*sic*]. ... Admirer of FDR's and says that the majority of Mo. Delegates are for him."[31] G. Ernest Shansbury of Baltimore, Maryland tendered "Root for Roosevelt" as the official slogan of the campaign.[32] Similarly, Harry H. Cooper from Detroit, Michigan thought it would be "suicidal to nominate [Melvin] Traylor for V. President."[33]

The DNC continued to collect and interpret similar opinion data, including editorial abstracts and summaries, straw polls from organizations like the American Legion, and news summaries from Democratic- and non-Democratic-affiliated papers, as well as to intermittently summarize incoming mail, usually after requesting the public to write in on a subject.[34] For instance, in 1944, the DNC kept a running tally of favorite possible vice presidential nominees (at the top of the list was actor Clarke Gable).[35] Historical investigations of the DNC during Roosevelt's time in office reveal analogous practices with regard to the emerging science of public opinion polling.[36] Similar patterns continued in the Truman administration; however, fissures in this practice began to emerge.

Truman

President Truman was similarly interested in mail-gauged public opinion and was certainly more invested in opinion mail than in public opinion polls as a valid representation of public preferences.[37] President Truman thought mail gave a better sense of the public mood because it represented what "the man on the street" thought.[38] Truman insisted on reading a broad sample of mail

[31] Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library, DNC files, DNC mail, "Governor Roosevelt's Mail," 27 May 1932, box 507–509.

[32] Ibid., 20 June 1932.

[33] Ibid.

[34] See in particular, Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library, DNC files, boxes 1, 40, 847–849, 862, and 880.

[35] Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library, DNC files, "1944 VP Candidate," box 1174.

[36] Holli, *The Wizard of Washington*, 69–73.

[37] Rottinghaus, "Reassessing Polling, 325–332"; Jacobs and Shapiro, "The Rise of Presidential Polling," 164.

[38] David McCullough, *Truman* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992).

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for that reason.[39] He did not want to read only letters praising him and noted, "When a fellow gets to the point where he has to be told what he wants to hear, he's a gone gosling and he can't be a good public servant."[40] For President Truman, "the daily stacks of troubles and dreams that he poured over late at night—from places like Skull Bone, Kentucky; New York City; Boise, Idaho; and Conway, Florida—was the next best thing to a poll to the one made by Americans in the voting booth, and it was [to William] Hassett [Secretary to the President] that he entrusted the job of overseeing what correspondence reached his eyes."[41]

Much like the records of the Roosevelt White House, documents recording the use of public opinion mail as a representation of the public are highly fragmented at the Truman Library, but the administration was clearly refining its gathering of opinion mail without the assistance of the Democratic Party.[42] The administration seemed to be most concerned about the overall volume of mail on specific issues that were "carefully watched," according to staff, rather than about a range of issues.[43] The small White House staff devoted to processing the incoming mail did keep tabs on the total mail received on a particular subject—for instance, desegregation, the Cold War, and the firing of General Douglas MacArthur—and this mail was tabulated sporadically at the end of the year on the basis of pro and con distributions.[44] Many of these individual letters were summarized and delivered to senior staff for extra attention.[45] It seems that letters about certain policy questions were counted to understand the direct scope of the incoming opinion mail, similar to President Roosevelt's "mail briefs." Because the administration made little and only

[39] Harry S. Truman Library, oral history interview with Mildred Lee Dryden, 26 September 1963, 55.

[40] Harry S. Truman Library, post-presidential files, "Memoirs," tape 12, transcript page 29.

[41] Giangreco and Moore, *Dear Harry*, 8.

[42] The Guide to Historical Materials (both in hard copy and online) Harry S. Truman Presidential Archives shows that some fragmented attempts were made to summarize the incoming White House mail on sporadic issues. Two visits to the Library produced only selected summaries of incoming White House mail, usually on a salient political issue. Consultations with Truman Library archivists suggest that there was very little information available regarding mail summaries but that samples of public opinion mail were saved on selected issues. Cornwell, *Presidential Leadership*, 246 notes that the Truman administration recorded mail issues weekly, but two visits to the Library and consultation with the archival staff at the Library uncovered one such memorandum totaling three pages in length in the "Paul Hume" vertical file. The format and font seem to precisely match the format and font of the mail summaries collected at the Eisenhower Library, indicating that the Truman White House possibly initiated a continuous systematic analysis of the mail, although this claim is not provable, given that the archivists assume the original documents to be lost, misplaced, or destroyed.

[43] Harry S. Truman Library, oral history interview with Joseph G. Feeney, 22 April 1967, 104.

[44] See Harry S. Truman Library, papers of Harry S. Truman, White House central files, "Public Opinion Mail," boxes 1–10; see also Harry S. Truman Library, official file–500 misc.–505 (1948), box 1372.

[45] Harry S. Truman Library, oral history interview with Perry Hardin, 8 May 1991, 10–11.

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TABLE 1

MacArthur Firing Opinion Mail Memo, 8 May 1951

			Totals		Grand Totals	
	Pro	*Con*	*Pro*	*Con*	*Pro*	*Con*
Week ending April 13th						
Telegrams	3,458	7,263				
Letters, cards, etc.	864	1,414	4,322	8,677		
Week ending April 20th						
Telegrams	4,415	3,956				
Letters, cards, etc.	10,086	14,917	14,501	18,873		
Week ending April 27th						
Telegrams	335	179				
Letters, cards, etc.	10,113	10,438	10,448	10,617		
Week ending May 4th						
Telegrams	77	26				
Letters, cards, etc.	7,447	7,886	7,524	7,912		
Present week through noon May 7th						
Telegrams	20	4				
Letters	893	306	913	310	37,708	46,389

Note: Document recreated from Dennis Merrill, ed. *Documentary History of the Truman Presidency*, vol 20 (Bethesda, MD: University Publications of America, 1995), 227.

sporadic use of public opinion polls, the Truman White House was almost exclusively reliant on internal studies of public opinion mail for its evaluation of its standing with the public.[46]

Two issues in particular seemed to get the most systematic notice: the firing of General Douglas MacArthur and the creation of the State of Israel. On the MacArthur firing, weekly tabulations were tallied from the date of MacArthur's firing and spanned five weeks, until the mail volume lightened considerably. Table 1 recreates a table from a memorandum to the President from William Hopkins (the correspondence clerk). In the accompanying memorandum, Hopkins indicated, "The above figures percentage wise are approximately 45% pro and 55% con."[47] These findings indicate that the firing of General MacArthur was not as unpopular a decision as suggested at the time by most of the major newspapers.[48]

The other issue that received considerable staff attention was the "Palestine Situation" to which Philleo Nash (administrative assistant to the President) and David Niles (administrative assistant to the President) were assigned as senior staff members. Niles received a memorandum from the mailroom on 3 January

[46] Rottinghaus, "Reassessing Polling in the Truman White House," 104.

[47] Dennis Merrill, ed. *Documentary History of the Truman Presidency*, vol 20 (Bethesda, MD: University Publications of America, 1995), 227.

[48] David McCullough, *Truman* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), 845–846.

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1950 that the White House had received 11,675 cards indicating displeasure with the creation of the State of Israel.[49] Eventually, two extensive internal studies were conducted into the geographical distribution, opinion valances, respondent type, and communication means sampled from the more than 86,000 pieces of mail (telegrams, cards, and letters) received on the Israel issue from 1947 to 1951.[50] The ultimate finding from these extensive surveys was that the tenor of the mail messages "was overwhelmingly in approval of the policies of our President and our government, although a good deal of impatience was expressed about delays in carrying out these policies."[51]

The Eisenhower and Kennedy White Houses: Systematizing the Process

The major difference between the Roosevelt and Truman administrations and the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations was the appearance of the weekly pro and con mail summaries from the White House mailroom. Instead of piecemeal efforts to intermittently gauge public preferences on select issues or to glean opinion from individual letters, the administrations subsequent to Truman systematized and internalized the process of collecting, analyzing, and summarizing the opinion results of the incoming mail (see Table 2 for a re-creation). The operation moved away from a party-focused enterprise and toward an internal White House procedure, much as public opinion polling had done earlier. These White Houses both hired outside pollsters to conduct polls for them, but neither administration appears as obsessed with polling as subsequent administrations appear to have been.[52] The desire to internally gauge opinion independent of institutional or political rivals seemed to parallel the same trend in polling.

The institutionalization of both public opinion polling and public opinion mail during this time period as a means to understand public opinion is a curious phenomenon. Surveys of mail on major issues and the systematic daily (then summarized weekly) attempts by the Eisenhower (and possibly Truman)

[49] See Harry S. Truman Library, papers of Harry S. Truman, White House central files, "Public Opinion Mail," boxes 1–10. In particular, boxes 1–9 include several hundred original postcards on the Palestine issue as well as several tabulations based on type of communication (including form letters, personal letters, petitions, resolutions, and clippings).

[50] Harry S. Truman Library, Philleo Nash files, Palestine analysis, "Knutson to Nash," 24 July 1951 and 6 August 1951, box 13.

[51] Ibid., 24 July 1951, box 13, page 3 of report.

[52] See Eisinger, *The Evolution of Presidential Polling*, 85–87. Louis Harris, Kennedy's pollster, polled for Senator Kennedy very early before the 1960 campaign, and in October of 1957, conducted a poll entitled, "An Analysis of a Trial Pairing of Vice President Richard M. Nixon vs. Senator John F. Kennedy For the President of the United States." The rapid increase in the number of polls began in 1960, when Harris conducted statewide polls in almost every state (in many states, including New York, Pennsylvania, and California, up to five times) and produced seventy reports for the campaign

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TABLE 2

Sample Mail Summary, 1 October 1953

Agency	*Subject*	*Total*
Budget	Con: Reduction in U.S.P.H. Service To Seamen	185
State	Re: Korea	208
	Con: Red China in the U.N.	225
	Pro: SCR 32	1
	Pro: SR 126	7
	Con: Aid to Tito	1
	Con: Release of 400 German War Criminals	124
Justice	Pro: Bricker Amendment	4
	Con: Smith Act	45
Defense	Con: Sale of Liquor in Armed Forces	8
	Con: Cut in Defense Budget	3
Treasury	Con: Sales Tax	8

Note: Table recreated exactly by author from Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, White House central files, official file, White House files, "Memorandum from Mr. Pagett," 1 October 1953, OF 72.

White Houses in fact predate the proliferation of public opinion polling in presidential political behavior. Although President Eisenhower was not a voracious consumer of polls in the mold of Presidents Johnson or Nixon, the Eisenhower administration did occasionally use polls.[53] President Kennedy's pollster, Louis Harris, conducted campaign polls for the Kennedy administration primarily at the state level, and this approach to securing public opinion polls established the autonomy of presidential polling.[54] It seems that polling efforts did not necessarily compete with or displace public opinion mail; rather these two measures offered added value and complemented each other in White Houses increasingly concerned about understanding and managing public opinion without interference from the party, Congress, or the media.

Eisenhower

The precise reason for the establishment of a weekly counting procedure for the White House opinion mail is not clearly known. Discontinuous evidence obtained at the Eisenhower Library suggests that this procedure was introduced as a means of streamlining and centralizing the distribution and processing of mail rather than of measuring opinion. A memorandum from Roger Steffan (special assistant to the assistant to the President) from 22 June 1953

between 3 September and 3 November. See John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Robert F. Kennedy pre-administration files, political correspondence 1959–60, Harris, "Schedule of Delivery of Harris Polls," 12 August 1960, box 13.

[53] Eisinger, *The Evolution of Presidential Polling*, 84–85.

[54] Ibid., 88; Lawrence R. Jacobs and Robert Y. Shapiro, "Issues, Candidate Image and Priming: The Use of Private Polls in Kennedy's 1960 Presidential Campaign," *American Political Science Review* 88 (September 1994): 527–540.

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outlines procedures for the more efficient maintenance of the filing and sorting of the incoming mail.[55] There was a great deal of concern over answering the White House mail in a timely and succinct manner, and each mail summary submitted to the President indicated the total volume of mail farmed out to other agencies (generally the State Department for foreign affairs, the Justice Department for legal questions, and the Treasury Department [Secret Service] for "abusive or threatening" mail), the total volume of mail being "held" until a proper disposition could be identified, and the total volume of mail yet to be processed.

President Eisenhower did see many of the mail summary reports, and most were circulated through the senior staff.[56] One of the President's closest aides, Gerald Morgan, was in charge of collecting and interpreting the White House mail summaries.[57] Table 2 shows an early sample of a mail summary and some of the issues present. Although subsequent presidents would largely abandon this practice in favor of more statistical (Johnson) or narrative (Nixon) analysis, the Eisenhower White House tended to keep track of singular modes of pro or con opinion, incorporating both sides of an issue opinion infrequently. This might be because they were only receiving letters that expressed one particular viewpoint; however, this seems unlikely. The staff was possibly more concerned about larger trends in the mail for purposes of intensity of opinion rather than direction.

Kennedy

The Kennedy administration utilized the mail to analyze trends in public opinion with greater frequency than had the Eisenhower White House, but not as often as did its successors. Archival data suggest that the Kennedy White House relied on the mail more, in part, because the senior staff did not take many polls during the life of the administration.[58] Most of the polls found in the Kennedy Library were taken during the 1960 campaign, and only a handful were taken by pollster Louis Harris during President Kennedy's tenure in office. President Kennedy's advisers did, however, acknowledge the trade-offs between these two measures of opinion. A caveat at the end of the 2 September 1960 mail summary notes, "Generally it is felt that the *issues* mail does *not*

[55] Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, White House central files, official file, White House files, "Steffan to Officials of White House Office," 22 June 1953, OF 72.

[56] Ibid., boxes 308 and 309, and Gerald Morgan staff files, boxes 30 and 31. Several handwritten comments, the initials "DE," or officially stamped "The President Has Seen" notations appear on the mail summaries at various and multiple dates.

[57] Morgan was the only staff member to have copies of these weekly reports, and his filings of these reports became the official reports for the record. See Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, White House central files, official file, White House files, "File Memo," 6 January 1960, OF 72.

[58] Scholars have found that Kennedy had significantly fewer polls querying the public on policy and popularity than did subsequent presidents. Lawrence R. Jacobs and Melanie Burns, "Presidential

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represent a true cross section of public opinion. People who are satisfied with the Senator's public statements (the majority of Democrats, hopefully) are less likely to write than the dissatisfied."[59]

The summaries of the mail began in the 1960 presidential campaign, away from the confines of the DNC, similar to the Kennedy campaign's public opinion polling operation.[60] These summaries periodically analyzed and editorialized the trends in the mail—although few actual raw number counts are listed—and divided the subjects into salient topics of concern for the campaign. For instance, in the 2 September 1960 summary, a point under "General Mail" notes:

> A large percentage of the letters continue to come from the *South*. People there have fears about the Senator's religion, government spending, and of course Civil Rights.[61]

Under "Economic Questions," the summary notes, "Have increased in number. *Inflation* seems to be a big concern, as is *Socialism*. Many feel that the Democratic Platform means increased Government interference. They also fear a give-away program."[62] On foreign policy, specifically on the issue of Cuba, "Generally people protest the [Eisenhower] Administration's policy and want Kennedy to come out strongly against the Castro regime. 'What will you do about the situation in Cuba?' is the typical question."[63]

Closer to the end of the campaign, in the 21 October 1960 summary, the mail summaries begin to discuss trends in voter group support. For instance, on religion, many "Protestants say they are proud to support JFK."[64] The month before, Senator Kennedy had given a major speech to a group of primarily Protestant ministers, insisting that he would rather resign his office than violate the separation of church and state.[65] The letters also reveal more grassroots support for JFK and support among businessmen, based upon positive evaluations

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Polling in Perspective" (paper presented at "Researching the Public Presidency Conference," Texas A&M University, College Station, TX, 23 January 2003).

[59] John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Robert F. Kennedy pre-administration political files, weekly report on issues mail (and misc.) 10 November 1959–16 September 1960, "Weekly Report on Issues Mail by David L. Hacker," 2 September 1960, box 52. Emphasis in original.

[60] The files of Robert Kennedy, who served as the manager of his brother's campaign, contain the bulk of the material relating to the 1960 presidential campaign. Although the folder title indicates that the mail reports span from November of 1959 to November of 1960, a thorough search of Robert F. Kennedy's papers yielded a low number of such reports.

[61] John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Robert F. Kennedy pre-administration political files, "Weekly Report on Issues Mail by David L. Hacker," 2 September 1960. Emphasis in original.

[62] Ibid. Emphasis in original.

[63] Ibid.

[64] John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Robert F. Kennedy pre-administration political files, political miscellany 7 October–5 November 1960, "Weekly Report on issues mail by David L. Hacker," 21 October 1960. Emphasis in original.

[65] Theodore C. Sorensen, *Kennedy* (Old Saybrook, CT: Konecky & Konecky, 1965), 191.

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in the incoming letters. The summary also reports that in the textile industry, the "mill owners want higher tariffs" and in the military, the servicemen "want [a] pay raise."[66] This knowledge allowed the campaign to understand the opinions of active group members, both those groups usually in agreement with the President's party and those not traditionally in the Democratic electoral coalition.

The Kennedy White House was more interested in using mail as a means to gauge public opinion than was the Eisenhower administration. Several documents from the Kennedy Library reveal a pattern of analysis on an infrequent basis, similar to that of the Eisenhower administration. The first of these analyses was done shortly after the inauguration and attempted to describe the overall volume and tone of the mail. Frederick L. Holborn, administrative assistant to the President, notes in a memorandum on 27 February 1961 that the weekly average of mail was about 40,000 letters and that:

> on issues there has as yet been no outpouring of mail on any one or seven series of subjects. The issue which most consistently produces response through mail is the Peace Corps. There has been a steady accumulation of mail on this subject ever since election and the total is now somewhere [*sic*] over 5,000. There has been an increase during the past 2 1/2 weeks of mail on the recession and the state of the economy, but has not reached deluge proportions.[67]

Not all of the mail was positive, however. Holborn further notes:

> There is also a scattering of hostile mail on the integration issue and on snafus which occurred to Inaugural visitors. There has been a sharp, almost total subsiding of mail on the religious issue, and thus far surprisingly little anti mail on medical aid to the aged or other "lobby" correspondence.[68]

In one of the first integrated analytical memoranda (explaining the mail count on an issue and offering an interpretation of the mail opinion), the Kennedy White House found itself in political trouble. Subsequent to the President's Budget and Tax Message (in which he proposed a series of tax reform measures), a memorandum from William Hopkins in the mailroom noted that the White House had received 9 pro budget message letters to 110 con letters and 84 pro tax message letters to 253 con letters.[69] Hopkins concludes by noting, "It would seem that in all probability as the session of Congress progresses, the volume of this mail will increase greatly."[70] The news

[66] John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Robert F. Kennedy pre-administration political files, "Weekly Report on Issues Mail by David L. Hacker," 21 October 1960.

[67] John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, White House central subject file, WH 5-1 (mail) 20 January–30 September 1961, "Holborn to Hatcher," 27 February 1961, box 1006A.

[68] Ibid.

[69] John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, White House central subject file, WH 5-1 (mail) 1 January 1963, "Memorandum from Hopkins," 6 February 1963, box 1006A.

[70] Ibid.

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was not all bad, however, for the administration, as outlined in a memorandum from the following month. An author in the press office notes:

> The majority of the people who have been writing letters about the President's tax program favor a tax cut, but are concerned about specific details about the program—particularly those involving tax reform—and how their own taxes will be effected [*sic*].
>
> It is incorrect to say that people are against the entire tax program simply because they don't like or don't understand certain details of it. For example, in a letter to the President, a New York secretary opened by thanking the President for his efforts to cut taxes, but then complained because she thinks that single girls aren't getting enough of a tax break.[71]

This and other similar analysis of the mail permitted a more systematic and nuanced interpretation of unfavorable policy opinion and ushered in the transition to the more political motives of the Johnson and Nixon administrations.

The Johnson and Nixon White Houses: Politicizing the Data

Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy moved the White House mail operations from a fragmented and sporadic enterprise to a consistent and useful measure of public opinion. Presidents Johnson and Nixon took this development a step further and began to regularly use the data for political purposes, including gauging pressure group mail, releasing mail for external public relations, and internally measuring public support. These administrations also began to track contentious political issues through the mail, and these were tabbed to public opinion trends in the political environment each administration faced. In addition, the administrations began to use these measures of opinion as a window into twin concerns over reelection and bargaining with Congress.

Scholars have documented how both the Johnson and Nixon administrations made expanded use of public opinion polling in the White House, and the progression of the use of opinion mail followed suit.[72] President Johnson's staff consistently monitored public opinion polling on their political opponents and policy programs in increasingly exploitative ways and sought to use public opinion data for "publicity" to manipulate press reports or further opinion.[73] In particular, they were interested in political popularity and their standing among various key coalition partners. The Nixon administration politicized polling research by selecting more-partisan polling organizations, externally

[71] John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, White House central subject file, WH 5-1 (mail) 1 January 1963, "Memorandum 'Filed by Press Office,'" author unknown, 5 March 1963, box 1006A.

[72] Jacobs and Shapiro, "The Rise of Presidential Polling," 167. The total number of private polls increased from 93 under Kennedy to 130 under Johnson and 233 under Nixon.

[73] Bruce E. Altschuler, *LBJ and the Polls* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1990); Eisinger, *The Evolution of Presidential Polling*, 92.

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utilizing opinion polls for rhetorical and bargaining uses.[74] Although not identical in deployment for each administration, the collaborative use of opinion-gauging techniques reveals a symbiotic connective resource for public opinion mail and polling.

Johnson

President Johnson's career-long interest in gauging and interpreting public opinion mail led him to create one of the most extensive internal apparatuses for public opinion analysis to this day.[75] President Johnson made these ideas clear in a speech toward the end of his term in office, in which he indicated that he was fortunate to have a high pile of mail during his political career and, "As I look back I can see as clearly now as then that the mail served as a social and economic indicator almost as much as an opinion sampler."[76] President Johnson further noted:

> I have always found that the homespun as well as the neatly typed and carefully outlined messages from my constituency—whether it was my district down home or all the 50 states—were indispensable to a clear view of our wants and needs. A man can read all the memos and reports prepared for him, all the data assembled by the people who work with him ..... he can study all the newspapers and magazines ..... he can watch television and listen to the radio ..... he can discuss the demands of today and tomorrow with his advisers and his critics. He can do all this, but sometimes he can't quite locate the pulse and feel the beat of the country without a direct word from the people who live in it.[77]

President Johnson further distinguished between poll-measured opinion and mail-measured opinion in that the mail writers were "unwatched" and "uninhibited," whereas the respondent in a poll could possess trepidation when answering survey questions.[78]

The mail reports were summarized weekly on the subject and disposition of the mail received by the White House mail room. Such weekly briefing memoranda were not done for Presidents Eisenhower or Kennedy, nor was the President himself interested in reading them personally, which reflected the increasing importance of public opinion mail as a resource in the White House.[79] The weekly memoranda were addressed "Memorandum for

[74] Jacobs and Shapiro, "The Rise of Presidential Polling," 187.

[75] Robert A. Caro, *Means of Ascent* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1990); and Robert A. Caro, *Master of the Senate* (New York: Random House, 2002).

[76] Lyndon Johnson Presidential Library, aides' files (Middleton), the President's mail, "Remarks by the President" written by Whitney Shoemaker, 2 December 1968, box 90.

[77] Ibid.

[78] Ibid.

[79] President Johnson specifically asked Paul Popple, assistant to the President for correspondence, to see weekly summaries of the mail. See Lyndon Johnson Presidential Library, PR 16, 9 April–7 September 1965, "LBJ to Popple," no date, box 8.

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the President," but were circulated to key members of the President's senior staff, including McGeorge Bundy (national security adviser), Horace Busby (special assistant), Douglas Cater (special assistant), Richard Goodwin (special assistant and chief speech writer), Bill Moyers (press secretary), Larry O'Brien (congressional liaison), Jack Valenti (special assistant), Marvin Watson (special assistant), and George Reedy (special assistant and press secretary).[80]

President Johnson and the senior White House staff were concerned about the volume and direction of public opinion mail sent to the White House as it related to the administration's credibility with an increasingly war-weary Congress and American public. Larry O'Brien, the President's congressional liaison, described the migration of mail opinion into congressional opinion:

> Now, more and more you'd have people you were dealing with say, "Oh, by the way. I'm getting constituent mail," and "the President ought to bomb them off the face of the earth," or "The President ought to figure a way out of this," or "The President—" whatever. It [opinion mail] was being reflected by what was occurring in the streets.[81]

The President himself was also a keen observer of public opinion mail. In a taped conversation in the Oval Office, after a speech offering financial assistance if the North Vietnamese stopped fighting, the President noted:

> Let me show you what they're saying. Atlanta, Georgia: "People are sick and tired of your lies about Vietnam. Bring these troops home." Lubbock, Texas: "We'll back down in Vietnam, as we have everywhere else under your position." ... "[Andrew] Johnson was almost impeached after Lincoln. You ought to be impeached." ... "Your speech made me sick. Why bomb? Negotiate!" "Your Vietnam backdown is [an] insult to U.S. men who died in the cause." ... "Stop the killing of American soldiers." ... "Good Texans prefer that you stop bombing first, then start spending the billions." California: "Do you really believe that peace can be purchased for a billion?" ... "Get out of Vietnam. U.S. is the aggressor. Not fooled by your ... speech." California: "a weak-kneed buyout scheme." ... "Stop inhuman napalm chemicals." ... "a billion-dollar appeasement. ... As Neville Chamberlain was to England, you are to the United States." They're just stacked in here by the dozens.[82]

The process of identifying issues of public concern in the opinion mail trends was tabbed to public opinion polls during the Johnson administration,

[80] See the 2 April 1965 summary for a full list of the individuals to whom the mail summary memos were circulated.

[81] Lawrence O'Brien, oral history interview XIX with Michael L. Gillette, 22 April 1987, 4; internet copy, accessed at the LBJ Library online, at http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/oralhistory.hom/obrienl/obrienl.asp, 25 May 2006.

[82] Michael Beschloss, *Reaching for Glory: Lyndon Johnson's Secret White House Tapes, 1964-1965* (New York: Touchstone, 2001), 272.

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which substantiates our argument concerning the simultaneity of internally managing opinion mail and polls. The procedure is summarized in a manual titled "Processing Presidential Mail," which indicated that the mail section chief would receive public opinion polling data in order to *simultaneously* collect mail opinion concurrent with public opinion poll results.[83] The White House could therefore compare these types of opinion side by side and produce an integrated opinion map of public preferences and intensities to understand the full scope of the opinion landscape.

The Johnson administration summaries also began to track contentious political issues and the influence of interest group mail. For instance, in May of 1967, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser persuaded Secretary General U Thant to withdraw UN observers from the Sinai and replace them with Egyptian forces, and shortly thereafter, Nasser announced the closing of the Strait of Tiran and access to the Israeli port of Eliat from the Red Sea.[84] President Johnson came under intense political pressure from domestic Jewish groups to reaffirm the country's commitment to the territoriality of Israel (which he shortly thereafter announced). The White House mail leading up to the beginning of the hostilities demonstrated this pressure. In the 26 May summary, 4,328 letters (to 64 against) urged U.S. intervention in the conflict and in the 2 June summary, a total of 51,225 letters and telegrams urged intervention (to 364 against).

Following President Johnson's reiteration of public support, on 5 June, Israel initiated the Six-Day War, in which they took the Sinai, the West Bank of Jordan, East Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights.[85] In the 9 June summary, more than 81,000 letters and telegrams (around 10,000 of which were specifically identified as form letters, petitions, or "pressure mail") flooded the White House, urging the United States to support Israel (and about 1,000 against). Again, the Johnson White House was compelled to diplomatically side with Israel (primarily through State Department actions), in part because of pressure from the American Jewish community.[86] In the ensuing weeks, pro-Israel pressure mail continued to flow into the White House at a similar ratio but with less total volume. Although the mail support for the general policy was very high initially, as the weeks passed, the volume of mail decreased and the support for the general policy slumped to around 50 percent.

[83] Ironically, the documentation for this procedure was found in the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, White House administration files, Gianinni files, mail section 3, processing presidential mail (1965), box 40. Issue subjects referenced by letter writers that did not match polling results were also tallied and forwarded to the mail chief for a decision on whether to include the results in the summary.

[84] Robert Dallek, *Flawed Giant: Lyndon Johnson and His Times, 1961-1973* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 425–428.

[85] Ibid., 427.

[86] Ibid., 429.

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Nixon

The Nixon White House broke ground in several ways regarding the evolution of new political tools to gauge and shape public opinion. The Nixon administration was the first White House to make more significant and centrally controlled use of media communication by creating the White House Communications Office.[87] The Nixon administration also began the centralization and expansion of public opinion polling in the White House by adding a rotating roster of pollsters.[88] The Nixon administration's use of the mail as a political tool was no exception to these trends—indeed these developments were related. The Nixon administration, and the President in particular, viewed the incoming opinion mail with a keen eye for external public relations strategies in addition to its value for internally conveying special interest and general public preferences. This insight is confirmed by a rare acknowledgement to the *New York Times* of the Nixon administration's normally secretive means of gauging public opinion.[89] Public opinion polling was used (and abused) in similar ways by President Nixon and his staff, in particular by selectively releasing "supportive" results and "priming" pollsters to query the public about certain issues using slanted wording.[90]

As with public opinion polls, a great deal of attention was paid to mail at the highest levels in the Nixon administration. The aggregate pro and con summaries were only sent to select senior staff, including Dave Gergen (White House communications director), John Ehrlichman (senior domestic policy adviser), and H.R. Haldeman (chief of staff).[91] This public opinion data, including polling, was given a high level of secrecy and was contained within the inner circle of presidential advisers.[92] The average weekly total of a typical week was around 40,000, showing a further upward progression of the total volume of incoming mail, a slightly higher than average volume (see Figure 1). On the first mail summary submitted to the President on 31 January 1969, he wrote "good job!" and initialed it "RN."

The President was personally concerned about understanding the trends of the public opinion mail but was primarily interested in pro mail.[93] The

[87] Michael B. Grossman and Martha Joynt Kumar, *Portraying the President: The White House and the News Media* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 1981); and John Anthony Maltese, *Spin Control: The White House Office of Communications and Management of Presidential News* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994).

[88] Eisinger, *The Evolution of Presidential Polling*, 98–103.

[89] "Nixon's Methods of Feeling the Pulse," *New York Times*, 12 December 1969.

[90] Jacobs and Shapiro, "The Rise of Presidential Polling," 163–195.

[91] See Richard Nixon materials project, National Archives II, White House central files, (CF) WH 4-1 (mail) 1971–1974, "Campbell to Gergen," 2 November 1971, box 69.

[92] Diane Heith, "Staffing the White House Public Opinion Apparatus," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 62 (Summer 1998): 165–189.

[93] Only pro mail received an acknowledgement from the White House.

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President's request in this regard was conveyed in a memorandum from H.R. Haldeman in 1969:

> He [the President] did ask, however, that in the compilation of samples of mail for him to review, you not include "Con" mail; i.e., mail that expresses opinions contrary to positions taken by the President on specific issue subjects.
>
> He is more interested in seeing the "Pro" mail that relates to the handling of the Presidency and the tone, etc. For example, he would like to see mail reacting to the Press Conference that gives him some feel of what the people particularly like in the style, tone or content, rather than substantive mail regarding the issues covered.[94]

The President was also primarily involved in utilizing interesting mail for rhetorical purposes, possibly explaining why the President only desired positive mail. He specifically requested such mail in 1971 by telling H.R. Haldeman, "What I really want is not to see so much for my own purposes but to find methods whereby it can be used more effectively in getting our message to the country."[95] With this strategy in mind, President Nixon also argued for the need for a campaign offensive before the 1972 election:

> I think the greatest deficiency is in having mail read for the purpose of getting out some nuggets which I can use from time to time in my informal remarks or even in speeches as I did at West Point. Ray's weekly mail sample is a very good step in the right direction as far as that goal is concerned. I would like to have one individual assigned to that who has high sensitivity and who will read mail with the idea in mind that I might use it for anecdote purposes.[96]

Ten days later, Haldeman produced a response to the President's request, which entailed expanding the Correspondence Office from six to ten people and empowering one person to be responsible for "human interest" mail.[97] The President frequently referenced letters he received from the public in speeches.

The President was also interested in recommendations for phone calls to selected letter writers, for example, to "someone who has lost a son in Vietnam or someone who has a particularly difficult problem and which the incoming letter says 'I suppose you will never see this letter but ...'"[98] Also of particular interest to the Nixon White House at the time were letters from

[94] Richard Nixon materials project, National Archives II, White House central file, subject file, EX WH 4-1 (mail) 29 January–28 Febuary 1969, "Haldeman to Brown," 3 February 1969.

[95] Richard Nixon materials project, National Archives II, President's personal file, memos, February 1971, "President to Haldeman," no date, box 3.

[96] Richard Nixon materials project, National Archives II, President's personal file, memos, June 1971, "President to Haldeman," 1 June 1971, box 3.

[97] Richard Nixon materials project, National Archives II, H.R. Haldeman papers, mail operation, "Haldeman to President," 11 June 1971, box 129.

[98] See Richard Nixon materials project, National Archives II, White House central files, (CF) WH 4-1 (mail) 1971–1974, "Gergen to Melencamp and Higgins," 18 March 1971, box 69.

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younger people, especially those in support of the war. The 5 March 1971 summary summarizes a letter:

> from an 18-year-old freshman at Washington University in St. Louis, who's not in sympathy with the violence-prone but deeply anguished by a set of attitudes that are pretty prevalent among many of his age-group. It's an occasionally irritating letter, but it does point up a group of stereotypes we have to contend with, and also a set of ambivalences—a deep love of country, and a deep (if juvenile) disillusion, yet withal a desperate search for hope and reassurance.[99]

A similar letter from a freshman at Northern Illinois University seeks reassurance from the Commander in Chief concerning the war and implores the President to "give me something to hold on to."[100] On 9 July 1971, a letter from "the young widow of a man killed in Vietnam on Christmas Day" urges that the administration "stay there until something has been accomplished. ... There is a purpose and that purpose is freedom, theirs as well as ours."[101] Publicly contrasting the views of the young protesters outside the White House with those in the mail from young Americans was a powerful public relations tool for the administration.

Vietnam, as the most contentious political issue of Nixon's day, was of particular concern to the senior staff as well, especially the question of whether the mail (either pro or con) was "inspired" by interest groups. Ken Cole (assistant to the President) requested this information from Al Haig (assistant to the President) in late September of 1969, and Haig replied that the volume of total mail on Vietnam was large, that the State Department alone had received "about 7,600 pieces of mail on Vietnam since September 1," and that three-quarters favored a rapid withdrawal.[102] As to the question of the degree of "inspired" pressure mail, Haig notes:

> The "campaign" mail has been in the form of pre-printed postal cards, mimeographed letters and advertisements clipped from newspapers. Apparently the "campaign" rate has been a fairly constant 30% over the past 9 months although there are weekly variations. This form of "inspired" mail is evidently organized by a few individuals or groups and comes in batches, often postmarked at one time.[103]

Similarly, in February of 1971, in a memorandum to H.R. Haldeman, Noble Melencamp reports that the mail on Vietnam from November of 1970 to

[99] Richard Nixon materials project, National Archives II, White House central files, subject file (WH), EX WH 4-1 (mail) 1–11 March 1971, "Price to President," 5 March 1971, box 11.

[100] Richard Nixon materials project, National Archives II, White House central files, subject file (WH), EX WH 4-1 (mail) 1–31 March 1971, "Price to President," 12 March 1971, box 11.

[101] Richard Nixon materials project, National Archives II, White House central files, subject file (WH), EX WH 4-1 (mail) 1–15 July 1971, "Price to President," 9 July 1971, box 11.

[102] Richard Nixon materials project, National Archives II, White House central files, (CF) WH 4-1 (office management mail) 1969–1970, "Haig to Cole," 10 October 1969, box 69.

[103] Ibid.

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February of 1971 has "run about 4% favorable, 78% unfavorable, and 18% miscellaneous comment."[104] Of particular interest was the finding that shortly after a search and rescue mission to free several prisoners of war (POWs) held in Vietnam in November of 1970, 3,100 additional letters, cards, and telegrams were received, with 92 percent of them favorable.[105] Overall, Melencamp notes:

> The mail favorable to U.S. policy is general citizen mail, reflecting a broad geographic, social and educational distribution. A very large amount of the mail opposing the U.S. policy is clearly inspired. It tends to come in heavy volume from specific metropolitan areas, principally those on the coasts, and many letters, although written by different hands, include identical wording.[106]

The Nixon White House was sensitive to the presence of "inspired" mail, especially on the Vietnam issue, thinking that such opinions could be easily (and publicly) discounted.

The steady rise in Vietnam mail during late October to late November of 1969 built to a crescendo on 15 November, when 250,000 people gathered in Washington DC to protest the war. This protest rally was the largest antiwar rally in the history of the United States and mirrored the rising trend in the mail opposing the war. Related to this, the 30 October summary notes:

> Substantial increase in volume. Telegrams decreased substantially but most continue to support U.S. policy. Excluding petitions, form letters and cards, about three out of five writers oppose U.S. policy. Sentiment calling for an all-out effort to win the war was about the same as last week. There were numerous suggestions for the President's proposed speech on 11-3-69 with some reflecting concern over POWs.

The total mail volume that week, driven by an influx of Vietnam mail, reached almost 170,000. Thus, the Nixon White House could internally be certain of a basis of support, despite the demonstrations of opinion outside the building.

Seeking to "go public" and reverse these negative trends, on 3 November 1969, President Nixon addressed the nation. The centerpiece of this speech was his argument that a "silent majority" favoring the war existed, and he implored them to support his Vietnamization policy. The mail summaries in the subsequent weeks showed that an ephemeral "silent majority" did write to the President, bolstering Nixon's argument. The first summary after the speech, on 13 November, noted "Response in both letters and telegrams is more than ten to one in support of the President." In particular, the number of telegrams, which were more expensive to send, in support of the President's speech and

[104] Richard Nixon materials project, National Archives II, papers of H.R. Haldeman, polling memoranda, "Melencamp to Haldeman," 5 February 1971, box 263.

[105] Ibid.

[106] Ibid.

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the U.S. policy in Vietnam increased exponentially over the previous week. Specifically, the rise in telegrams supporting the U.S. policy rose from 193 to 1,919 during the week, a ten-fold increase.

In keeping with the "politicization" theme of this period in opinion mail development, however, Alexander Butterfield later admitted that these letters were "largely contrived" (but sincere) and that praise was arranged in advance from labor unions, the American Legion and Veterans of Foreign Wars.[107] The Nixon administration manipulated opinion through these fabricated arrangements largely for public relations gains, a finding that lends credence to our claims of the "politicization" of opinion mail. President Nixon discussed this "influx" of mail in public speeches in subsequent days, including one in the House Chamber on 13 November, where he read verbatim two letters he had received from the public after his speech that "express[ed] the sentiments I was trying to express on November 3rd."[108]

The general trend of mail opposition to the Vietnam War was reversed after the speech, albeit temporarily, and this continued into the following week. The 20 November summary notes "heavy increase in letter and card count favoring Administration policy." The volume of mail that week continued to strongly support the President's "silent majority" speech and the U.S. policy in Vietnam. The 28 November summary reported 72,580 letters, 4,831 cards, and 391 telegrams (for a total of 77,802) in support of the war effort and 22,590 letters, 4,475 form cards, and 166 telegrams (for a total of 105,033) opposing U.S. policy in Vietnam. These positive trends faded away the following week, and the opinion on Vietnam returned to pre-speech levels of opposition.

Conclusion

This article has introduced the heretofore-unexplored story of public opinion that examines the origins and development of the public opinion apparatus in the White House and clarifies the instrumental connections between the public and the president. The empirical descriptions illustrated over the course of the modern presidency reveal an ongoing plebiscitary conversation between the leader of the free world and those who elected him. Presidents and the White House staff were equally interested in reading these individual letters and summary trends, and, as this article suggests, consulted these mail-based opinions when assessing policy needs, formulating public policy, and persuading the public. Whether the use of this data by presidents is partisan, political, or otherwise, all modern presidents have looked to public opinion mail to connect with

[107] George Lardner, Jr., "Butterfield: Response to Nixon's Silent Majority Speech was Contrived," *Washington Post*, 23 January 1999.

[108] *Public Papers of the President, Richard M. Nixon.* "Remarks in the Chamber of the United States House of Representatives," 13 November 1969 (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971), 932–933.

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their constituents. The direct effect of public opinion mail on presidential action is only anecdotally explored here, but it is an issue worthy of further study.

The simultaneous development of the public opinion polling apparatus and the public opinion mail apparatus requires some concluding analysis. This concurrent emergence was not coincidental: presidential administrations sought to jointly use public opinion polls and public opinion mail to judge public expectations and limits. Counting public opinion mail actually became systematized and institutionalized in the White House *before* public opinion polls. The fact that the White House did not abandon public opinion mail summaries as a form of gauging public preferences (as it did with ending editorial summaries with the emergence of scientific polling) is telling.[109] Opinion mail had characteristics of public opinion that the White House valued and was unwilling to relinquish. This mail gave the White House an understanding of an informed and active public—a particularly valuable resource for presidents running for reelection.[110]

Similarly, the secretive or open use of public opinion mail data parallels the staffing arrangements and distribution of public opinion polling in the White House.[111] Those administrations that exerted close and secretive control over public opinion data (like the Nixon administration) did so with both opinion mail and polls; those who were open (like the Johnson administration) were open in regard to both opinion mail and polls. For instance, Johnson's penchant for sharing the latest poll results with anyone who would listen and the White House's decentralized and extensive distribution of polling data mirrored the wide distribution network of public opinion mail summaries. Alternatively, the Nixon White House tightly controlled the distribution of public opinion polls, keeping the information in a White House safe, deeming it too valuable to be shared.[112] The sharing of public opinion mail data was also restricted to the President and his closest advisers (Gergen, John Erlichman, and Haldeman) rather than a wider audience within the West Wing. This suggests the prospect of an equitable resource arrangement between opinion mail and polls.

Why presidents began and continued to tabulate incoming White House mail also has an important parallel to the growth of White House polling. Eisinger argues that presidents began polling in order to retain institutional and political autonomy independent of Congress, their political party, or the mass

[109] Brandon Rottinghaus, "Limited to Follow: The Early Public Opinion Apparatus of the Hoover White House," *American Politics Research* 31 (September 2003): 540–556; Eisinger, "Gauging Public Opinion," 643–661.

[110] Steven J. Rosenstone and John Mark Hansen, *Mobilization, Participation and Democracy in America* (New York, Macmillan Publishing Company, 1993), 109. Philip J. Powlick "The Sources of Public Opinion for American Foreign Policy Officials," *International Studies Quarterly* 39 (December 1995): 427–451.

[111] Diane J. Heith, *Polling to Govern: Public Opinion and Presidential Leadership* (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), 165–189.; Diane J. Heith, "Staffing the White House Public Opinion Apparatus, 1969–1988, *Public Opinion Quarterly* 62 (Summer 1998): 162–189."

[112] Eisinger, *The Evolution of Presidential Polling*, 100.

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media.[113] Letters sent to the White House represent a similar kind of autonomy, in that these pieces of mail are smaller, more private and textual samples of opinion sent specifically to the president for the purposes of informing, persuading, or dissuading him (to name a few). However, these findings suggest independence from political party, Congress, or the media may not have been the sole cause of the White House looking inward to gauge public opinion. That the White House valued mail opinion and catalogued it simultaneously with polling emphasizes the growing interest in public opinion self-sufficiency in the West Wing. Presidents engaged in increasingly public politics could not afford to ignore opinion so direct, unvarnished, and engaged.*

[113] Ibid.

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Islamist *New Thinking* in Turkey: A Model for Political Learning?

GAMZE ÇAVDAR

While such issues as the compatibility of Islam with democracy, the future of Islamism, and democratization in the Middle East were being debated among academics and policymakers alike, the Islamist-rooted Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi* [AKP]) led what Stephen Kinzer has called "the most astonishing political revolution" in Turkey.[1] Within less than a year in power, the AKP managed to pass two democratization packages that introduced long-awaited changes related to freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and civilian control of the military. Despite the question of whether such changes would be implemented adequately, the credit for this initiative and for the passing of democratic reforms goes to the AKP as the ruling Party. Considering that these steps came at a time of heated debate about the impact of the "war on terrorism" that some observers believed "wounded the cause of moderation,"[2] the democratization steps taken by a political party with Islamist roots often seemed counterintuitive.

The AKP's performance in government has led some observers in Turkey, in the Middle East, and even in U.S. policy-making circles to argue that Turkish Islamism can be a model for Islamists in the region.[3] This article examines the potential exportability of the Turkish Islamist "model"to elsewhere in the Middle East. This question's significance goes far beyond academic studies on Islamism, given the policy implications for the region. This article also addresses the applicability of such a model to the region by examining the *sui*

[1] Stephen Kinzer, "The Quiet Revolution," *The American Prospect* 14 (December 2003): 13–15.

[2] Hussain Haqqani, "Islam's Weakened Moderates," *Foreign Policy* (July/August 2003): 61–64.

[3] A similar analysis on the "Turkish model" was done by Brookings Institute analyst Ömer Taşpınar. Taşpınar's focus was slightly different from that of the present article, inasmuch as he discussed whether Turkey's Kemalist political system is suitable for the Arab world, particularly Iraq.

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generis forces behind the transformation of Turkish Islamism and the lessons it might embody for Islamists in the region. Further, it contends that the "Turkish model as is" is unlikely to be adopted elsewhere in the Middle East, because it is the specific product of a transformation based on a set of distinct political and economic conditions.

Turkish Islamism and the *New Thinking*: How Different Is the AKP?

Although Islamists ultimately seek to create an Islamic state, militant and political Islamists differ in their opinions about how such a broad objective should be achieved.[4] In contrast to militants, political Islamists reject violence and show a willingness to participate in political and economic life. Although political Islamist groups are far from uniform, it is possible to make two generalizations, which may be applied to the AKP.

First, in addition to engaging in a wide spectrum of socioeconomic activities, political Islamist groups rely on the electoral process to strengthen their political and social bases, and they accept incremental changes whenever the circumstances permit. Cases in point are the Party for Justice and Development (*Hizb al-Adala wa al-Tanmiyya*) in Morocco, the *Salafi* movement in Kuwait, the Reform Party (*Hizb al-Islah*) in Yemen, the Islamic Action Front (*Jabhat al-Amal al-Islami*) in Jordan, and the independent candidates of the Muslim Brotherhood (*Ikhwan al-Muslimin*) in Egypt. These groups have all represented Islamists' voices in local politics or national parliaments.

Second, it is not unusual for political Islamists to moderate their positions according to conjectural and structural changes in international and domestic settings. Islamist groups have often displayed pragmatic orientations, diverging from doctrinaire positions. For example, Kuwaiti Islamists welcomed the U.S. presence in Kuwait after the Gulf War;[5] the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood supported King Hussein's rule until the signing of the peace agreement with Israel in 1994;[6] Sheikh Abdessalam Yassin, the leader of the Moroccan Islamist group, came to accept the idea of democratic rule;[7] and the

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See Ömer Taşpınar, *An Uneven Fit? The "Turkish Model" and the Arab World* (Washington DC: The Saban Center for the Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institute, 2003). Another study on the Turkish model was conducted by Binnaz Toprak, who discussed the model of the Turkish political system as a whole. See Binnaz Toprak, "A Secular Democracy in the Muslim World: The Turkish Model" in Shireen T. Hunter and Huma Malik, eds., *Modernization, Democracy and Islam* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2005), 277–292.

[4] Ibrahim Karawan, *The Islamist Impasse* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997): 23.

[5] Nicholas Blanford, "Even Kuwait's Islamists Welcome U.S.," *Christian Science Monitor* 26 September 2002, accessed at http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/0923/p07s01-wome.html, 22 June 2006.

[6] Dilip Hiro, "Middle East: Islamist Parties and Democratic Politics," *Inter Press Service*, 10 July 1997.

[7] Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, "Islamism, Moroccan-Style: Ideas of Sheikh Yassin," *Middle East Quarterly* 10 (Winter 2003): 43–52.

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Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt has shown its willingness to work within restricted political pluralism.[8]

If electoral participation and moderation are not unique to Turkish Islamism, then what makes the AKP distinct among its Middle Eastern counterparts? The AKP operates within a secular democratic system in which the government can be replaced through competitive elections. Only fourteen months after its establishment, the AKP won a third of the vote in the November 2002 elections and secured a two-thirds majority in Parliament, forming a majority government. Despite the Party's Islamist heritage, the AKP targeted a broad constituency, cutting across class, gender, and ethnic lines, and gained the support of those who previously had voted for central-right and Islamist parties.[9] In contrast to the two previous Islamist parties—the Welfare Party (*Refah Partisi* [RP]) and the Virtue Party (*Fazilet Partisi* [FP])[10]—AKP leaders have refrained from making references to religion, instead calling their Party "a party of 'conservative democrats.'" In fact, the government's performance since 2002 has been marked by pragmatism rather than religious principles. The AKP government has given priority to democratic reforms in order to meet European Union (EU) standards, postponed politically sensitive issues (such as the headscarf and religious education), worked with the International Monetary Fund on economic adjustment, rejected the notion of an "Islamic common market," and maintained economic and military relations with Israel.[11] The AKP's stance has questioned standard descriptions of an Islamist party. The moderation that the AKP represents remains unprecedented when compared to the Party's Turkish and Middle Eastern counterparts.

[8] John Walsh, "Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood: Understanding Centrist Islam," *Harvard International Review* 24 (Winter 2003): 32–36.

[9] "Iki Parti Secmeni AKP'ye gitti," *Radikal* (Turkish daily), 6 November 2002, accessed at www.radikal.com.tr, 22 June 2006.

[10] The RP, which was established in 1985, achieved great success in the local elections of 1994 and the general elections of 1995. Between 1996 and 1997, the Party formed a coalition with the True Path Party (*Doğru Yol Partisi*). Necmettin Erbakan served as the prime minister until his government was forced to resign. The resignation took place after the National Security Council demanded that the government curb the influence of Islamism, often referred to as the "February 28 decisions." The RP was closed down on 18 January 1998 by the Constitutional Court, which justified the action on the grounds that the RP "posed a great danger to the secular nature of the Turkish State." The Constitutional Court order also banned Erbakan and five other top policymakers from politics. A new party, the Virtue Party (*Fazilet Partisi* [FP]) was founded under the leadership of Recai Kutan in December of 1997. However, the FP was also closed down in June 2001 by a Constitutional Court order, on the grounds that the Party was a continuation of the RP.

[11] Previously, on 1 March 2003, almost 100 Party legislators voted against then-Prime Minister Abdullah Gül's request to allow deployment of U.S. troops in Turkey in preparation for the Iraq War. In October 2003, however, Parliament authorized the AKP government to send Turkish troops to Iraq. This shift in Parliament's position came after mounting pressure from the U.S. government and the possibility of an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq.

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This Islamist *new thinking*,[12] as represented by the AKP, is the result of a process of political learning, defined as "a change of beliefs (or the degree of confidence in one's beliefs) or development of new beliefs, skills, or procedures as a result of observation and interpretation of experience."[13] Another analyst broadened the definition by arguing that an evaluation of structure and cognitive change is essential to the concept of political learning.[14] As is detailed below, the Turkish state's role in setting up the parameters for political action and the unique position of the EU regarding democratization in Turkey have created what may be called "structure." Constraints imposed by that structure have limited Islamist actions and provided distinct opportunities for the emergence of a brand of reformist new thinking. Despite the impact of the Turkish state and the EU on such Islamist transformation, this transformation was not dictated by sheer structural forces. As Jack Levy put it, "Learning is not a passive activity in which historical events generate their own lessons that actors then absorb. ... Learning is an analytical construction. People interpret historical experience through the lens of their own analytical assumptions and worldviews."[15]

Not all leaders of the Islamist movement drew the same lessons from their experiences with the RP and the FP; some chose to pursue the traditional line of Islamist politics in the Felicity Party (*Saadet Partisi* [SP]). In other words, the same domestic, regional, and international settings that led to new thinking in the AKP yielded different lessons for the SP leadership. This contingent aspect of political learning is what makes it different from automatic alterations resulting from changes in the environment. Learning is not automatic, nor can its direction be easily predicted.[16] While political actors may want to replicate the successes and avoid the failures of the past, they do not necessarily learn correct lessons. Rather, it is often the case that such actors "select from historical experience those cases that provide the greatest support for their pre-existing policy preferences, or they reinterpret a given case in a way that reinforces their views, so as to rally support for their preferred policies, whether they be driven by views of the national interest or partisan political interests."[17] The following section will examine how the Islamist new thinking has taken shape in Turkey and will explain the roles of domestic and regional factors in the process.

[12] The phrase *new thinking* was first used by foreign policy specialists to describe Mikhail Gorbachev's concept of security, which fundamentally departed from the traditional Soviet concept.

[13] Jack S. Levy, "Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield," *International Organization* 48 (Spring 1994): 279–312.

[14] Janice Gross Stein, "Political Learning by Doing: Gorbachev as Uncommitted Thinker and Motivated Learner," *International Organization* 48 (Spring 1994): 155–183.

[15] Levy, "Learning and Foreign Policy," 283.

[16] Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 217–282.

[17] Levy, "Learning and Foreign Policy," 306.

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TRANSFORMATION OF TURKISH ISLAMISM

The Pillars of Islamist New Thinking

The first pillar of the Islamist new thinking is the learning process of the party leaders. The learning experience of political leaders deserves close attention, since they play a major role in translating the learned lessons into concrete policy changes. In contrast to the previous RP and FP examples, the leaders of the AKP refused to define their new Party in any religious terms.[18] Their previous experiences in the Islamist movement, in general and during the RP and FP periods in particular, made them cognizant that confrontation with the secular establishment is not welcomed by the Turkish population. They further came to acknowledge that any attempt to increase the influence of Islam in Turkish politics, let alone any radical changes in domestic or foreign policy, were bound to be blocked by the secular establishment, that is, the military and the civilian bureaucracy. Thus, the top Party leadership, particularly Tayyip Erdoğan and Abdullah Gül, concluded that a radical transformation of the state was impossible.[19] Instead, what was desirable and feasible, they believed, was to seek greater religious freedoms within the parameters of a secular and democratic political system.

Political actors seem to learn more from their failures than from their successes. The call for reform within the FP was raised after the Party, led by Recai Kutan, lost its leading position and became the third political party in Parliament in April 1999. The closure of the FP in June 2001 gave the reformist wing of the Party an opportunity to join representatives from the other central and right-wing parties to form a new party, one that deviated from the historical legacies of the RP and the FP.[20] The leadership of the new Party, the AKP, believed that the repetition of RP and FP policies would mean political suicide. It even went a step further by stating that the Party had nothing to do with Islam.[21] Wanting no tension with the secular establishment, the Party promised no radical changes in Turkey's domestic politics or in its foreign policy. Instead, it projected an image of pursuing political stability after a period of protracted instability. Moderation became central to the Party's political posture and practice: female candidates were chosen from among those who did not wear

[18] The RP's "Just Order" (*Adil Düzen*) policy promised major changes in domestic politics and foreign policy. For an evaluation of the Just Order, see Mehran Kamrava, "Pseudo-democratic Politics and Populist Possibilities: The Rise and Demise of Turkey's Refah Party," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 25 (November 1998): 275–302. The FP used a more moderate and nonconfrontational line than the RP did. See Birol Yeşilada, "The Virtue Party," *Turkish Studies* 3 (Spring 2002): 62–81.

[19] Göksel Özköylü, "Erdoğan'ın Hikayesi," *Hürriyet* (Turkish daily), November 2002 (Special File); Sencer Ayata, "Will Turkey Become More Islamic: The AKP Party in Power?" Lecture, 27 July 2003, accessed at http://www.buworldofideas.org/shows/2003/07/20030727.asp, 22 June 2006.

[20] *Sabah* (Turkish daily), 16 September 2003.

[21] Ayfer Selamoğlu, "28 Şubat'tan Dersimizi Aldık," *Radikal*, 8 January 2003; see also the interview with Metin Metiner, a former advisor to Erdoğan, in *Radikal*, 23 February 2004.

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headscarves, campaign slogans were selected carefully, and respect was repeatedly given to Atatürk's legacy. During its electoral campaign and four years in government, the emphasis of the Party was on economic reform and political democratization. Put simply, the AKP almost became a mainstream party with some sensitivity to religious issues.

Through the quality of its leadership, the AKP has demonstrated that it is possible to overcome the feeling of helplessness adopted by those who emphasize the asymmetrical power between the status quo seekers and their challengers in the Turkish system. The leaders also made it clear that confrontation "at any cost" with the secular establishment would never be a political choice. While the AKP leaders decided not to be intimidated by the obvious inequality of power, they had overcome the temptation to act according to the imperatives of ideological purity. This was the key point regarding the role of political learning by the AKP leaders.

The second pillar of Islamist learning comes from the intellectual arena. The AKP's agenda for Islamist transformation found support from intellectuals who provided theoretical foundations for the Party's ideology. Some leading figures in the conservative/Islamist media had previously fueled discussions of reform within the FP.[22] The focus of these discussions was the necessity of having a different orientation in Islamist politics that, these figures believed, was not represented by the FP leadership. Just before the November 2002 elections, a group of intellectuals led by Ali Bulaç began publishing a new magazine that lent intellectual support to the AKP program. The first issues were devoted to the discussion of what they called "new Islamism."[23] The authors argued that new Islamism was a response to domestic and international developments, such as the lack of an alternative system to liberal democracy and a free market economy, the skepticism of the West toward the Muslim world in the aftermath of September 11, the negative impact of the February 28 process on the Muslim community, and Turkey's prospective EU membership and its impact on Turkish democracy.

The neo-Islamist thinkers stated that under such internal and external conditions, the old discourse and actions of the previous parties had become "useless," and they called for an accommodationist rather than a confrontational approach. The same intellectual effort led to the January 2004 International Symposium on Conservatism and Democracy in Istanbul, attended by many intellectuals and politicians, including Prime Minister Erdoğan.[24] In his book entitled *Conservative Democracy*, Yalçın Akdoğan, an advisor to the AKP government, further elaborates upon the AKP government's ideology.[25] Inspired

[22] Ahmet Taşgetiren, "Şimdi Değilse Ne Zaman?" *Yeni Şafak* (Turkish daily), 13 May 2000; Ali Bulaç, "Arka Plan," *Zaman* (Turkish daily), 16 May 2000.

[23] See particularly the third issue of *Bilgi ve Düşünce* (December 2002).

[24] For the text of the symposium panels, see *Uluslararası Muhafazakarlık ve Demokrasi Sempozyumu* (Ankara: AK Parti, 2004).

[25] For a critical evaluation of the AKP's ideology, see Sultan Tepe, "Turkey's AKP: A Model 'Muslim-Democratic' Party?" *Journal of Democracy* 16 (2005): 69–82.

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by neo-Islamist intellectualism, Akdoğan argues that the AKP differs from political Islam not only in terms of its "means" but also in terms of its "ideology."[26] The AKP's "conservative democracy," Akdoğan explains, combines international norms with local values and cultures.[27]

The AKP's political learning is quite limited regarding the issue of gender. In the Party's program, women are often referred to within the context of family and are considered primary caregivers.[28] The Party has shown a strong resistence to many attempts at fighting gender discrimination, such as improving women's political participation through quotas, on the grounds that the attempts contradict "our tradition and cultural values." The AKP's patriarchy, which is embedded in society at large, was also expressed in amendments to the Turkish Penal Code that were passed by the justice subcommittee in November 2003. The amendments reintroduced a reduction of penalties with respect to "honor crimes" committed against women, which had been eliminated by the 6th Reform Package in the summer of 2003.[29] The AKP tends to narrowly describe women's rights as their rights to religious freedom, an apparent reference to the headscarf ban.

The third pillar of the Islamist transformation, and perhaps the most dynamic force behind the AKP's new thinking, has been the rising conservative capitalists of Anatolia. Ahmet İnsel has described these groups as "culturally conservative, politically nationalist and moderately authoritarian, economically liberal, or rather, on the side of free enterprise."[30] According to İnsel,

> a real class struggle continues to be waged between the traditional upper-middle class and the new middle class—a struggle whose external appearances are characterized by the symbols of identity politics, at the same time related to economic positions. The instinctive reactions and fears of the laicist elite in the face of the AKP and the political stance it represents have their source mainly in the anxiety of losing a hegemonic position; they reflect a certain kind of class position. The clash between the radical laicists and the Islamists in Turkey is not only a clash between modernizationists and traditionalists, but also a clash between the high (havas) and the low (avam) dating from the final period of the Ottoman Empire. The AKP's coming to power with a parliamentary majority, enabling a single-party government, constitutes an important threshold in this nearly century-old conflict.[31]

[26] Yalçın Akdoğan, "Siyasi İslam ve AKP," *Yeni Şafak*, 4 January 2004.

[27] Yalçın Akdoğan, *Muhafazakar Demokrasi* (Ankara: Ak Parti, 2003). See also Yalçın Akdoğan, "Yeni Bir Siyasi Tarz," *Radikal*, 10 September 2003; on the evaluation of the concept, see Ali Bayramoğlu, "AKP Tartışmaları," *Yeni Şafak*, 22 August 2003; Derya Sazak, "AKP'nin Yol Haritası" *Milliyet* (Turkish daily), 25 August 2003; Hayrettin Kahraman, "İslamcılar Değişti mi?" *Yeni Şafak*, 19 September 2004.

[28] See the government program submitted to the Grand National Assembly on March 2003 by Tayyip Erdoğan, accessed at http://www.akparti.org.tr, 22 June 2006.

[29] Derya Sazak, "TCK ve Kadın," *Milliyet*, 3 November 2003. The reduction of the penalty for "honor crimes" was finally eliminated with the amendments to the Criminal Law on 19 September 2004.

[30] Ahmet İnsel, "The AKP and Normalizing Democracy in Turkey," *The South Atlantic Quarterly* 102 (Spring/Summer 2003): 293–309.

[31] Ibid., 299.

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The existence of a class component behind the AKP depersonalizes the new thinking as a long-term political and economic movement, and it has potential repercussions for transforming existing state–bourgeoisie relations in Turkey. The course of development of the traditional republican bourgeoisie and that of the Islamist/conservative bourgeoisie has differed greatly, along with their respective relations with the state. The latter grew independent of any protection from the state. It benefited from the liberal economic policies of former Prime Minister Turgut Özal in the 1980s, achieving a significant degree of control over economic and political life in central Anatolian cities. Unable to benefit from the state's preferential treatment, conservative capitalists' influence has remained limited to major provincial economic centers and has been insignificant in the industrial and financial centers around Istanbul.[32] The conservative bourgeoisie were represented by the Association of Independent Industrialists and Businessmen (*Müstakil Sanayiciler ve İşadamları Derneği* [MÜSİAD]) rather than the main Istanbul-based organization of industrialists, the Association of Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen (*Türk Sanayiciler ve İşadamları Derneği* [TÜSİAD]), which represented the traditional republican bourgeoisie.

Aiming to curb the influence of Islamist financial institutions on the economy, the February 28 process tried to restrict their activities. This was fueled by suspicion toward them on the part of the military. During this period, for instance, the military claimed that Islamist businessmen financed the Islamist movement.[33] More importantly, state security courts charged Erol Yarar, then chairman of MÜSİAD, with "provoking hatred amongst people" in a speech he made condemning restrictions on religious education. With the emergence of the AKP, the ideological common ground between this conservative bourgeoisie and the new party led to a new partnership of mutual support and benefit. In other words, the agenda of this new class seeking a bigger share of the economic pie overlapped with the liberal/conservative agenda of the new thinking.

The transformation of Turkish political Islamism has been a project formulated by the top leadership of the Party, and is supported by neo-Islamist intellectuals along with the conservative bourgeoisie. It is the nature of this collectivity that poses challenges to the process of political learning, however. As Earl Ravenal argues, "The learning of a collective is different from the learning of an individual. ... Lessons must be internalized in some enduring, objective, consistent, and therefore predictable way."[34] What is not clear yet is to what extent the new thinking of the AKP has been "internalized" by the entire Party, that is, its conservative deputies and their constituency. Moreover, although the Party was able to bring together liberal and conservative segments

[32] Wendy Kristianasen, "No Delight For Turkey: New Faces of Islam," July 1997, accessed on the website of *Le Monde Diplomatique* at http://mondediplo.com/1997/07/turkey, 21 January 2003.

[33] *Milliyet*, 16 October 1999.

[34] Quoted in Levy, "Learning and Foreign Policy," 288.

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that refused a traditional line of Islamist politics, disagreements do exist and are likely to remain, even at the level of leadership. This is especially true when it comes to specific policy choices, such as how many, when, and about what particular issues concessions can be made.[35] It was the AKP's hope that as the government gained more legitimacy through successful economic and democratic programs, it would be easier to introduce the Islamic reforms (the headscarf and religious education, for example) demanded by its conservative constituency.[36] So far, however, the AKP has had to postpone its hopes.

Structural Factors

The Role of the State

One of the most striking characteristics of the state–Islamist interaction in Turkey has been the dominant role of the state. As Ümit Cizre Sakallıoğlu, a prominent analyst of Turkish politics, puts it, "It is the Turkish state, not the initiative and self-sustenance of grassroots Islam that has been the most important determinant of the political life of Islam and its relevance in politics throughout the republic."[37] The state domination over religious affairs was inherited from the Ottoman era. The Ottoman sultan, the highest political figure, did not take orders from the *ulema* (religious leaders), whose role remained limited to issues such as marriage, divorce, and inheritance for the Muslim population. This characteristic of the Ottoman religio-political relationship helped the new republic adopt the principle of secularism in its peculiar way. Accordingly, the secular character of the state in Turkey does not lead to the state's dissociation from religious affairs, as in the case of Anglo-Saxon examples; rather, it is similar to the French state's interventionist role in religion.[38] Thus, the Turkish state is actively involved in defining the role of religion. It educates, appoints, and pays the religious professionals of the Directorate of Religious Affairs (*Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı* [DİB]), approves the content of Friday sermons, teaches mandatory religious courses in schools, controls religious schools, and enforces laws about the wearing of religious symbols and clothing in public places and state-owned institutions.

One of the consequences of this state dominance has been to uniquely shape the Islamist movement in Turkey. Despite their diverse characteristics,

[35] For the tension between the Party leaders and conservative deputies, see Ergün Aksoy, "AKP'nin Dünü, Bugünü ve Yarını," *Radikal*, 9 October 2003; major fault lines within the Party became evident in early 2005 when a number of AKP deputies resigned from the Party.

[36] The word "Islamic" refers to an individual's adherence to Islam, and therefore is distinguished from the concept of "Islamist."

[37] Ümit Cizre Sakallıoğlu, "Parameters and Strategies of Islam-State Interaction in Republican Turkey," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 28 (May 1996): 231–252.

[38] On Turkey's secularism principle, see Şerif Mardin, "Religion and Secularism in Turkey" in Ergün Özbudun and Ali Kazancıgil, eds., *Atatürk: The Founder of a Modern State* (London: C. Hurst, 1981).

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Islamist groups share certain features that have been shaped by state policies in one way or another. For example, Islamist movements operate within the boundaries of a nation-state initiated and implemented by Kemalism (derived from the founder of modern Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk). Moreover, a great dose of nationalism has influenced the rhetoric and the actual record of Islamist policies. For instance, Islamist intellectuals' solutions to the Kurdish question are marked by differences along ethnic lines.[39] The nationalism shared by the top leadership was crucial in enabling the RP to build an electoral alliance in 1991 with the Nationalist Movement Party (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi*), the leading nationalist right-wing party.

Moderation is another characteristic of the Islamist movement in Turkey. The movement largely remains a milder form of political Islam rather than a militant version. Militant Islam in Turkey is much more limited in numbers and influence, especially compared to its Algerian and Egyptian counterparts. The Islamist terrorist attacks that took place in late 2003 in Turkey were isolated incidents. Political Islamist groups do not cooperate with or have an alliance with militant groups. Unlike the FIS (Islamic Salvation Front) in Algeria, for example, the closures of Islamist parties and the military coups in Turkey did not bring about violent confrontations with the security forces.

The state policies of creating the parameters for Islamist parties further moderated the already mild nature of political Islam in Turkey. Islamists were left with little room for maneuvering as new laws were passed regarding political parties and religious education, and party leaders were banned from politics for "undermining the founding principles of the state." Each newly founded party adopted a more moderate line than the previous one. Consequently, earlier anti-American, anti-EU, and anti-secular rhetoric was softened each time as the political system constrained an Islamist agenda while providing opportunities for a non-Islamist one.

State–Islamist interaction does not always take the form of conflict. The interaction is often more complex and nuanced than one might assume it would be between two diametrically opposed actors. Faced with Islamist challenges, the state resorted to diverse strategies ranging from repression to accommodation, from religious legitimation to state-clientalism.[40] During the 1970s, regimes throughout the region supported Islamists because they perceived a greater threat from other political forces, including Nasserists, Ba'thists, and leftists. In Egypt, the regime of Hosni Mubarak has financially supported nongovernmental organizations through which Islamists have provided goods and services. Similarly, the Moroccan regime has backed Sufis vis-a-vis more-radical Islamists.[41]

[39] Ümit Cizre Sakallıoğlu, "Kurdish Nationalism from an Islamist Perspective: The Discourses of Turkish Islamist Writers," *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 18 (April 1998): 73–90.

[40] Karawan, *Islamist Impasse*, 29–36.

[41] Quintan Wiktorowicz, "Islamists, the State, and Cooperation in Jordan," *Arab Studies Quarterly* 21 (Fall 1999): 1–18.

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The multifaceted characteristics of the state–Islamist interaction apply to the Turkish case as well. For instance, in the post-1980 regime, the military had considered Islam a major instrument for promoting political stability, which they believed was mainly challenged by left-wing activism. Without changing the state's promise of secularism, a notion called "Turkish-Islamic synthesis" was adopted by the military. This period was characterized by an increased number of religious programs broadcast on state-owned television. Moreover, religious education was introduced in schools, and the financial resources available to the DİB were increased.[42]

Despite the similarities to other examples, however, the state–Islamist interaction in Turkey is distinguished by Islamists' inclusion. Turkey remains different from the Muslim Middle East due to its relative political freedom and competitive elections. This has had a major impact on the Islamist transformation. Despite all its shortcomings (that is, the military's control over civilian governments, party closures, human rights abuses, etc.), Turkey's relatively free political system has given Islamists a unique opportunity. The Turkish state has excluded radical elements while reluctantly providing the opportunity for Islamists' incorporation into the system. Islamist parties in Turkey (although not under the name "Islamists") have been active participants in local and national politics since the introduction of the multiparty elections in 1950. Since the early 1970s, Islamists have established their own parties.[43] As Robert Putnam observes in his famous book on Italy, *Making Democracy Work*, even those with radical agendas seem to adopt moderation once they become part of the government.[44] The Islamists' experience in municipalities played a major role in their political socialization. According to İhsan Dağı, Erdoğan's experience as a mayor was crucial in his ideological transformation, because governing a municipality with a population of twelve million helped him realize "the impossibility of ideological governing."[45] In other words, Islamist inclusion into the political system, in turn, helped them move beyond simplistic assertions that "Islam is the solution."

The Impact of the EU

As the recently started accession talks with the EU remain under constant threat of collapse, the prospect of EU membership for Turkey remains uncertain. Nonetheless, Turkey's long relationship with the EU has placed structural constraints on Islamist politics while facilitating the emergence of the

[42] Ziya Öniş, "The Political Economy of Islamic Resurgence in Turkey: The Rise of the Welfare Party in Perspective," *Third World Quarterly* 18 (December 1997): 743–766.

[43] The origins of Islamist parties go back to the National Order Party (*Milli Nizam Partisi* [MNP]) (1970–1971) and the National Salvation Party (*Milli Selamet Partisi* [MSP]) (1972–1980).

[44] Robert Putnam, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).

[45] Ihsan Dağı, "AKP Islamcı bir Parti mi?" *Radikal*, 22 November 2002.

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AKP's new thinking. The AKP's new thinking radically differed from the anti-EU stance of the RP because the AKP realized that the EU could play a critical role in achieving some political objectives.[46] Perhaps the most crucial issues for the Party were the limited role of Islam in the public sphere and the asymmetry of power between military and civilian authority. It was the AKP's hope that the EU would help achieve civilian control over the military and enhance religious freedom.[47] It is ironic that the state elite that initiated the process of joining the EU now resist fulfilling the requirements for full membership, while the religious and ethnically sensitive segments of the population carry the EU flag. The Westernization project that dates back to Ottoman times is today being adopted by the most marginalized groups for the first time.

Soon after the AKP government was formed by Abdullah Gül, the Party initiated a campaign at the EU Copenhagen Summit of December 2002 to demonstrate Turkey's strong determination to qualify for full membership. It soon became clear, however, that Turkey needed to introduce reform to fulfill the Copenhagen criteria and to become eligible for EU accession negotiations.[48] Turkey had to wait until June 2006, when the EU members finally decided to begin accession talks.

The decision at the Copenhagen Summit gave the AKP government legitimacy and a unique opportunity to introduce reforms for compliance with the Copenhagen criteria. In the summer of 2003, the government managed to institute two constitutional amendments, known as the 6th and 7th Reform Packages.[49] The 7th Reform Package was particularly important in that it limited the power of the National Security Council (*Milli Güvenlik Kurulu* [MGK]), which was dominated by top army officers.[50] The MGK had long been criticized by the EU for holding too much power over civilian governments. Through these restrictions on the MGK, the AKP expected to increase Turkey's chances for an EU membership. Subsequent developments demonstrated, however, that the military's role in Turkish politics is much more resistant to change.

The EU's constant criticism of Turkey over its shortcomings in political and civil rights has been coupled with its concern about the spread of Islamism in Turkey. While the EU has asked Turkey to exercise more civilian

[46] For a comparison between the AKP and RP policies toward the EU, see Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, "Islamic Europhilia in Turkey and the AKP" (paper presented at the Middle East Technical University 2nd Conference, Ankara, Turkey, 23–25 June 2003), accessed at http://www.ir.metu.edu.tr/conf2003/papers/grigoriadis.pdf, September 2003.

[47] An interview with Bülent Arinç, one of the architects of the AKP, sheds light on this issue. See Murat Yetkin, "Beni 28 Şubat AB'ci Yapti," *Radikal*, 5 June 2005.

[48] Bülent Aras and Bülent Gökay, "Turkey after Copenhagen: Walking a Tightrope," *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans* 5 (August 2003): 147–164.

[49] *BBC News*, 30 July 2003.

[50] With the new MGK law, the chief secretary has become a civilian deputy prime minister who decides when the MGK meets.

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control over the military, enhance political freedom, and protect human rights, it has also made it clear that the Union will not tolerate an anti-secular orientation. The EU's concerns about Islamism further accelerated the de-Islamization process in Turkey. The most important signal was given by the European Court on Human Rights (ECHR) with respect to the RP's closure. In contrast to previous decisions, the ECHR ruled in July 2001 that the ban on the RP in Turkey did not constitute a violation of Article 11 of the ECHR, which upholds the right to assemble and maintain political parties.[51] A similar position was also taken by the court in 2005 regarding the headscarf ban in Turkey, which, the court decided, did not constitute a human rights violation.[52] Many observers have argued that these two decisions have significantly reduced the government's enthusiasm for Turkey's EU membership.

This article has so far identified and explained the domestic and international factors behind the transformation of Turkish Islamism. The next section will discuss the obstacles to exporting this transformation elsewhere in the Middle East.

Obstacles to a Turkish Regional Model

Regional Perspectives on the Turkish Model: A Matter of Controversy

In academic and policy-making circles alike, the transformation of Turkish Islamism has raised hopes of forwarding Turkey's gentler and kinder Islamism as a model for other Islamist groups in the region.[53] The administration of George W. Bush took the lead by hailing Turkey as a democracy that could be a model for other Muslim countries.[54] Similarly, while making a strong appeal for Turkey to be admitted to the EU, Prime Minister Erdoğan argued that such a move would make Turkey a model for the Islamic world.[55] Some prominent analysts also adopted this view. Graham Fuller, for instance, argued in a recent article that Turkey represents "a genuine model that finally offers a degree of genuine appeal to the region."[56]

[51] *Turkish Daily News*, 1 August 2001.

[52] "AIHM Leyla Sahin'in Türban'la Ilgili İtirazini Reddetti," *Hürriyet*, 10 November 2005.

[53] "Rebuffing Turkey," *New York Times*, 13 December 2002; David Gardner, "Confident Leader with a Mandate," *Financial Times*, 10 December 2002; Gwynne Dyer, "Muslim Democracy in Turkey," *The Guardian* (Charlottetown), 12 August 2003, 137.

[54] Richard Norton Taylor, "US hawk wants Turkey in EU," *Guardian*, 3 December 2002, accessed at http://www.guardian.co.uk/eu/story/0,,852594,00.html, 22 June 2006.

[55] "EU Membership Would Make Turkey Model for Islamic World, Says Erdogan," *Deutsche Presse-Agentur*, 3 September 2003. Similar comments were also made by Abdullah Gül. See *Turkish Daily News*, 4 December 2003.

[56] Graham E. Fuller, "Turkey's Strategic Model: Myths and Realities," *Washington Quarterly* 27 (Summer 2004): 51. Also see Vali Nasr, "The Rise of 'Muslim Democracy,'" *Journal of Democracy*

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Major developments in Turkey have been followed with considerable interest by Arab Muslim thinkers and activists. This interest is reflected in newspaper articles and the media coverage of Turkish politics. As detailed below, a review of the Arab media and interviews reveals a mixed record, not a clear-cut consensus on what the Turkish case represents and whether it can be a model for Muslims in the Middle East.

Those who hold positive views about the AKP advocate the implementation of its policies as an example for the Arab world to follow. This praise of the AKP stems from varying areas, such as the AKP's foreign policy, which many Arab observers perceive as independent, the Party's success in initiating concrete and feasible objectives, its attempts at challenging the highly unequal distribution of power in Turkish politics (particularly with regard to the military establishment), and the AKP government's agenda for democratic reforms.

Among the most acclaimed features of the AKP government is its foreign policy regarding the Middle East. Some analysts believe that Turkey has abandoned its previous "policy of subservience to the U.S."[57] Turkey's objection to the U.S. war in Iraq and Erdoğan's characterization of Israeli incursions as state terrorism were welcomed by these intellectuals. For many observers, Turkey's new role in the region was a signal of a new Turkey that is not afraid of acting according to the wishes of its people.[58] Thanks to the AKP government, it was argued, Turkey was "taking a more honorable view of the region,"[59] defending Palestinian interests better than many Arab countries,[60] and earning the admiration of the Arabs.[61] Nader Fergany argued that the Turkish Prime Minister was more able to criticize Israel than were Arab leaders because

> Erdoğan was democratically elected and, therefore, accountable to the nation that put him into office. No nation that lives in freedom and under good governance would brook injustice, even towards others. Nor can leaders elected in free and fair elections afford to ignore the feelings of their people. Is there a lesson here?"[62]

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16 (April 2005): 13–27. Nasr argues that "Muslim democracies" provide "a model for pragmatic change."

[57] Quoted in "Turkey and Syria Chart a New Course," *Mideast Mirror*, 13 January 2004.

[58] Quoted in "A Brave Turkish Stand," *Mideast Mirror*, 28 May 2004.

[59] This was taken from an article entitled "The New Turkey and the Arab Political System" by a Turkish affairs specialist in Lebanon, Jihad al-Zain. It was published in the Beirut daily *Al-Nahar* on 20 June 2004. See "Turkey's Political Model," *Middle East Economic Survey* XLVII, 28 June 2004, accessed at http://www.mees.com/postedarticles/politics/ArabPressReview/a47n26c02.htm, 22 June 2006.

[60] Ahmed Dawa "Ankara'nın Tutumu Araplara Örnek Olsun," in the Syrian daily *Al-Thawra* on 28 May 2004 and republished in *Radikal*, 2 June 2004; similar comments made by Lui Kadumi appeared in the Qatari daily *Al-Watan* on 11 June 2004. See "Türkiye Araplara Örnek Olsun," *Radikal*, 14 June 2004.

[61] Quoted in "A Brave Turkish Stand," *Mideast Mirror*, 28 May 2004.

[62] Nader Fergany, "More Arab than the Arabs?" *Al-Ahram Weekly*, 10–16 June 2004, accessed at http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/694/op3.htm, 22 June 2006.

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Discussions about the significance of the Turkish case have stressed other features as well. Abdel-Muneim Said, Director of the Al-Ahram Research Center, and others have argued that the AKP's significance comes from its ability to reconcile Islamic values with democracy, just like many Arab intellectuals who used the AKP as "a counter Huntington example" in the post-September 11 era.[63] For some analysts, the AKP represented an attempt to find a balance between Islamic, secularist, and democratic values,[64] whereas others believed that the Turkish case was worth studying because the AKP's electoral victory meant a defeat for the country's decades of experience with secularism.[65] For yet others, the Turkish experience was worth examining because of its success in holding reliable, open, and free elections and achieving democratic reforms and more civilian control over the military.[66]

The review of Arab media and interviews also indicates the existence of those who reject the Turkish case because it has produced a system that is not genuinely Islamic. According to this group, the AKP adopted secularism and moved away from Islamic principles as the Party reformed itself. The reaction of Mohammed Mahdi Akef, the leader of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, is significant, given the Brothers' influence over other Islamist groups. Akef rejected the Turkish model completely and found Erdoğan, unlike Erbakan, to be "unprincipled" because of his close relations with the United States.[67] An article published in *Roz al-Yousuf* agreed with this view. It criticized the Party for losing its Islamic credentials and for compromising too much in going along with a ban on the headscarf and placing restrictions on *İmam Hatip* (preacher) schools.[68] According to Fahmy Howeidy, a prominent Egyptian intellectual, one of the most important reasons the United States has marketed the AKP as a model to the Muslim world lies in the fact

[63] Abdel-Moneim Said, "A Fourth Way," *Al-Ahram Weekly*, 27 February–5 March 2003, accessed at http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2003/627/op71.htm, 22 June 2006. See "Understanding the AKP Victory," *Mideast Mirror*, 25 November 2002 (Wael Mirza's article from the Saudi daily *Al-Watan*); see also "The Islamist March via the Ballot Box," *Mideast Mirror*, 7 November 2002 (Mazin al-Sakit's article from the Jordanian daily *Al-Dustour*).

[64] *The Star* (Jordanian weekly), 7–13 November 2002, accessed at http://star.arabia.com/article/0,5596,214_6467,00.html, October 2004; see also Rasha Saad, "Islamism at the Ballot Box," *Al-Ahram Weekly*, (Egyptian weekly) 28 November–4 December 2002, accessed at http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/print/2002/614/re7.htm, 22 June 2006.

[65] "Turkey and Syria Chart a New Course," *Mideast Mirror*, 13 January 2004.

[66] Idris Buwani, "Mu'aadilat Khafiyya fi Al-Sura'a Beyne Al-Tayyar Al-Islami wa Al-Tayyar Al-'Almani fi Turkiyya," *Al-Mustaqbal Al-Arabi*, January 2004: 75–81; Muhammad Amin Al-Meydani, "Turkiyya Tukaddim Nafsiha Namudajan Liltewazun wa Al-Intifah," *Al-Hayat* (Pan-Arab daily published in London), 13 June 2004.

[67] Al-Musawwar's interview with Akef, "Kayfa Tusallatim Ila Nikaba Al-Sahfiyiin?" *Al-Musawwar* (Egyptian weekly), 19 March 2004: 22–23; see also Amira Howeidy, "We Take Nobody's Permission," *Al-Ahram Weekly*, 15–21 December 2005, accessed at http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2005/773/eg5.htm, 22 June 2006.

[68] "Al-Hicab Mamnu'a fi Turkiyya Al-Dawla Al-Muslima," *Roz al-Yousuf* (Egyptian weekly), 10–16 January 2004.

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that Turkey is actually a secular system that largely marginalizes the role of religion in society. Therefore, Howeidy believes, the advocacy of the Turkish model is just another American strategy to control the Islamic world.[69]

As the above analysis of Arab perspectives suggests, the AKP experience has not sent a clear-cut message of a model for reform and moderation to Islamist groups in the region. The opinions indicate a simultaneous record of sympathy and denunciation. What is also striking about those who have had sympathy for the Turkish new thinking is their exclusive focus on one particular policy choice of the Party, such as foreign policy and democratization, rather than discussing the model in its entirety. This important point suggests that while the above-represented sympathy can generate hope for some reformists within Islamist groups, the question of whether the Turkish model can create a domino effect in the region remains highly dubious. As Essam El-Erian, a prominent leader of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, argues, mere discussions about the Turkish case among the Brothers and others do not suggest the Brothers' willingness to follow the Turkish path.[70] El-Erian argues that the Muslim Brothers' own political experience since 1928 is greater than that of the AKP's new and uncertain experience that emerged in a different political setting.

Domestic and Regional Contexts

As detailed above, political and economic conditions have been crucial factors in the transformation of Turkish Islamism. The nature of the Islamist goals and methods is more closely related to the socioeconomic and political conditions within which Islamists operate than to what some scholars call a lack of "more tolerant Islamic traditions." A closer look at Islamist movements in the Arab Middle East suggests the existence of settings that are different from that found in Turkey. The Islamists remain popular among the Muslim population because of domestic issues such as legitimacy crises of existing regimes, limited political liberalization, lack of genuine electoral politics, and economic hardship.[71] Islamism in these settings represents the most reliable alternative to the existing regimes in the eyes of many constituencies. Regionally, Islamism is fed by factors such as the American invasion of Iraq, the American presence in the region, and the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Turkey's close association with the West and the Islamists' nationalism has largely diminished their sensitivities to such issues. As one analyst argued, "Events in what one might call reference states are an especially

[69] Fahmy Howeidy, "Tasrib Amriki Limashru'a 'Al-Sharq Al-Awsat Al-Kabir,'" *Al-Sharq Al-Awsat* (Pan-Arab daily published in London), 4 February 2004, accessed at http://www.asharqalawsat.com/print/default.asp?did=id216052, 22 June 2006.

[70] Essam El-Erian, in a telephone interview with the author, 1 October 2004.

[71] Robbert A.F.L. Woltering, "The Roots of Islamist Popularity," *Third World Quarterly* 23 (December 2002), 1133–1143.

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important source of political learning. A reference state is a nation that serves as a point of comparison for political actors in another state. Such states serve as reference points because of geographic proximity, cultural similarity, shared history or some combination of the three."[72] The nationalist nature of the Turkish case, its close association with the West, and the Arabs' memories of Turkey (which are less than favorable, to say the least) are obstacles to perceiving it as a reference state.

In the Turkish case, the constraints placed upon an Islamist agenda have been accompanied by opportunities for moderation. Turkish Islamism has been incorporated into the secular political system by adopting secular elements along the way. Due to the relative political openness, Turkish Islamist parties have also faced accountability for their participation in domestic and international politics. While it is true that a significant number of elections have been held in Muslim countries throughout the region, many of them have provided only limited opportunities for political socialization and have not gone beyond what some analysts have called a "menu for manipulation."[73] The elections are introduced, controlled, and can be halted by the existing regimes at will, and are characterized by fraud. Rather than being power-sharing experiments, these elections seem to be a survival strategy, a tactical opening of the regimes that are facing a crisis of legitimacy, and can be followed by a deliberalization process, as has recently taken place in Egypt and Jordan.[74]

Limitations and Uncertainty of the AKP Model

A significant obstacle to importing the Turkish model into Muslim countries in the Middle East is the uncertainty surrounding the AKP's experience with the new thinking. It remains unclear to what extent the AKP's moderation has been internalized by the whole Party, if at all, and whether the AKP government will be able to respond to the demands of its constituencies with different leanings, including nationalists, liberals, Islamists, and the bourgeoisie.[75] Questions have been raised in conservative circles about the AKP's ability and willingness to respond to the demands of the Islamist/conservative population.[76] The intellectual efforts of new Islamism are still being discussed

[72] Nancy Bermeo, "Democracy and the Lessons of Dictatorship," *Comparative Politics* 24 (April 1992): 273–291.

[73] Andreas Schedler, "The Menu of Manipulation," *Journal of Democracy* 13 (April 2002): 36–50.

[74] See Diane Singerman, "The Politics of Emergency Rule in Egypt," *Current History* 101 (January 2002): 29–36; Russell E. Licas, "Deliberalization in Jordan," *Journal of Democracy* 14 (January 2003): 137–145.

[75] For more information about the lack of cohesion between different ideological groups within the AKP, see Kemal Balcı, "AK Party in Danger of Growing Too Fast," *Turkish Daily News*, 28 March 2004; Kemal Balcı, "Will AK Party's Holy Alliance Fracture?" *Turkish Daily News*, 29 February 2004.

[76] *Vakit*, a daily Turkish newspaper, often publishes such critics. See also Ali Bulaç's critique of the AKP's policies towards religion: "AK Parti'nin Handikapları," *Zaman*, 12 April 2004.

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within Islamist circles with a degree of skepticism.[77] Criticism of the AKP mounted after the passage of the resolution on the deployment of Turkish troops to Iraq, a resolution that was supported by the top leadership and a vast majority of AKP deputies—with only seven deputies opposed. The disappointment, and even anger, from newspaper analysts who had previously supported the government was unmistakable. "This may be the beginning of an end," wrote Şahin Alpay in the Turkish daily *Zaman*, arguing that the nation would not forgive the AKP.[78] In the face of such criticism, the AKP is increasingly feeling the need to balance its pragmatism and the demands of its conservative constituency. This is evident in the government's occasional—and unsuccessful—moves toward lifting restrictions on *Imam Hatip* schools, loosening control over the headscarf, and criminalizing adultery. None of these attempts has been able to satisfy its conservative base, however.[79] A more recent criticism has been raised by one of the architects of the AKP project, Ali Bulaç, who accused the AKP government of failing to keep its promises and of pursuing populist policies.[80] As long as the headscarf and religious education reforms are not implemented by the AKP government, such criticisms are likely to increase in the years ahead.[81]

Moreover, the challenges facing the AKP have not been limited to its Islamist roots. Because of the short history of the Party (established on 14 August 2001) and of the government (formed on 18 November 2002), it is too early to make an accurate assessment of the government's success. It is, however, possible to identify some general trends. The Party's popularity has increased, as the March 2004 local elections showed (the AKP won 42.4 percent of the total votes), due to its careful avoidance of confrontation and its relative success in economic revival and democratization. Many challenges remain, however, including widespread unemployment, clientalism, the crisis-prone economy, and resistance to the implementation of democratization packages, which are particularly crucial for the Kurdish population. A major challenge for the government lies in its ability to play a two-level game, in which the Party must satisfy its conservative rank and file while not provoking the secular establishment. Regardless of how moderate the Party's discourse and actions have been, the secular establishment, particularly the military, remains suspi-

[77] Yusuf Kaplan, "'Yeni Islamcılık' Numarası: Pergelini Şaşırmak ya da Garpzedelerden Sonra Şimdi de Şarkzedeler," *Yeni Şafak*, 17 and 19 February 2003.

[78] Şahin Alpay, "Sonun Baslangıcı mı?" *Zaman*, 9 October 2003; see also Fehmi Koru, "Ortak Akıl," *Yeni Şafak*, 9 October 2003; Mehmet Ocaktan, "Amerikancılığın Bedeli Ağır Olacak," *Yeni Şafak*, 10 October 2003.

[79] Ali Bayramoğlu, "AKP'de Neler Oluyor?" *Yeni Şafak*, 18 September 2004.

[80] See *Bilgi ve Hikmet* (Turkish weekly) for Bulaç's column. Accessed at http://www.bilgihikmet.com, 22 June 2006.

[81] The tension is clearly explained by Hayrettin Kahraman in "Iktidarin Üç Mesele İle Imtihani" *Yeni Şafak*, 4 September 2005; also see Ahmet Taşgetiren, "Cözemediğimiz Için Özür ..." *Yeni Şafak*, 30 December 2004.

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cious of the AKP's intentions.[82] Explicit and implicit statements by top military officers and higher-ranking bureaucrats have made this point clear.[83] The tension is likely to mount, as the AKP-dominated Parliament has to elect the next president in 2007. The success of the Turkish Islamist model will therefore largely depend on whether the AKP can find a balance between its conflicting objectives and on its ability to find solutions to protracted economic and political challenges in domestic politics and foreign policy.

The AKP's ideology of conservative democracy remains ambiguous, and certain governmental decisions have revealed the limitations of its political learning. In the name of responding to its conservative constituency, the AKP government from time to time engages in policies that raise questions about its claim of being pluralist and tolerant. This point is illustrated by the government's attempt to criminalize adultery and limit alcohol consumption, its dismissive attitude toward the *Alevi* population (the largest non-Sunni Muslim population), and the AKP municipalities' tendency to promote gender segregation. The government further drags its feet in ensuring the rights of religious minorities in the areas of institutional autonomy and property rights.[84]

This article's discussion about the AKP model has underlined major obstacles to the duplication of the Turkish experience elsewhere in the Middle East. It has argued that the region is full of Islamist groups that operate in different political, cultural, and economic settings with varying and conflicting goals and strategies. The notion of a model that "fits all" does not hold much promise, because it fails to acknowledge the diversity among Islamist groups. Moreover, the notion takes a noncritical stand toward the model, ignoring limitations in its acceptance of democratic values. Instead of advocating the exportation of the Turkish experience to Islamist groups regardless of their peculiarities, it might be better to identify the lessons to be learned from this experience.

Lessons to Be Learned

The transformation of Turkish Islamism highlights important lessons that may potentially be applicable to other Islamist cases in the Middle East. First, the Turkish experience with the AKP is important in raising questions about the understanding of Islamism as a static and uniform political movement and in

[82] Since the establishment of the AKP government in late 2002, President Ahmet Necdet Sezer has vetoed a significant number of bills, the most controversial of which was an education reform bill to allow young people trained as imams to go to university. The government shelved the bill to reconsider later. For details, see *Hürriyet*, 1 June 2004.

[83] *Hürriyet*, 19 May 2006.

[84] Elizabeth H. Prodromou, "Turkey between Secularism and Fundamentalism? The 'Muslimhood Model' and the Greek Orthodox Minority," *The Brandywine Review of Faith and International Affairs* 3 (Spring 2005): 11–22.

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revealing Islamists' ability to adopt democratic values. The AKP is not the only example. As has been shown by the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan and their political party, the Islamic Action Front, the Islamist movement in Jordan "has been consistently in the forefront of democratizing the Jordanian polity since liberalization began in 1989."[85] Islamists' adoption of democratic rules was not because the Islamist movements were "made up of Jeffersonian democrats, but rather because greater democratization has served their organizational and political interests."[86]

The second lesson is the positive role that can be played by an external factor (the EU, in the Turkish case) in democratization and moderation. The AKP realized that relations with the EU are not simply a foreign policy issue for Turkey, but are also a vehicle for greater political action and the promotion of human rights and religious freedoms. Turkey's relations with the EU make up the history of Turkey's democratization process. Many legal changes and their implementation have resulted from Turkey's wish to comply with European standards. The mass popular support behind Turkey's application for EU membership left many politicians with little choice but to support steps toward compliance, at least rhetorically. This popular support was related to the lack of a colonial legacy in Turkey as well as incentives in the form of aid, credit, direct investment, and so on that a prospective membership would bring. Turkey's experience with the EU is different from the "promotion of democracy" that the current U.S. administration subscribes to in regard to Iraq. In the broader Middle East, foreign involvement, as historical examples have shown, is likely to bring resentment and radicalism, rather than democratic change and moderation.

A final lesson is the importance of Islamist inclusion. The fear of having Islamists come to power has become an excuse for regimes to resist allowing greater participation. For example, Algerian violence during the 1990s, after a military coup prevented the formation of an Islamist government, gives many authoritarian governments an excuse to ridicule the prospect of free electoral politics and to resort to repressive and exclusionary policies against political Islamists. Many Arab regimes welcomed the military coup against the FIS and made sure that Islamists across the region were kept under control. Tunisia and Morocco, for instance, banned their Islamist parties and used the violence in Algeria as justification for their decisions.[87] Given the diverse characteristics of Islamist groups and their unequal commitment to democratic rule, it is not feasible for current regimes to pursue inclusive policies toward all Islamists. But the examples in Jordan, Morocco, and Egypt indicate Islamists' willingness to play by the rules.

[85] Glenn E. Robinson, "Can Islamists Be Democrats? The Case of Jordan," *Middle East Journal* 51 (Summer 1997): 373–388.

[86] Ibid.

[87] A.H. Akbari, "Nervous Neighbors," *Africa Report* 37 (March/April 1992): 16–18.

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Concluding Remarks

A reading of twentieth-century Middle East history tells us that attempts to apply a specific model to a wider region are by no means new. Fascination with newly established regimes has often led some observers to believe that these would create a domino effect in a region. Two examples of this line of thinking were the Islamist regime in Iran, whose primary foreign policy objective was to spread Islamic revolution,[88] and Egypt's Gamal Abdul Nasser, who assigned Egypt the role of "hero" for Arab, African, and Islamic countries.[89] Yet, the dominos did not fall, despite the hopes of some and perhaps the fears of others. After the initial excitement faded away, it became obvious that these models had in fact established authoritarian regimes whose performances left much to be desired. Moreover, those who were assumed to have learned the "lessons" had not actually done so, but instead had developed strategies to sustain the status quo.[90]

To its credit, what makes the Turkish Islamist model different and more appealing to many analysts is its adoption of peaceful means. In contrast to the clerical regime of Iran, which came to power through a revolutionary upheaval followed by a reign of terror, and Nasser's regime in Egypt, which attained power through a military coup and established an authoritarian regime, Turkish Islamists' new thinking proposed to give a different version of Islam, yet obtained and held power through democratic means. This discussion suggests, however, that the Islamist new thinking will join the list of models that have little chance for emulation. Thinking along the lines of "modelhood"—although often tempting—underestimates the distinct conditions in which political movements operate and overestimates the ability of others to learn the "right lessons." Yet, a political movement's success should not be judged only by its potential for export. Although the new thinking that the AKP represents stands little chance of being duplicated elsewhere, it nonetheless provides an opportunity for Turkish politics to mature toward greater democracy.*

[88] John L. Esposito and James P. Piscatori, "Introduction" in J.L. Esposito, ed., *The Iranian Revolution: Its Global Impact* (Miami: Florida International University Press, 1990), 30–38.

[89] Gamal Abdul Nasser, *Egypt's Liberation: The Philosophy of the Revolution* (Washington DC: Public Affairs Press, 1956).

[90] Gregory Gause, "Revolutionary Fevers and Regional Contagion: Domestic Structures and the 'Export' of Revolution in the Middle East," *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies* 14 (Spring 1991): 1–23.

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Breeding Bin Ladens

America, Islam, and the Future of Europe

Zachary Shore



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

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



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Book Reviews

Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq *by Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor. New York, Pantheon Books, 2006. 640 pp. $27.95.*

What the U.S. military can get young men and women to do puts all of us who are professors to shame. If we could induce such skill, dedication, and discipline in our students, our colleges and country would be in great shape. The heart of *Cobra II* is a blow-by-blow military history of the invasion of Iraq, concentrating on the American ground war (the air campaign and the role of the British are only touched on). In these 300 pages, we get powerful detail, often at the level of small units. When a tank gets destroyed, it is not a statistic but is filled with individuals; the soldiers who struggle and die are characterized and named. I have never been in combat, but Michael R. Gordon, a *New York Times* military correspondent who covered the war, and Bernard E. Trainor, a retired Marine Corps lieutenant general and former *Times* correspondent, make me feel as though I have. It is a thoroughly gripping account.

The authors make clear that the training and technological wizardry of the U.S. forces, impressive as these were, could not completely dissipate the fog of war. Intelligence was poor, and the Iraqi use of the Fedayeen came as a shock. Although the Iraqi forces had little mobility, reconnaissance ability, or effective communication, they sometimes had a good idea of where the Americans would be. American units were frequently surprised at both where the Iraqis were and where they were not. Furthermore, because the Iraqi military was very weak, crippled by Saddam Hussein's fear of a military coup, it could have been defeated by an even less-skilled force than it confronted.

Cobra II has received most attention not for this discussion, however, but for the opening and closing sections that describe the planning for the war and, more briefly, the botched reconstruction efforts. Despite the availability of sufficient time for planning, the plans for the war were not developed coherently but were based instead on an intellectually bizarre but politically understandable combination of best-case and worst-case analysis. The outlines of the story are well known, but Gordon and Trainor provide texture and detail. With the support of President George W. Bush, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was committed to his program of "transformation"—that is, taking advantage of modern technologies to allow small and flexible forces to do the job that had

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previously required massive numbers of troops. In his eyes, Afghanistan had shown that this concept would work, and Iraq would be an even more impressive demonstration. He and the rest of the administration were also committed to avoiding long-term peacekeeping and nation-building operations. These two preconceptions meant that neither the invasion nor the occupation of Iraq was thought to require anything like the 380,000 troops projected in earlier war plans. Tommy Franks, the general in charge, resisted for a while but eventually conformed. He claimed to have been persuaded, but the Secretary of the Army probably had it right when he said: "Rumsfeld just ground Franks down" (p. 461).

Many military officers felt that the United States was cutting things too close, a view that seemed substantiated when optimistic predictions about mass defections from the Iraqi army and massive support from civilians failed to materialize, and when supply lines were attacked by Fedayeen. But, partly at Franks's urging, the offensive continued after a slight pause and liberated Baghdad with amazing speed, although the paucity of troops meant that the United States would not have been able to secure weapons of mass destruction sites had they been found.

The birds came home to roost in the wake of the major combat. Gordon and Trainor document how the top levels of the U.S. government failed to do serious planning for the post-war period and brushed aside calls for a larger security presence and the rapid training of the Iraqi police. Furthermore, in what remains an inexplicable intelligence failure, no one realized how fragile and run-down the infrastructure of Iraq was, and the Pentagon, which was allowed to take charge to the exclusion of the State Department, had neither an understanding of Iraqi politics nor plans for how the political reconstruction would proceed.

This account has weaknesses, of course. People who gave Gordon and Trainor extensive interviews come off very well; those who did not talk are treated more harshly. As in most instant histories, few documents are available and many scores are being settled. We also get only glimpses of what is happening at the highest political levels, and diplomatic considerations are shoved to the margins.

The book is filled with illuminating details and remarks. In the former category are the numerous instances of actions taken to provide good television coverage (pp. 397, 407, 417, 421, 428, 458). Of the latter, perhaps the best was made by a senior member of the initial political team sent to Baghdad: "It was very obvious to me that we could not run a country we did not understand" (p. 470). To take one crucial example that was new to me, only after having decided to abolish the Iraqi Army did the Americans learn that their assumption that most of its top ranks had been members of the Baath Party was incorrect (p. 485). (The authors attribute the decision to L. Paul Bremer, not to Rumsfeld and Dick Cheney, as most other accounts have.)

The authors believe that better preparation would have produced a much better chance of reconstructing Iraq. For them, the brief period following the

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military victory was a lost opportunity. They may be right, but note the story told by an American soldier, who, along with several of his colleagues had been captured during the fighting: "The Iraqis had a hard time understanding something. Shoshanna is Panamanian. Edgar is Hispanic. Joe is Philippine, and Patrick is from Kansas. ... One Iraqi said to me, 'You no fighting each other? Why?'" (p. 441). Perhaps even good planning would not have led to a viable polity.

ROBERT JERVIS
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The American Era: Power and Strategy for the 21st Century *by Robert Lieber. New York, Cambridge University Press, 2005. 272 pp. $28.00.*

The Case for Goliath: How America Acts as the World's Government in the Twenty-first Century *by Michael Mandelbaum. New York, Public Affairs, 2005. 283 pp. $26.00.*

Criticizing U.S. foreign policy is a popular parlor sport, rivaling the World Cup in its global appeal. Iraq embodies U.S. failures: the absence of weapons of mass destruction, a resistant insurgency, and a state at risk of collapse. Largely because of the U.S. presence in Iraq, most of the world thinks the United States is the biggest threat to world peace (Pew Research Centre, 2006). However, as important as it is for America to acknowledge the shortcomings of its foreign policy, it is equally important that analyses be historically grounded and sophisticated, and that these consider alternatives to America's positions and policies.

Two recent books by leading foreign policy analysts take the more difficult and, indeed, more unpopular route. These books, by Michael Mandelbaum and Robert Lieber, have a common intent: to remind Americans and the world that the exercise of U.S. power has never been altruistic or problem-free. By focusing on cases in which the United States has used its power appropriately to stabilize the world and to help establish global institutions, the books consider what most detractors of U.S. policy forget: where would the world be without the United States to lead?

The Case for Goliath is clearly argued and well supported, accessible to both laymen and undergraduates. Mandelbaum details what the United States has accomplished since the end of World War II, but he is clearly not just a cheerleader for the United States, and he is realistic about what has motivated U.S. behavior. From beginning to end, Mandelbaum's thesis is that it is more appropriate to think of the United States as a world government rather than an empire. While empires are about inequality, coercion, and control by foreigners, Mandelbaum maintains that the United States does not directly or indirectly control other states, and when it has had the opportunity to dictate

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outcomes in a country, as it exemplified in Bosnia after 1995, it willingly shared its power with others. Mandelbaum is correct, and by defining *empire* early in the book, he develops a much better framework for understanding the U.S. role in the world.

In Mandelbaum's view, the United States steers rather than controls, and provides public goods and services for the world community. The meat of the book provides an excellent overview of what the United States built after World War II: policies and institutions that cohered into two international orders, one involving security, and the other economics (p. 18). Adeptly moving between history and current events, the book explains how the American military's reach has been used to provide reassurance and security to parts of Europe and Asia.

At times, however, the patriot in Mandelbaum slips out, and his choice of imagery to illustrate his points speaks volumes. For example, he initially compares the U.S. role in the world to the sun's position in the solar system (p. xvi) and later claims that America's role in the world since World War II has something in common with the theme of the Frank Capra film *It's a Wonderful Life* (p. 194). Thus, although Mandelbaum makes an excellent case for why the United States has, in some respects, acted as a world government, providing global public goods and stabilizing the world, his questionable analogies weaken rather than strengthen his argument.

Robert Lieber's book adopts a similar if not more strident tone about American foreign policy and the need for a strategy of primacy. However, *The American Era* emphasizes what has changed in the post-September 11 world and how the United States needs to confront its unique but inherently difficult position. Lieber claims that "Islamist terrorism and WMD, the inadequacy of international means for confronting this danger, and the unique power of the United States" require that Americans acknowledge the problems in international relations for what they are (p. 37). For Lieber, this means that growing anti-Americanism has more to do with what the United States *is* than what it *does*. Hostility toward the United States thus stems as much, or more, from reactions to globalization, modernity, and American preponderance as it does from U.S. policies themselves (p. 7). As Lieber admits, his argument is not the norm among academics, regardless of their philosophical tradition.

There are many strengths to this book; above all, Lieber is able to clearly link international relations theories to current policy debates. His thorough (although not excessive) reading of relevant literature will probably make this a common text for classes on U.S. foreign policy. In general, Lieber provides not only both sides of an issue but also numerous and conflicting perspectives, as well as concise literature reviews of debates ranging from U.S. grand strategy to threats to American primacy to positions on the role of culture in international politics. One glaring exception to this rule is the chapter on Iraq. Lieber pays scant attention to the numerous criticisms of the administration

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of George W. Bush, including that it was intently looking for information that would link Saddam Hussein to both Osama bin Laden and September 11. Given the importance of Iraq to the intensification of anti-American attitudes, this omission is problematic.

Despite their shortcomings, both books provide significant evidence for what we as Americans sometimes hate to admit: we are the superpower, and the world regularly looks to us to assist and to lead but also to blame. These scholars demonstrate that America's unique position has created numerous challenges and burdens, which the books detail in different but often overlapping ways.

Disappointingly, both authors essentially let the Bush administration and the American people off the hook by concluding that foreign policy challenges and anti-Americanism are due largely to the structure of the international system and are not a by-product of how the U.S. government has used its power or flaunted its position in the world. In addition to recalling what the United States has done right and what it must do in a post-September 11 world, it would have been helpful if these books had concluded with policy recommendations as to how the United States could better negotiate its inherently difficult position. Certainly, there must be some way of reversing the global public opinion that it is the United States, rather than Iran or North Korea, that is the greatest threat to world peace. Several years ago, then-candidate Bush seemed to know how the United States could maintain its legitimacy and avoid global resentment. It was, we should not forget, through humility and the judicious use of power.

PATRICE MCMAHON
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Suicide Terrorism *by Ami Pedahzur. Cambridge, MA, Polity Press, 2005. 261 pp. $24.95.*

Ami Pedahzur examines the global history of suicide terrorism in his most recent book, *Suicide Terrorism*. He isolates the variables among diverse cases from the Middle East, South Asia, and a more globalized suicide terror campaign perpetrated by al Qaeda and its ideological cohorts.

Pedahzur emphasizes that suicide terrorism is instrumental because terrorist leaders believe it is effective. Suicide terrorism is used not only to destroy a specific target but, more broadly, to translate into political gains for the terrorist organizations that employ it.

According to Pedahzur's comprehensive study, suicide bombing has grown exponentially over the last twenty years. He makes clear, however, that this is not solely an Islamic phenomenon but has been utilized with great efficacy by secular groups as well. "Islam is not the factor that explains suicide terrorism and treating it as such is misleading" (p. 23). Nevertheless, unlike other studies

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on the subject, Pedahzur's does not go so far as to dismiss religion outright in the fostering and creating of a politically receptive environment for violence.

A successful suicide bombing campaign requires individuals willing to die and a community that will support them. Hence, organizations that sponsor terrorism have glorified martyrdom and have endeavored to create "a culture of death" (pp. 28–29) by capitalizing on the community's belief that it is the target of discrimination and on the resulting feelings of hopelessness and powerlessness. "The social environment to which the individual belongs, whether it is a community or a more restricted organizational framework ... will significantly facilitate his or her enlistment to the mission" (p. 26).

Pedahzur also focuses on individual bombers and their motivations, including financial motivations, personal revenge, and the desire to erase social stigma. He analyzes what makes the bomber volunteer and concludes that "this is a social political phenomenon and it has very little to do with personal characteristics" (p. 136). Nevertheless, he provides meticulous detail about individual acts of terrorism. More than providing mere statistics or raw numbers, *Suicide Terrorism* details the bombers' very personal stories, drawing similarities across the cases and across regions.

Pedahzur has done a great service to students of terrorism by including an appendix with the most comprehensive list to date of suicide terrorist attacks and their locations, targets, total casualties, and claims of responsibility. In many respects, Pedahzur's study is a corrective to previous data sets that were often incomplete or poorly defined. In addition to providing the data, Pedahzur correlates the campaigns and the increase of attacks with political events such as negotiations (to test whether suicide terror is intended to be a spoiler) or increased state counterterrorist policies (to test to what extent suicide terror is exacerbated by state coercion).

In some cases, the correlation between policy and suicide terror is clear. However, Pedahzur avoids causal arguments about the relationship between suicide terrorism and exogenous political events.

There are only a handful of issues that merit limited criticism. In Pedahzur's attempt to take the middle ground, he has avoided discussion of some of the more controversial aspects of the various ethno-nationalist conflicts. For example, regarding the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, he neglects the role of key events—Ariel Sharon's visit to the Temple Mount or the death of Muhammad Durra, for example—in exacerbating the tensions between Israelis and Palestinians as well as increasing popular support for the use of violence against Israeli civilians. He likewise underplays some of the domestic-level variables that propelled the popularity of Islamic parties in Palestine, in particular the cronyism and intense corruption of the Palestinian Authority.

These small critiques aside, *Suicide Terrorism* is an exhaustive study and provides incisive analysis of the subject.

MIA BLOOM
University of Georgia

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Terrorism and the State: Rethinking the Rules of State Responsibility
by Tal Becker. Oxford, UK, Hart Publishing, 2006. 390 pp. Cloth, $70.00; paper, $40.00.

The U.S. invasion of Afghanistan after September 11 probably violated international law. The UN charter forbids the use of military force except in self-defense or with the authorization of the Security Council. The Security Council did not authorize the invasion. The invasion was not an act of self-defense against Afghanistan, because the Taliban government did not launch the attack of September 11, al Qaeda did; and al Qaeda was not the government of Afghanistan. The Taliban government did provide support to al Qaeda, but providing support is not the same as authorizing the attack, and so even if providing support to a terrorist group violates international law (which is itself a difficult issue), such a violation would not justify the use of military force by the United States in self-defense.

Yet, with some minor exceptions like North Korea and Cuba, other nations did not condemn the United States for this violation of international law. For the international lawyer, this must mean either that the U.S. invasion really did not violate international law or that international law spontaneously changed. Tal Becker takes the former position. He argues that the view that the United States violated international law is based on an erroneous "agency theory" of state responsibility, according to which a state can be held responsible for a private act such as the attack of September 11 only if it authorizes or directs the attack. In place of this theory, Becker advances a "causation-based theory" of state responsibility, according to which a state can be held responsible for such an attack if its violation of its duty to prevent terrorism "caused" the attack. Becker concludes that the U.S. invasion was legal self-defense because Afghanistan's Taliban government caused the attack by failing to take action against al Qaeda prior to September 11.

Becker is a learned and careful commentator, and international lawyers will benefit from reading his book. The first part, on the law of state responsibility, and the second part, on the law governing states' obligations to prevent terrorism, stand on their own and can be read with profit even by those who are not persuaded by the causation-based theory advanced in the third part. The theory itself will cause controversy. The legal authorities that Becker can cite in its favor are, as he admits, slim.

For readers who are not international lawyers, the book is likely to be bewildering inside baseball. Written with an international law audience in mind, it does not try to explain or acknowledge the limitations of the methodology of international law. The uninitiated will discover that international lawyers make arguments by discussing a small number of authoritative legal materials and a large number of academic papers that discuss these same materials, mostly ignoring the empirical reality of interstate relations and neglecting questions of power. The organizing premise is that all states are treated the same by

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international law; the goal is to derive a universal norm from the handful of legal and historical precedents. Thus, Becker largely ignores the most likely scenario: that nations that approved of or acquiesced in the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan did so for geopolitical reasons and did not believe that they thereby committed themselves to a general legal norm that permits any nation attacked by foreign terrorists—India, Israel, Russia, Iraq—to invade a country that harbored them, as the causation-based theory requires. It may be that one set of rules governs the United States and another set of rules governs other nations, in which case Becker's attempt to derive a single rule that governs all states is futile. But this possibility is not one that can easily be acknowledged by international lawyers. It would do too much violence to their worldview.

ERIC A. POSNER
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Ending Empire: Contested Sovereignty and Territorial Partition *by Hendrik Spruyt. Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 2005. 205 pp. Cloth, $55.00; paper, $22.50.*

Although every European empire ultimately gave up its overseas colonies, some battled the "winds of change" more stubbornly than others. Even when the overall balance sheet went into the red, colonial armies, settlers, and imperially oriented businesses still benefited from empire. In this fascinating book, Hendrik Spruyt argues that political fragmentation in the imperial center allows more opportunities for these groups to delay territorial withdrawal.

Drawing on strategic-choice institutionalist theory, Spruyt argues that polities fragmented by multiparty parliamentary coalitions, weak parties, checks and balances, or cartelized authoritarian regimes provide more veto points. Fragmented parliamentary systems enable small, pro-imperial parties to engage in coalitional logrolling, and also to deter larger conservative parties from moving to the center for fear of losing votes on their right flank. In contrast, strong presidential democracies and two-party parliamentary democracies with strong party discipline cater to the median voter. Unitary authoritarian states should also be immune to parochial imperial interests.

Spruyt tests these hypotheses with several case studies. He argues that multi-party systems strengthened political resistance to Dutch disengagement from Indonesia in the late 1940s, to French withdrawal from a costly war in Algeria in 1954–1962, and to Israeli withdrawal from its occupied territories in the 1990s. Authoritarian Portugal did not surrender its colonies until its politically powerful military lost interest in them. The less fragmented polities put up less of a struggle. Charles de Gaulle was able to quit Algeria after constitutionally strengthening France's executive branch. Two-party Britain calmly relinquished its vast overseas holdings after World War II, and the Soviet Union's unified dictatorship allowed a peaceful dissolution in 1991. All these empires, Spruyt

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argues, faced net material incentives for retrenchment, but variation in such incentives does not adequately explain differences in readiness to withdraw.

Spruyt makes good use of historical process tracing to show how spoilers obstructed liberalizers in the French Fourth Republic, the Netherlands, and Israel. But the model does not describe the Portuguese process very well. The fascist party and military jointly ruling Portugal both favored empire until the 1974 coup, so it is hard to see how fragmentation or vetoes hindered decolonization. Centralized authoritarian power does help explain Mikhail Gorbachev's ability to adopt loosening reforms. But dissolution of the internal empire was never Gorbachev's aim, and it occurred mainly after the abortive August 1991 coup paralyzed the Soviet regime.

Some alternative explanations are dismissed a little too quickly in the cases. The impact of the relative magnitude of settler populations—that of France in Algeria was the largest by far of the European empires—is not analyzed in detail. Tony Smith (*The Pattern of Imperialism*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), Daniel Philpott (*Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), and historians of empire have argued that France's assimilationist imperial ideology led it to be more recalcitrant than Britain, where elites had long accepted the principle of gradual colonial self-rule. Jack Snyder's *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991) and Charles Kupchan's *The Vulnerability of Empire* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994) emphasized the role of strategic beliefs in a broader range of dysfunctional imperial policies. Snyder traced strategic myths ultimately to political cartelization, while arguing that they exert independent influence once entrenched. Spruyt, in contrast, views public opinion as malleable, indifferent, and impotent, and elite ideas as a mere artifact of domestic political dynamics. Additional evidence on this point—for example, showing that the French Socialist Party's support for empire was due to electoral competition and coalition maintenance more than to a long-standing commitment to "Greater France"—would have strengthened his case.

Overall, however, Spruyt takes care to qualify his conclusions and to acknowledge other factors in play. This is a well-written, superbly researched, and thought-provoking book, and a valuable contribution to the literature on imperial decline.

PETER LIBERMAN
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Modern Revolution: Social Change and Cultural Continuity in Czechoslovakia and China *by Daniel Brook. Lanham, MD, University Press of America, 2005. 242 pp. $34.00.*

Modern Revolution seeks to trace the causal sequences behind the "Velvet Revolution" in Czechoslakia in 1989 and China's 1989 Tiananmen mass dem-

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onstrations. Seven chapters are devoted to Czechoslovakia; a single chapter seeks to discover parallels between the two cases. Daniel Brook lays claim to a new theory of "modern revolutions," in which mass movements successfully seize state power from one-party dictatorships in industrialized societies, leading to fundamental alteration of the states' "social, political, and economic symbols and structures" (p. 25).

The substantive chapters cover the aborted Prague Spring of 1968 that the author sees as a top-down prelude to the Velvet Revolution twenty years later, which, in his view, was bottom-up. The effect of the East–West Helsinki Agreements of the mid-1970s, which boosted dissent in Czechoslovakia, is then examined. This is followed by a cursory glance at economic problems and longer chapters on the impact of Mikhail Gorbachev, the opening of mass media in the period leading up to 1989, and the roles played by relative deprivation and by the military. Brook seeks to separate long-term causal influences from near-term proximate ones, which helps to explain the chronological layout of the chapters.

A disappointment is that all of the empirical chapters are based on secondary sources. There is not much new here for readers familiar with the history of the Czech interwar period and the Communist era. In the chapter on China, Brook's understanding of the events of 1989 is sketchy but serviceable. In contrast, the discussion of the post-Tiananmen era—which is important to him because he sees Tiananmen as a rehearsal for future upheavals—is remarkably thin and based mainly on sources published in the mid-1990s, long before the world realized that China in the twenty-first century was no longer caught up in the time warp of Tiananmen. For a book published in 2005, this is a major lacuna.

The author devotes the first two chapters to social science theories and methodologies. He has read widely in the recent scholarship on revolution and in the literature on the comparative method. The number of citations and the lengthy explications in which they are embedded are truly impressive. But it must be said that his reading ranges from eminently useful theoretical statements to rather wacky ones. I can't for the life of me understand why Thomas Kuhn's treatise on scientific revolutions has to be invoked, or, for that matter, theoretical physics. Most of the theories are interesting but too loosely applied to the data to be of much help.

It is worthy of praise that the author freely acknowledges his leftist biases. But this doesn't mean that the application of his biases doesn't require criticism. He writes, "Even when a revolutionary government becomes odious, it is usually less so than its predecessors" (p. 5). His inability to distinguish between the Tsarist and Stalinist periods does not inspire confidence, and his narrow grasp of the subject is also shown by his treatment of the Helsinki Agreements. Yes, the human rights provisions undermined Communist rule, but the rulers believed in the efficacy of their control systems, and hence accepted the human rights clauses as a small price to pay for securing their main

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goal, Western recognition of the post-war borders. (There are also other serious factual errors.) In sum, this volume may be useful to graduate students who wish to pursue the author's interest in discussing the utility of various theories for explaining important events such as those of 1989.

THOMAS P. BERNSTEIN
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A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium *by Peter J. Katzenstein. Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 2005. 297 pp. Cloth, $49.95; paper, $22.95.*

What is the nature of the international order in the post-Cold War era? Peter J. Katzenstein argues that the contemporary international system is characterized by regional orders with unique ordering principles and institutional designs that respond to American global leadership in regular but idiosyncratic ways. In his view, globalization and internationalization make regions porous—that is, susceptible to outside influence—but do not make them uniform. In this regard, he rejects a traditional hub-and-spokes conception of a hegemonic world order in which the core state determines global arrangements, arguing instead that each of the "spokes" has a distinctive shape, with distinctive institutions, values, and practices. Furthermore, through a process of "two-way Americanization," the American hub itself is affected and shaped by the regional spokes, because regional actors use both formal and informal means to influence American policy.

He elaborates on this argument with reference to two regions—Europe and Asia—that have a prominent position in what he calls "the American Imperium." Each region has an identity, shaped by culture and centuries of history, that conditions its adaptation to American-led globalization. Europe is a federal, multilateral, formal, and legal regional order, whereas Asia is national, bilateral, informal, and based on traditional networks rather than formal institutions. In large measure, these regional personalities can be traced to American multilateralism in Europe after World War II, contrasted with American bilateralism toward Asia. These identities shape their distinctive regional approaches to contemporary challenges, such as the development of technology or the pursuit of security.

Katzenstein's approach is self-consciously eclectic. Rather than siding with materialist, ideational, or behavioral approaches to the concept of "region," he fuses all three in his analysis (pp. 6–13). He similarly refuses to choose between conceptions of the contemporary political economy as *globalization* and those that characterize it as *internationalization*, instead incorporating both phenomena into his analysis (pp. 13–21). More generally, he draws upon the broadly divergent traditions of realism, liberal institutionalism, and sociological constructivism in building his argument (p. 39). In this manner, the book engages many ongoing debates in the literature without taking sides.

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The book's approach is innovative and important. It represents an improvement over the globalization literature, which overstates the uniformity of a globalized world—something belied by the institutional, political, and cultural differences between regions and states, even those most closely tied to the global economy. It also improves upon realist, unipolar approaches that assume that the global hegemon shapes the international system but, by virtue of its superior power, is largely immune from influence from the rest of the world. Instead, Katzenstein indicates that "porous regions" can also shape both the policy environment and even the very identity of the United States in the contemporary era. In addition, the empirical chapters, in and of themselves, represent an important contribution, inasmuch as Katzenstein displays an unparalleled depth of knowledge about the two regions and about the politics, history, and culture of Germany and Japan.

The book, though, has a few stylistic and organizational weaknesses. In particular, the organization of the individual chapters and the book as a whole is often difficult to follow and leaves central concepts insufficiently explained until the end. For example, the central term *American imperium* is not adequately explained until the concluding chapter (pp. 209–217). *Porous regions* is similarly not defined clearly up front, creating some confusion about whether all regions have been made porous by globalization and internationalization or, as suggested in chapter 1, porous regions remain "relatively rare" (p. 3). Readers might also wish for a more systematic approach that would spell the argument out clearly up front, address its leading competitors, and present a clear plan for demonstrating the value-added of Katzenstein's theoretical framework.

Nonetheless, the book is a monumental work that will help shape the scholarly debate about the contemporary international system. It will be of considerable interest to specialists in international relations and historians—as well as amateurs—of American foreign policy.

NORRIN M. RIPSMAN
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How Congress Evolves: Social Bases of Institutional Change *by Nelson W. Polsby. New York, Oxford University Press, 2004. 272 pp. $29.95.*

Many different types of research methodologies must be accessed if one is to fully understand the U.S. Congress, partly because Congress is what Nelson Polsby refers to as a "transformative legislature" (Nelson W. Polsby, "Legislatures" in Philip Norton, ed., *Legislatures*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990, pp. 129–148), and partly because it is a legislature in which power is relatively decentralized. The leading experts on Congress engage not only in macro-level studies involving, for example, statistical analyses of aggregative data, but also in detailed, micro-level studies of how members of Congress

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behave and interact. The very small number of political scientists who can be regarded as experts on Congress have in common an encyclopedic knowledge of hundreds, if not thousands, of individuals who have served in Congress. Polsby is one of those experts, and his recent work provides an exemplary model of how the wealth of detail that supports the central arguments of a book need not get in the way of clear exposition, so that the arguments can be understood by expert and layperson alike. In *How Congress Evolves*, 155 pages of text are supported by 80 pages of footnotes, some of which will interest the experts as much as the text itself. Yet the main body of the book will engage anyone interested in how American politics works. It is an outstanding monograph, and its publication will be widely acclaimed.

Polsby's subject is how this legislature has changed, and his interest in long-term congressional transformation will come as no surprise to the many generations of students, scholars, and observers of Congress who continue to read his classic 1967 article on congressional institutionalization ["The Institutionalization of the US House of Representatives," *American Political Science Review* 62 (March 1968): 144–168]. In some sense, *How Congress Evolves* can be regarded as a (more important) sequel to the *APSR* article—in much the same way as the *Lord of the Rings* was to *The Hobbit*.

In his earlier work, Polsby explained how the contemporary, professionalized House of Representatives evolved from a body in which membership turnover had been high and the exercise of power within the chamber had depended largely on resources derived from outside of it. That professionalized chamber had become established between the end of the nineteenth century and the early decades of the twentieth century. Polsby's more recent concern is to explain how the working of an institutionalized Congress changed gradually during the second half of the twentieth century. In turn, his interest in that specific evolutionary path is used to develop a framework for understanding more generally the patterns of institutional evolution in Congress.

His central argument is that ultimately, the stable set of relations within Congress that had become established by the end of the New Deal were undermined by changes in the social bases of politics. In particular, Congress changed because Southern politicians changed, and the latter changed because the entire socioeconomic structure of the South changed. One of the main factors underlying this transformation was technological—the invention and general availability of air conditioning for domestic use. Until that occurred, the South remained a frontier (my word, and not his), into which there was little incentive for capital and populations to flow. With the advent of air conditioning, the South became a region that could attract skilled workers. This development undermined the long-standing basis for the conduct of politics in the South and, in turn, had a major impact on congressional behavior.

Yet my brief account of Polsby's main argument necessarily fails to do justice to the subtlety and complexity of his book, in which particular examples

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are used so effectively to illustrate general themes. Undoubtedly, *How Congress Evolves* is destined to become a classic.

ALAN WARE
Oxford University

Off Center: The Republican Revolution and the Erosion of American Democracy *by Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson. New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 2005. 272 pp. $25.00.*

Since the Bush administration took power in 2001, it has made a concerted effort with the Republican congressional leadership to push through policy that disproportionately benefits the most wealthy Americans and to reduce funding for and make sweeping changes to social welfare programs that are broadly supported by Americans. These policies have been achieved without an electoral backlash from the moderate middle of the electorate—the segment that should, theoretically, impose restraint on radical policies of both the left and the right. How is this possible when so many constitutional and structural facets of the American political system concentrate power in the hands of centrist voters and legislators?

Off Center delivers a forceful explanation of how the Republicans have achieved these policies. Contrary to the conventional wisdom and despite Republican electoral victories, the electorate is not becoming more conservative on the issues. Activists from both parties, however, have become more distant from the center of the American ideological spectrum, with Republican activists moving more than twice as far from the middle as Democratic activists (p. 27). So how have the Republicans been successful?

The answer is through the coordinated efforts of the Republican political machine, led by the "new power brokers" (p. 135). According to Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson, the Republican machine is led by the most reactionary (conservative is a misnomer for this group) members of the party: Tom DeLay, Grover Norquist, and Karl Rove. The authors detail a number of ways in which moderate Republican legislators are kept in check by the power brokers, the least of which is the threat to fund conservative primary challengers to their reelection bids. The most important means of influence that the machine has is "backlash insurance ... strategies to keep moderates in line and shield party loyalists against political retaliation by moderate voters" (p. 12). Backlash insurance involves controlling the agenda, designing policy so that the long-term effects are not immediately noticeable, and crafting rhetoric that simultaneously highlights broadly desired policy outcomes while obfuscating their less popular effects (pp. 149–161). Hacker and Pierson acknowledge V.O. Key's admonition that "voters are not fools," but they argue instead that "on certain issues, many of them can be fooled" (p. 67). Their case study of the 2001 tax cut phase-ins for the wealthy is illustrative of the strategies associated with backlash insurance.

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Compelling as the book is, a deeper discussion of why the Democrats have failed to stop the Republicans would be warranted, and particular attention could be paid to the domestic political cover that Republicans get from foreign policy crises. Additionally, the authors take the role of the mass media as a given. The effects of Republican rhetorical policy persuasion are taken as axiomatic, and the role of the press in scrutinizing (or not) policy is not adequately addressed. Why haven't blogging liberal policy wonks been able to expose Republican policy fraud the way that Republican bloggers have been able to patrol the media?

Finally, events following the publication of this book need to be reconciled in future editions. For one, the Republicans failed in their initiative to privatize Social Security. Additionally, Tom DeLay's retirement, Karl Rove's legal worries, and congressional lobbying scandals could spell the end of the new power brokers.

Despite these shortcomings, *Off Center* provides a valuable analysis of policy formulation and passage to explain a phenomenon that has not been adequately addressed by existing literature. The explanation that Hacker and Pierson provide is detailed and plausible, and they provide plenty of real-world context with which to support their points. It is an enjoyable read and should have significant appeal to anyone interested in legislative process and politics.

TODD L. BELT
University of Hawai'i, Hilo

Campaigning for Hearts and Minds: How Emotional Appeals in Political Ads Work *by Ted Brader. Chicago, IL, University of Chicago Press, 2005. 280 pp. $24.00.*

In the past decade, an interdisciplinary army of scholars has laid waste the notion that reason stands as opposed to emotion. In the process, researchers have begun to illuminate the interactive and contextual relationship of affect and cognition. In *Campaigning for Hearts and Minds*, Ted Brader argues that campaign advertising is a principle means of emotional appeal (through music and visual imagery) to voters' hearts *and* minds. Indeed, he concludes that sophisticated voters are the ones most responsive to the emotional appeal of ads. He finds, contrary to extensive extant literature, that ad campaigns *do* matter, in a measurable and statistically significant way, shaping viewers' approach to information and decision making.

Brader draws several propositions from the "conventional wisdom" of journalists, pundits, consultants, and academics. His study confirms them in part (emotional appeals are routine and key to the power of political ads, and draw their emotional impact from music and imagery), while contradicting claims that ads work primarily by transferring emotion from the ad to the candidate,

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that emotional appeals are manipulative and irrational, and that emotional appeals principally influence less-informed voters.

Brader also offers evidence that positive ads may be as polarizing as negative ones. Borrowing from the theory of affective intelligence, he argues that fear and enthusiasm ads work differently. Fear ads prompt viewers to reassess their convictions and search for new information. Enthusiasm ads reinforce certainty and boost motivation to participate. This motivational effect is independent of whether the enthusiasm ad was sponsored by a candidate they favored or opposed—viewing a disfavored candidate's enthusiasm ad strengthened opposing voters' resolve just as it did supporters', fueling electoral polarization.

At the core of Brader's study is an experiment conducted during the 1998 Massachusetts Democratic gubernatorial primary, when a nonrandom but fairly representative sample of 286 residents of the state were shown ads that he created featuring two of the candidates (embedded in a videotape of local news). Viewer responses to ads with emotional cues were contrasted with responses to similar ads lacking such stimuli. The cues were uplifting music (John Williams's "Hymn for New England") and pictures in the enthusiasm ad and, in the fear ad, an unharmonious modern symphony and uninviting imagery of drugs, guns, and law enforcement.

Considering how limited this exposure was, Brader's results were dramatic. A single exposure to an emotionally evocative ad produced effects "comparable in size to significant shifts in bedrock social and political factors such as education, age, partisanship, and sophistication" (p. 186). Brader downplays the magnitude of these effects, noting that in actual campaigns, both sides run ads and do so repeatedly. Discounting the magnitude of the findings, however, substantially muddies the inferential waters.

Critics may also question the broader external validity of conclusions based on a sample including just 9 percent Republicans (even if it does represent the typical Bay State voter). Nor is the study's internal validity immune to challenge. Survey responses indicate *intent* to participate, not actual participation. In attempting to cleave emotion from both narrative and partisanship, the study risks overlooking cognitive and emotional associations that may have as much to do with viewer response as with the experimental dose of emotion. Brader effectively makes the case for the motivational role of emotions while acquitting them on charges of serving as a crutch for the unsophisticated. Yet even as he cautions against excessive praise of emotion, we are left little better able to distinguish benign from injurious emotionalism.

Brader extends existing scholarship by empirically demonstrating how the theory of affective intelligence can advance our understanding of the role of emotion in political advertising. His work deserves a wide audience.

GLENN W. RICHARDSON, JR.
Kutztown University of Pennsylvania

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The Politics of Attention: How Government Prioritizes Problems *by Bryan D. Jones and Frank R. Baumgartner. Chicago, IL, University of Chicago Press, 2005. 304 pp. Cloth, $70.00; paper, $25.00.*

Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones revolutionized the study of agenda setting with their punctuated equilibrium model of policy change. Their view of policy change as proceeding through processes of positive feedback and periods of stasis brought on by negative feedback provided a compelling alternative to the traditional incrementalism models. Their most recent book, *The Politics of Attention*, represents the development of their punctuated equilibrium model of policy agenda setting; they have integrated findings from a wide variety of policy areas into a general model of policy change.

Building on Bryan Jones's previous work on political psychology and the organizational basis of political institutions, *The Politics of Attention* provides an institutional logic for the pattern of systematic under-reaction and over-reaction that drives the punctuated equilibrium model. Policy-making institutions are, in the authors' view, information-processing mechanisms. Political organizations have to interpret signals from their environment in order to create policy outputs. However, policy-making organizations are disproportionate information processors. Systematic biases in the processing of information lead to "a pattern of extreme stability and occasional punctuations" (p. 5).

The book explores the theme of disproportionate information processing and its effects on the outputs of political organizations through a variety of analytical techniques. The most novel form of analysis is stochastic process modeling (p. 115). In this form of analysis, a policy process is analyzed on the basis of the distributional characteristics of its outputs. Institutions characterized by disproportionate information processing should also be characterized by a non-normal distribution of outputs, wherein there are a larger-than-expected number of small and large changes—and a smaller-than-expected number of medium-sized changes. The authors find that institutions near the beginning of the policy process—such as stock markets and mass media—are characterized by output distributions that are closer to normal than those of institutions near the end of the process—such as congressional committees and the president. The authors argue that the greater mal-distribution is evidence of greater institutional friction in these terminal political institutions (such as the presence of multiple veto points) than in the input processes that are characterized by competitive markets.

The discussion of information processing leads the authors to next consider the question of policy responsiveness. The book tackles the question in two ways. First, the authors consider "issue intrusion" (p. 209). The authors find that issue intrusion requires objective conditions indicating a severe problem combined with the relatively high weighting of the specific indicators that indicate severity. This finding draws attention back to the essential attention orientation of policy change. Second, the book explores the correlation

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between public attention to problems and congressional attention to the same problem areas. The correlation pattern suggests some manner of agenda congruence coexisting with crowding and spillover effects (p. 269). As a whole, Bryan Jones and Frank Baumgartner see in their analysis of the dynamics of agenda congruence and issue intrusion a hope for policy representation even in the presence of disproportionate information processing.

The diverse approaches to the study of policy change are a major strength of the text. Individually, the various assessment techniques have significant flaws. For example, the stochastic process technique has difficulty with testing multiple potential causes of "inertia," because it is essentially a univariate analytic technique. The correlation analysis of agenda congruence is limited by the problems of cross-time correlation analysis. Together, however, the diverse methods provide compelling evidence. In the end, the book illustrates the continuing development of the punctuated equilibrium model of policy change and the diversity of issues that the model provides leverage in explaining.

SCOTT E. ROBINSON
University of Texas, Dallas

American Voter Turnout: An Institutional Perspective *by David Hill. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 2006. 183 pp. $22.00.*

David Hill provides a comprehensive overview of how voter registration laws, electoral competition among states and within single-member districts, and the separation of powers affect voter turnout in the United States. The recent history of and academic literature exploring these institutions are aptly synthesized in the book. As an inexpensive paperback, the book is an attractive supplement to an upper-level undergraduate or graduate elections course. Scholars familiar with the literature will not find groundbreaking research, but might find enticing historical and scholarly nuggets buried in the text, as I did.

Hill begins with familiar questions about U.S. voter turnout: why is it lower than that in other democracies and why is it declining? Unfortunately, the comparative question is unanswered because Hill "relies solely on the effect of institutions in the United States" (p. 32). Have recent turnout rates "steadily declined" (p. 3)? Sam Popkin and I argue that contemporary turnout declines are attributed to the rising voting-ineligible population [Michael P. McDonald and Samuel Popkin, "The Myth of the Vanishing Voter," *American Political Science Review* 95 (December 2001): 963–974].

Hill is familiar with the research and uses my state-level turnout measures in his analysis, but the research is mentioned only in footnotes. Nor do the chapters address turnout declines. Voter registration laws have generally been relaxed, so why isn't turnout going up? Single-member districts and a federal government have existed since the country's founding, so how can these institutions explain declines? The book's introduction would have been better

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framed by focusing on the intersection of institutions and turnout rather than by raising questions left unanswered in the text.

There are other notable omissions. Although Hill nicely covers contemporary reforms, the historical treatment is cursory. For example, Hill provides a thorough review of recent changes to voter registration laws, but is vague on the circumstances surrounding the adoption of these laws. A greater historical emphasis might have led to an examination of the institutional context that precipitated turnout declines following the 1896 election. Walter Dean Burnham's seminal works in the field and on this issue [for example, "The Changing Shape of the American Political Universe," *American Political Science Review* 59 (March 1965): 7–28] are not cited.

Hill ends with reform prescriptions, but the conclusion is a bulleted list that could have been better tied to previous chapters. Recommendations for voter registration reference an earlier chapter, but those for absentee and early voting do not and deserve to have been investigated in greater depth. The focus on presidential and congressional elections perhaps blinded Hill to promising state-level reforms, such as public financing of elections, term limits, and redistricting reform, that might increase electoral competition. A final danger with books relevant to current policy making: Hill's call for Electoral College reform is already dated as states consider entering pacts to award their votes to the popular vote winner.

Despite these criticisms, I would consider adopting the book for my own election classes. For a graduate course, I would assign selected articles that Hill places within the context of the larger literature. Graduate students taking comprehensive exams will find the book's literature review helpful. For an upper-level undergraduate course, the material is generally presented in a manner accessible to students. A caveat, although not a critical issue, is that the book starts in a nontechnical manner but later shifts into a clunky statistical analysis that might confuse some students. Graphic presentation of results would have better served readers.

Hill's major contribution is that he pulls together the literature on institutions and voting. Twenty years ago, this book could not have been written, because there was little scholarly literature. Now, there is more research, and students are interested in the conduct of elections. It is a mark of the growing maturity of election administration study that this book can be written and published.

MICHAEL P. MCDONALD
George Mason University

Politics Online: Blogs, Chatrooms and Discussion Groups in American Democracy *by Richard Davis. New York, Routledge, 2005. 184 pp. Cloth, $95.00; paper, $24.95.*

There is a real need for a proper empirical survey of new forms of Internet-mediated discussion, including chatrooms, blogs, and emerging arenas of social

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interaction such as MySpace and Facebook. Unfortunately, this book does not meet that need. Although it presents some interesting arguments, its empirics are very badly dated. This might not be a serious problem for some forms of social scientific research. However, when (as in this case) the author is trying to capture a rapidly changing space of social interaction, it can be quite a serious problem indeed.

The suggestion in the title of the book that it provides a real discussion of blogs is somewhat misleading. Blogs receive only a cursory—and not entirely accurate—treatment (the author claims Blogger is a popular blog but it is not a blog at all; it is a publishing service used by millions of bloggers). The meat of the book is in its discussion of Usenet, which relies primarily on a Pew Survey conducted in 1998, and a detailed examination of discussions in four newsgroups in 1999. The author uses these to arrive at some quite interesting conclusions. He explains how Usenet works, setting out its norms and providing numerous examples of posts, which provide a real flavor of the mixture of crackpottery and political back-and-forth that characterized it at its height. He presents some interesting findings about the differences between Usenet users and the general population. He further shows how there are real differences between Usenet posters and "lurkers" (readers who never themselves post). Finally, he identifies many of the problems with Usenet—the lack of filtering mechanisms, the tendency towards "flamewars" in which individuals engage in mutual vituperation, the invasion of spam, and the dearth of focused debate.

However, although this suggests some fascinating and important research agendas, it is also very dated. The main research was carried out six years or more before publication, a near eternity in the evolution of the relationship between politics and the Internet. Usenet simply is not anywhere near as important or relevant as it used to be. Far more important today are blogs, which do not receive much in the way of serious discussion in this book. There is no concerted effort made by the author to compare Usenet and blogs to see whether the lessons that can be learned from Usenet in the late 1990s have any relevance to blogs (or indeed to other emerging forms of communication) today. Indeed, at many points, the book reads like a time capsule from the 1990s, telling us about a time in which the most important topics of political debate were Bill Clinton and the Whitewater scandal. Newspaper articles from this period are cited as being of contemporary relevance. For example, we are told that "commercialism is spreading on Usenet as new companies are organizing to place commercial ads on Usenet groups and link commercially oriented sites link [*sic*] to newsgroups" (p. 124). The references bolstering this point are 1998 articles from *Advertising Age*, *PC Week*, and *Brandweek*. I very seriously doubt that Usenet is the focus of major advertising efforts today. More generally, the references have a dated feel; there is very little mention of literature written after 2000, and where there is, it is treated rather skimpily.

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This is a pity—the book presents some interesting arguments. However, as a guide to the contemporary relationship between politics and the Internet, it is badly out of date.

HENRY FARRELL
George Washington University

The New Imperial Presidency: Renewing Presidential Power after Watergate *by Andrew Rudalevige. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 2005. 384 pp. $29.95.*

"For the 35 years that I've been in this town, there's been a constant, steady erosion of the prerogatives and the powers of the President of the United States, and I don't want to be part of that," Vice-President Richard Cheney said in 2003 (p. 211). On the contrary, George W. Bush and Cheney have presided over such an impressive and perhaps ominous consolidation of presidential power that it represents, as Andrew Rudalevige says in this timely and learned book, a "new imperial presidency."

The erosion Cheney scorned began with Watergate. The "old" imperial presidency, which culminated in the presidencies of John F. Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson, and Richard M. Nixon, was at first celebrated by the generation of political scientists inspired by the New Deal. But by the mid-1970s, satisfaction with a strong presidency dissolved amid Vietnam and Watergate. Congress sought to box in the presidency and to reassert itself through an array of legislation meant to curb the executive's penchant for secrecy, limit its informational advantages, restrict its unilateral war-making tendencies, and subject it to the impartial rule of law.

Almost every legislative reform of that era, as Rudalevige shows, has since crumbled. Some reforms, like the War Powers Act, were peppered with opportunities for crafty presidents to evade their impact. Some, like campaign finance reform, were eviscerated by the Supreme Court. The effect of others, such as the Freedom of Information Act, has been blunted by decisive presidential resistance. With reforms such as intelligence oversight and budgeting, Congress itself has proved incapable of acting—or unwilling to act—cohesively and consistently. Finally, what Rudalevige calls a "tidal wave" of executive assertion since September 11 has strengthened the office in almost every dimension (pp. 211–259). The net effect is Cheney's wish come true: a return of presidential power perhaps surpassing Nixon's. Watergate stands revenged.

The Bush administration's amplification of presidential power, although more extreme, is aligned with efforts by many previous administrations to expand the presidency at the expense of Congress. In his effort to assert executive privilege, legitimate new surveillance techniques, expand governmental secrecy, conduct war making without congressional interference, and carry out policy without legislative oversight, Bush is not entirely different from his

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predecessors of both parties, including Bill Clinton, Nixon, Johnson, Dwight Eisenhower, and Franklin Roosevelt. What matters is not ideology or personality so much as "positionality." Anyone who occupies the office will try to expand it. As Rudalevige notes, "Presidents since the beginning of the republic have sought to better their status in the constitutional order" (p. 13).

Party government—where one cohesive and disciplined party controls the presidency and both houses of the legislature—augments executive power by virtue of the public visibility of the president as party leader and the manifold opportunities for policy control vested in the executive office. Yet against the extra-constitutional solvent of parties (which allows separate branches to act cohesively), Rudalevige argues for a more classical rivalry between the legislature and the executive. Presidential power is a necessary resource, especially where quick and decisive action is appropriate. But restricting its use to indispensable or helpful occasions requires a legislature jealous of its constitutional advantages, a quality Congress has too often lacked. Positionality should motivate legislators as well as the executive.

Although the imperial presidency is "conditional, fragile, and revocable," in that it depends on the continued passivity of a "supine" Congress, there is little reason to expect Congress to reassert itself anytime soon (p. 15). Ultimately, Rudalevige argues, the responsibility for restraining executive power falls on citizens, for only when the electorate makes itself "invisible" can the president grasp power audaciously while Congress sits idly to the side (p. 285).

This book should help awaken both the electorate and its leaders to the urgency of a subject long at the heart of constitutional government. Gracefully written, sparkling with vivid quotations and insightful analysis, *The New Imperial Presidency* will reward both specialists and students. Yet most crucially, it is a book for citizens who seek to understand and control the politics that, in spite of all, they continue to authorize.

RUSSELL MUIRHEAD
University of Texas Austin

Painful Choices: A Theory of Foreign Policy Change *by David A. Welch. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 2005. 312 pp. $35.00.*

David Welch is to be commended for developing an ambitious theory that recognizes that humans, not factors, make decisions, and that they are affected by history and psychology. He is interested not in how foreign policy is made, but in why—and when—it changes. His answer is that leaders change policy not to achieve gains but because they fear impending painful losses. Change is most likely to take place "when policy fails either repeatedly or catastrophically, or when leaders become convinced that it will imminently do so" (p. 46). And major changes come more often from autocratic rulers, who face few limitations, than from ponderous, bureaucratized democracies.

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Welch reaches these conclusions on the basis of four distinct case studies: the Argentine decision to invade the Falklands/Malvinas Islands in 1982; the Japanese decision not to insist on control of the Kurile Islands since 1945; American decisions to increase and then to decrease U.S. military involvement in Vietnam between 1965 and 1973; and various Canadian decisions on free trade with the United States in the twentieth century. The book opens with a brief chapter defending the usefulness of theorizing in thinking about international affairs, followed by a more substantial exposition of the theory itself, then the case studies. The book is clear and readable throughout, with a refreshing acknowledgment that any theory has its limitations.

Among these one must count the problem of defining key terms. What constitutes a major change in policy? In three of the cases, it is the use of military force. Welch observes that highly bureaucratized, democratic governments are less likely to frequently change their foreign policies because of the many competing inputs to policy making. Because the United States makes frequent use of its military power, either the definition of major change must be refined, or the theory must be adjusted.

Similarly, how is one to know whether policymakers are "operating in a gains frame, rather than a loss frame" (p. 91)? This distinction is crucial to the argument that leaders undertake the risk of change when they are seeking to avoid losses, not to achieve gains. The model is apt for U.S. officials' thinking about Vietnam. But the distinction will continue to be debated. Why did the Argentine generals decide, in 1982, after nearly 150 years of living with "a palpable and painful sense of loss" over the Falklands/Malvinas (p. 82), that the sense of loss had suddenly become intolerable? Perhaps they were thinking of the potential gain in badly needed domestic legitimacy that could accrue from the victory they anticipated. Did Saddam Hussein invade Kuwait in 1990 because he feared a continuing, catastrophic loss of oil from the disputed Rumaila oil fields on the border, or did he hope to gain a controlling share of Persian Gulf production? Using Welch's categories, these puzzles will continue to be important in assessing, for example, whether the present government of Iran believes that its nuclear program is an opportunity to gain prestige or that relinquishing it would be an unacceptable loss to Iran's security.

Welch excludes certain leaders, such as Adolf Hitler, from the theory on the grounds that they do not behave rationally, are excessive risk takers, or are afflicted with megalomania. Whether the world will have fewer such leaders in the future, as Welch hopes, this exception does raise the problem of deciding who is rational. Given the time-honored practice of labeling any uncooperative foreign leader irrational, from Charles de Gaulle through Fidel Castro to Hugo Chávez, analysts seeking to apply Welch's theory may require more guidance.

MAX PAUL FRIEDMAN
Florida State University

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From Movements to Parties in Latin America: The Evolution of Ethnic Politics *by Donna Lee Van Cott. New York, Cambridge University Press, 2005. 296 pp. $75.00.*

Donna Lee Van Cott has been a pioneer in the study of the politics of indigenous people in Latin America. Her new book is an important contribution to the study of political parties, especially the questions of why indigenous parties form and succeed or fail to.

Historically, party competition in Latin America did not significantly mobilize around ethnic differences. This has changed in recent years with the emergence of electorally significant parties in Bolivia and Ecuador that have emphasized indigenous issues and identities. Most notably, Evo Morales, the leader of the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) won the Bolivian presidential election of 2005; his campaign emphasized his indigenous identity and called for improving the lot of Bolivia's indigenous majority. The success of MAS and its Ecuadorian counterpart, Pachakutik, frame the fascinating questions at the core of this book. Why did electorally successful indigenous parties emerge when they did? What accounts for the important variance in the success of these parties?

Empirically, the book focuses on Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru, which have large indigenous populations, and on Argentina, Colombia, and Venezuela, which have much smaller indigenous populations. This selection of countries appropriately allows for a discussion of considerable variance in the success of indigenous parties. In Bolivia and Ecuador, indigenous movements and parties have been major political actors, whereas in Peru, they have not. In a similar vein, in Colombia and Venezuela, small indigenous populations have successfully mobilized and have placed indigenous issues on the national political agenda, whereas in Argentina, they have not.

Theoretically, this work adds to the literature that emphasizes the political mobilization of different forms of identity, as opposed to simplistic social cleavage or primordial approaches that assume that important social differences will be reflected in party competition. To explain the varying degrees of success of indigenous parties, Van Cott cogently emphasizes three factors. First, more-permissive electoral institutions make it easier for new parties (including indigenous parties) to burst onto the scene. For example, decentralization provided new opportunities for indigenous parties and helps account for their growing success in Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela in the 1990s; conversely, recentralization under President Alberto Fujimori (1990–2000) helped thwart the emergence of robust indigenous movements and parties in Peru. Second, some qualities of party systems are more favorable than others to the rise of new parties. For example, Van Cott argues convincingly, the existence of a solid partisan left prior to the 1990s, but its demise in the 1990s, was particularly favorable for the success of indigenous parties. The earlier existence of a solid leftist party generated cadres with organizational know-how, connections to

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grassroots movements and people, and political passion. The demise of the old left in the 1990s facilitated the articulation of ethnic issues and interests; the old Marxist left subordinated ethnicity and cultural politics to class and material interests. Third, with only one exception, indigenous social movements created the new indigenous parties. Drawing on resource mobilization and political opportunity structure approaches to social movements, Van Cott argues that some factors that contribute to social movement success also help explain the emergence and success of indigenous parties. Of particular note, radical constitutional reform created a political opportunity structure favorable to indigenous parties in Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela. Van Cott effectively organizes the empirical analysis around her main theoretical arguments.

Van Cott concludes the book with a brief reflection (pp. 227–235) on the positive implications of the strengthening of ethnic movements and parties for democracy. I suspect that some of these movements and parties pose more potential dangers for democracy than Van Cott mentions. Some indigenous leaders and movements are less than fully wedded to liberal democracy, so their strengthening could have pernicious as well as positive consequences for democracy.

This minor quibble aside, *From Movement to Parties* is very well researched, clearly and persuasively argued, and well written. It is essential reading for political scientists who work on ethnic parties, social movements, and Latin America.

SCOTT MAINWARING
University of Notre Dame

Political Culture and Institutional Development in Costa Rica and Nicaragua: World-making in the Tropics *by Consuelo Cruz. New York, Cambridge University Press, 2005. 304 pp. $80.00.*

Consuelo Cruz has written an interesting book that compares the political trajectory of two neighboring countries, Costa Rica and Nicaragua, by focusing on political culture.

The book analyzes which factors lead to sustainable economic and political development by re-centering political culture as a major explanatory variable, thus adding a new perspective to the institution-centered explanations that have been dominant in recent decades. The author does not dismiss the importance of institutional design, but rather links institutions to a more nuanced definition of political culture at the center of the analysis. Political culture is defined as a fluid "system for normative scheming embedded in a field of imaginable possibilities" (p. 3) that is in dynamic interaction with the institutions surrounding it.

The book takes a historical approach, going back to the colonial period in search of an answer to a fascinating and long-recognized Central American political enigma: why did two similar countries (Spanish colonies with small, peripheral economies, which gained independence at the same time) develop

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along two very distinct political trajectories? Costa Rica, as the oldest democracy in the Americas, is the Central American exception. Yet its northern neighbor, Nicaragua, endured political instability, manifested in a series of regime types ranging from capricious dynasties, through a revolution, to a less-than-functional democratic regime. Similarly, indicators of social and economic (in)equality vary considerably across the two countries, with Costa Rica having considerably higher social and economic equality than Nicaragua.

To address this puzzle, the book draws on historical evidence reaching back several hundred years. The analysis is divided into eight chapters, an introduction, and a concluding essay. The author's emphasis on political culture is spelled out in a comprehensive theoretical chapter that delineates its importance and explains Cruz's interpretation of how the concept affects and is affected by political institutions; she also explains how political culture can create critical junctures, which in turn change subsequent development (political and economic).

Although the author presents empirical evidence to support her challenge of many dominant explanations for democratization and development in Latin America, some of the evidence dealing with the most recent developments appears somewhat dated and is less compelling than the earlier sections of the book. For example, the author cites a "recent" poll confirming her claims of high and stable regime support in Costa Rica using a book published in 1996 (p. 166). Declining "democratic regime support" and declining voter turnout, even in the case of Costa Rica, are given short shrift.

That said, this well-researched and well-argued book is an important addition to the literature on economic and political development, not just for the two cases examined, but for the larger context of the developing world. This attempt to re-situate political culture as a centrally important explanatory variable adds a fresh perspective to current analyses, and Consuelo Cruz's way of conceptualizing political culture as a dynamic, interactive variable that is engaged with other factors (economic, institutional) makes for a sophisticated and novel analysis. The book will be of interest to scholars of Central American politics, sociology, and history; it provides a new lens through which to interpret the political and economic histories of Costa Rica and Nicaragua. Cruz's approach makes a welcome addition to the recently renewed interest in historical and qualitative analysis and thus also makes the book an important read for those interested in new approaches to studying comparative politics more generally.

BRUCE M. WILSON
University of Central Florida

Rwanda's Genocide: The Politics of Global Justice *by Kingsley Moghalu. New York, Palgrave, 2005. 252 pp. $39.95.*

The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) is an enigma in international politics. The post-genocide government of Rwanda pressed for its

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creation, yet ultimately voted against the United Nations Security Council resolution that established it. Countries throughout the world have touted the ICTR as an appropriate and necessary (if belated) international response to the 1994 genocide, but nonetheless drag their heels when requested to cooperate with the Tribunal. Perhaps most importantly, as Kingsley Moghalu tells it, the Tribunal was conceived of as an independent judicial body operating above the political fray, yet virtually every element of it—from its creation to the debate over its completion strategy—has been highly politicized.

Moghalu, a former special counsel and spokesman for the ICTR, offers something of an insider's account of the Tribunal. He delves into the politics of the Tribunal's creation, staffing, cooperation with sovereign entities (including, most importantly, Rwanda itself), and several major episodes (such as the arrest, order to release, and cancellation of the release order of accused genocide planner Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza). At each turn, Moghalu usefully spells out the cast of characters involved, the positions each took, and their motivations for doing so. For example, with respect to the Barayagwiza affair, Moghalu walks through the reasoning employed by the appellate chamber that called for the suspect's release, as well as the review of the decision that reversed its course. In doing so, Moghalu finds a perhaps unexpected consistency in legal reasoning (based on the facts available at the respective times of the decisions) while recognizing and documenting the political stakes and motivations that were also in play. Elsewhere, to pick another example from among many, Moghalu describes actors on either side of the debates over whether to couple the ICTR with the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia, and later to de-couple it (at least through the creation of a separate chief prosecutor position for the Rwandan Tribunal). Again, Moghalu addresses both the practical and political matters behind the decisions, while supplying telling vignettes, such as that of a deal—abandoned before it could be implemented—to prosecute alleged war crimes by the Rwandan Patriotic Army (the military arm of the movement that came to power at the end of the genocide).

In the grand scope of history, matters such as these may not amount to much. Yet Moghalu never loses sight of their significance for the outcomes of the Tribunal. He avoids an "inside baseball"-like account by clearly spelling out the parameters of the various debates, and by retaining in sight what is at stake. At a larger level, by framing the debates as instances in which *realpolitik* concerns meet humanitarian principles, Moghalu places the issues he addresses—and the Tribunal itself—in an important discourse about post-Cold War world politics.

Perhaps the greatest enigma of all regarding the ICTR is that despite massive logistical challenges and more or less constant political controversy, the Tribunal has made groundbreaking advances in international law and has, Moghalu claims, largely succeeded in bringing the architects of the genocide to justice. Moghalu's ability to recount in detail the story lines beneath the

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controversies that the ICTR has faced supports what otherwise might appear as boosterism on behalf of his former employer. (It is worth noting that befitting his former post as spokesman for the Tribunal, Moghalu devotes a chapter to why the Tribunal's successes are not more widely appreciated.) For Moghalu, the ICTR's experiences reflect ongoing tensions between high ideals and realist politics. The Tribunal's successes show how the former may not necessarily be swamped by the latter. Moghalu's book provides a historicist explanation for why this might be so.

DAVID J. SIMON
Yale University

Prosecuting International Crimes: Selectivity and the International Criminal Law Regime *by Robert Cryer. New York, Cambridge University Press, 2005. 392 pp. $88.00.*

Selective prosecution can be a problem in any system of criminal law. But in the unique area of international criminal law—applying to war crimes, genocide, and certain other crimes prosecuted by international tribunals—a degree of selective prosecution has long been accepted as more or less inevitable. This was supposed to change with the arrival of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and other recently established international tribunals. These new courts were intended to make enforcement of the law more consistent than it had been in national courts. Robert Cryer argues that although the rise of these tribunals represents an improvement over domestic enforcement, it has not ended selectivity in the way international crimes are defined and prosecuted. He supports this argument with plentiful evidence from doctrine and practice, which makes his book an invaluable reference guide for students and scholars.

Cryer begins with a useful review of the history of international criminal law, including some of its lesser-known precedents. His survey ranges from ancient India, where violators of the law of war were treated as outcasts and stripped of their privileges, to a truce in 1453 between Austria and Burgundy, which created one of the earliest known "mixed courts" (tribunals consisting of judges from both factions to ensure impartiality) to adjudicate disputes arising from a war between these two principalities. Cryer also covers more familiar milestones in international criminal law, such as the drafting of the first treaties on the laws of war and the later creation of international courts, such as the Tokyo and Nuremberg tribunals, to apply them. Selectivity and partiality have characterized war crimes prosecutions throughout this history. Although justice has been swift when the power and political will to prosecute have been present, countless acts of inhumanity have gone unpunished when these have been lacking.

Cryer is convincing in showing that these problems persist in the modern world of international criminal law enforcement. Despite treaties that have

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expanded the opportunity and duty to prosecute international crimes, most states have refrained from doing so. International criminal tribunals created after the Cold War have only partially alleviated the problem. These tribunals have also applied the law selectively, as a result of resource constraints, prosecutorial choices, and conditions imposed upon them at their creation.

Cryer argues persuasively against selectivity in prosecution as leading to arbitrariness in the choice of laws that are enforced and discrimination in the choice of persons who are prosecuted—practices that harm the legitimacy of the system and are inconsistent with the rule of law. Where Cryer may be on less solid ground is in placing in the same category of unwanted selectivity recent efforts to narrowly define international crimes. He criticizes the more rigorous definition of crimes in the ICC Statute as a step back from the broader definitions that prevailed under international customary law. However, notice, predictability, and political acceptability are also important values in criminal law, and the more precise definitions promulgated by the ICC Statute can be understood as serving these values. What Cryer refers to as the broader customary law was itself shaped significantly by judges at the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. These tribunals may have expanded the scope of international crimes beyond what many countries would be willing to accept, were the same rules to be applied to them; but even as the ICC Statute increased worldwide consciousness of international criminal law, it also provided an opportunity to limit the reach of the law to those areas where it is most likely to be enforced and effective.

JENIA IONTCHEVA TURNER
Southern Methodist University

Dangerous Sanctuaries: Refugee Camps, Civil War, and the Dilemmas of Humanitarian Aid *by Sarah Kenyon Lischer. Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 2005. 204 pp. $35.00.*

In this well-constructed and well-argued book, Sarah Kenyon Lischer challenges naive and uncritical views of refugees and assistance to refugees. Lischer contends that refugees can spread civil war and that humanitarian aid can become a tool of war. Employing a thoughtful research design that examines variation across time and space, she argues that violence is more likely when refugees constitute themselves a "state in exile" and when the country receiving the refugees either does not challenge or directly supports a militant refugee leadership. Overall, the book is a stimulating, careful, and important contribution to the growing literatures on civil wars, the international dimensions of civil wars, and humanitarianism. The author's frameworks and analyses will be useful to scholars and practitioners alike.

In the first two chapters, Lischer sensibly analyzes how and when refugees and humanitarian aid will extend civil war. Lischer sees three types of refugee

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populations: situational refugees, persecuted refugees, and refugees who form a state in exile. The latter are most likely to spread civil war, the author concludes. However, the policies of states that host refugees largely determine whether the potential to spread civil war materializes. Some states support refugee leaders who seek to reinvade their countries of origin; other states seek to disarm and contain militant refugees.

The author identifies four specific ways that humanitarian aid can exacerbate conflict. First, humanitarian assistance can directly support militants. Second, humanitarian assistance can sustain the dependents of militants, thereby reducing incentives to end conflict. Third, humanitarian assistance can support a war economy when militants tax aid or sell it. Fourth, humanitarian assistance can confer legitimacy on militants, because aid agencies must cooperate with them or because the fact of refugee camps indicates a problem back home.

Three innovative case studies, each with internal variation, form the book's core. Lischer first examines Afghan refugees who fled to Pakistan and Iran. The Pakistan-bound refugees ultimately prompted cross-border violence with the Soviet-backed, Afghan regime. By contrast, the Iran-bound refugees did not. The two refugee populations left Afghanistan for similar reasons, had similar ethnic profiles, and were of similar sizes. However, Pakistan (and Western governments) supported refugee war plans; Iran did not. The author similarly compares Rwandan Hutu refugees who fled to Zaire and Tanzania. In Zaire, Rwandan refugees launched cross-border raids, eventually triggering a devastating multinational war. By contrast, Rwandan refugees in Tanzania did not spread war. Lischer concludes that the receiving state determined the different outcomes. Finally, Lischer examines a case of Bosnian Muslims who broke away from the Bosnian government in the mid-1990s. Refugees first used camps in Croatia to re-group and attack; later, they did not. The receiving state's changed policy was the difference, Lischer argues.

In concluding, Lischer offers suggestions to humanitarian agencies for how to limit the danger that refugees pose. Ideally, an international peacekeeping force should separate civilians from non-civilians. Barring that, organizations should lobby receiving states to launch police actions. Organizations should additionally provide independent information and counter militants' propaganda. If all else fails, Lischer argues, organizations should reduce or withdraw aid if proper conditions are not met.

The book is sensible and well written, although some claims feel overdrawn. For example, Lischer argues that the receiving state largely determined why the Rwandan refugees in Zaire spread war while those in Tanzania did not. However, the Rwandan refugees in Zaire were more predisposed to militancy than those in Tanzania. Zaire was where the defeated Rwandan military and most national government hard-liners fled after the war. The receiving state's policies mattered, but the refugee populations were importantly different from the beginning.

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Throughout, Lischer challenges rival socioeconomic theories for why refugees might spread violence. She persuasively shows that camp size, the distance of camps from borders, the supposed prevalence of bored young men in camps, and poor living conditions are insufficient explanations. Lischer's arguments are sound, but the hypotheses she examines are often ad-hoc explanations, not sophisticated rivals. Lischer might have devoted less space to debunking them. But these are minor criticisms of an otherwise significant contribution. *Dangerous Sanctuaries* advances and systematizes debates about humanitarian aid while offering a careful argument about how and when refugees will spread war.

SCOTT STRAUS
University of Wisconsin, Madison

New Media Campaigns and the Managed Citizen *by Philip N. Howard. New York, Cambridge University Press, 2005. 288 pp. Cloth, $65.00; paper, $23.99.*

The Internet and related technologies—what Philip Howard calls "hypermedia"—have become an obvious part of political culture. The question is, with what consequences? As Howard notes, much literature about the Internet's impact on politics only speculates about its potential merits and demerits. Howard examines the consequences of hypermedia for how political campaigns are organized, a subject often ignored in favor of the Internet's impact on citizens. His investigation shows that the structure and goals of hypermedia organizations are important, especially because of their implications for citizenship.

The book makes four key claims. First, hypermedia campaigns are distinct from mass media campaigns. Howard characterizes mass media campaigns as involving traditional survey research, television advertising, and centralized control among elite political consultants. Hypermedia campaigns involve polls of narrowly tailored samples, "data mining" of political and consumer information, and "narrowcasted" messages designed to reach only select citizens. These techniques are freely available in the marketplace rather than the exclusive domain of consultants.

Second, hypermedia consultants are themselves a cohesive community. Although not part of any single organization, they identify with each other rather than with partisan or ideological groups, and share the goal of improving political discourse. However, as Howard argues, important tensions exist between hypermedia in theory and in practice.

Third, hypermedia campaigns are organized in a "heterarchy" rather than in the hierarchy that characterizes mass media campaigns. Participants are thus interdependent in complex ways, with information and accountability flowing horizontally more than vertically.

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The fourth claim is normative: while hypermedia tools empower citizens, they also "manage" citizenship in deleterious ways. Hypermedia tools allow both citizens and campaigns to engage in "red lining": filtering content so that citizens encounter less information at random and often information different from that seen by others. Red lining degrades the public sphere, in Howard's view. Meanwhile, the practice of data mining ensures that citizens' preferences are continually monitored without their consent. Howard calls this an invasion of privacy and proposes government oversight of hypermedia campaign practices.

The strengths of this book are many. It overflows with provocative theoretical claims. Future work on the nexus of the Internet and politics must grapple with Howard's ideas. His interviews with consultants and case studies of organizations produce fascinating insights. His methodology—a social network analysis that "mapped" the hypermedia community, combined with ethnographic research within that community—is an innovative way to research decentralized communities.

I will offer three brief criticisms, all of which suggest questions for future research. First, I question the dichotomization of hypermedia and mass media campaigns. These categories are ideal types, but in fact, many campaigns are hybrids. The central questions concern how these hybrids function and with what consequences. Second, Howard is sometimes too quick to praise hypermedia campaigns and criticize mass media campaigns. For example, he describes the shift from the "blunt" survey instruments of mass media campaigns to the targeted polls and data mining of hypermedia campaigns as "the progression of scientific method out of alchemy" (p. 95). However, because hypermedia polling often involves non-random, self-selected samples—which Howard later acknowledges (p. 197)—it better embodies alchemy's goal of producing something valuable from something worthless. Finally, Howard's case studies of hypermedia campaigns emphasize instances in which they effected change in citizens or policymakers, not instances in which they failed to do so. He writes, "Cataloging all of these movements to weigh successes against failures ... would be an impossible project" (p. 124). This is true, and, to be fair, Howard's book is not explicitly about this subject. Nevertheless, the importance of hypermedia campaigns will be clearer when we know whether they succeed at what is perhaps their primary goal: to change citizens' attitudes and behaviors.

JOHN SIDES
George Washington University

Uncompromising Positions: God, Sex, and the U.S. House of Representatives *by Elizabeth Anne Oldmixon. Washington DC, Georgetown University Press, 2005. 224 pp. Cloth, $44.95; paper, $26.95.*

Evidence of Congress' contemporary foray into social policy abounds: the Defense of Marriage Act and the Partial Birth Abortion Act are two products

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of this recent trend. Both of these laws call to mind legislation that cuts through a deep cultural cleavage between the forces Elizabeth Anne Oldmixon describes as "progressive sexuality" and "religious traditionalism." Determining how members of the House of Representatives decide to approach subjects of such intense emotion and interest is the purpose of Oldmixon's book.

The author interviews fifteen House members and twenty House staff and analyzes legislation from the 103rd Congress through the 107th (1993–2002) to argue that representatives wade through both goal orientation (electioneering and policy making) and a cultural cleavage between progressive sexuality and religious traditionalism when facing the "gut-level" issues of abortion, gay rights, and school prayer. Against this background, Oldmixon tests the hypothesis that political party, ideology, and religion will predict legislators' voting patterns, a hypothesis confirmed by logit analysis. Although this outcome is not surprising, it does apply an under-used method (congressional interviews) to the literature on social policy and congressional behavior. The analysis is crisply written and the data analysis accessible.

Oldmixon misses three opportunities in this book. First is the opportunity to apply her theory to both chambers. While no book can exhaust the list of interesting questions, the exclusive treatment of the House continues the field's avoidance of the upper chamber. Perhaps interesting differences exist between the motivations in the two chambers; it is important to know whether such distinctions exist.

More significantly, there is a lack of contextualization here, particularly in the abortion policy section. Although Oldmixon aptly places the three policy issues (abortion, gay rights, and school prayer) within the larger social context of cross-cutting cultures (progressive sexuality and religious traditionalism), the treatment of those cultural developments is thin. Particularly in the area of abortion politics, the author glosses over critical literature. In fairness, her purpose is not to write an exhaustive history of the social movements that provide the context of cultural cleavage, but rather to give a brief context for her legislative study. Still, the treatment is thin, relying heavily on only a few sources, and leads the author to some confusing generalizations. For instance, the author claims that representatives compromise more readily on abortion through the appropriations process (p. 36), but provides us no evidence of a pattern of compromise (in fact, the book's title suggests otherwise). At another point, Oldmixon argues that legislators are reluctant to confront abortion, a claim hard to sustain without evidence (p. 81), given the number of abortion votes taken every year. And finally, Oldmixon proposes that both parties are divided on social policies, a dubious claim, at least in abortion policy; House Republicans consistently vote as a bloc on most abortion-related matters.

Given the time focus of the book, I am surprised to find that the author does not consider the role of divided government in her analysis. This might provide fruitful insights in future iterations of her work, because divided government provides the majority party in the House with incentives to raise

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moral issues with which to force opponents—most importantly the president—to "stand up for sin" (p. 37). While Oldmixon is wisely selective in her choice of variables, divided government could prove informative in future projects.

The book's real strength lies in its elegant and straightforward observation that the "background social structure and foreground goal orientation [winning election, policy] interact to produce policy on moral, or cultural, issues" (p. 25). This theoretical framework is useful to scholars and students of Congress as we try to make sense of that institution's work.

MELODY ROSE
Portland State University

Issue Politics in Congress *by Tracy Sulkin. New York, Cambridge University Press, 2005. 224 pp. Cloth, $70.00; paper, $21.99.*

The phrase "issue uptake" kept appearing when I first thumbed through this book, and despite my familiarity with voluminous amounts of political science jargon, this was a new one for me. Issue uptake occurs when a member of Congress takes legislative actions on issues that were raised by his or her opponent in the previous election. I would have been pleased by a study that documented the extent to which legislators attempt to implement their *own* campaign priorities, let alone those of their competitors. Tracy Sulkin examines legislators' actions on their own and on their opponents' campaign issues and in doing so provides new and important insights into the ways in which campaigns affect governing and incumbents use their opportunities in office to secure their reelection.

There is good news: legislators are responsive. They add their opponents' issues to their own legislative agendas and do the hard work of writing and passing legislation to address those concerns. Additionally, there is an incentive for legislators to take up their opponents' issues because greater electoral security is the result. If an incumbent has stolen her opponent's ideas, what does a challenger have to run on?

Sulkin is extremely thorough in her examination of issue uptake. She explores which legislators uptake most frequently, the methods legislators use, the timing of uptake activities in proximity to elections, the electoral consequences of co-opting opponents' issues, and the legislative fates of uptake proposals. In each of these areas, she explores the patterns of evidence in detail.

Her thoroughness is exemplified by her examination of the relationship between a legislator's electoral vulnerability and his/her level of issue uptake. She describes two competing expectations (pp. 89–90). The first, the inoculation hypothesis, posits that vulnerable legislators will engage in more uptake behavior because they are most concerned about securing themselves against challengers. The second, the election selection hypothesis, argues that the safest legislators will engage in more uptake behavior because their security

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is the result of their ability to please constituents and to ward off quality opponents. These distinctions become critical when the data show that the least secure members of the House engage in uptake, consistent with the inoculation hypothesis, whereas the most secure Senators engage in uptake, consistent with the election selection hypothesis. Sulkin carefully shows that the differences between the chambers are the result of meaningful differences in behaviors rather than statistical flukes.

In many ways, this book is exploratory. Sulkin has invented the issue uptake concept, so we really don't know how frequently to expect it to occur, whether members of the House and Senate will behave differently, and so on. Similarly, sometimes there are potentially competing expectations (the inoculation versus election selection hypotheses), and we often have to delve deeply into the data to get a clear picture of what behavior is occurring. The temptation is to imply that the data support a particular hypothesis, when multiple expectations are available to explain a variety of patterns in the data. Documenting the existence of uptake and its patterns and effects is a tremendous contribution in itself.

Issue Politics in Congress will be a substantial contribution to the literature because it goes to the core of the nature of republican democracy: how legislators respond to constituents' electoral signals of their priorities. It is an extremely creative and meticulously empirical approach to studying representation. It shows that elections matter in setting the policy agenda in Congress—even when the candidate who highlighted the issue loses the election.

ERIC S. HEBERLIG
University of North Carolina, Charlotte

Failing Grades: The Federal Politics of Education Standards *by Kevin R. Kosar. Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005. 259 pp. $55.00.*

The story of education policy in America is rich with irony. Liberalism is premised on the belief that government can be a tool to fix many social problems, yet many liberals resist the idea that schools—the most prevalent government-run institution—can be expected to improve academic outcomes, particularly among the socially disadvantaged. On the other hand, conservatives, who generally see government as "the problem and not the solution," see schools as the means to raise academic achievement for all. Kevin Kosar's *Failing Grades: The Federal Politics of Education Standards* ably chronicles the political developments that have led to this intriguing irony, by way of explaining how the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act came to be. As explained in Kosar's book, NCLB is itself rooted in irony. Here is an act that dramatically expands the federal government's role in education, promoted by a president whose party has long advocated limiting the role of the federal government in education. *Failing Grades* convincingly argues that efforts at education reform have been stymied by a standoff between two opposing ideological camps. On

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one side are anti-statists who are suspicious of federal involvement in setting education policy but who want to hold schools accountable for their students' academic performance through testing. On the other are liberals, who welcome the federal government's role in education but disapprove of testing. Splitting the difference between them is the Quality Schools Advocacy (QSA) Movement, a motley assembly of business leaders, compassionate conservatives, and New Democrats, who have adopted accountability as an organizing principle for education reform. Schools, they argue, respond to incentives. Set the incentives correctly, and schools will improve. When candidate George W. Bush decided to make education reform the signature issue of his 2000 presidential campaign, he adopted the philosophy underpinning QSA.

From this description, it may appear that the long-standing antipathy toward the expansion of the federal role in education has been overcome. Anti-statism is dead—but long live anti-statism! Although under NCLB, schools face federally imposed penalties if their students do not meet academic standards, the federal government has not actually specified what those standards ought to be. Instead, states are left to develop their own exams and thus arrive at their own performance standards. In perhaps the greatest—and most troubling—irony of all, the same reformers who see incentives as the lever for improving schools were apparently blind to the fact that state policymakers respond to incentives too. In his concluding chapter, Kosar effectively describes how states are free to set their own levels of academic proficiency, which, in many cases, are suspiciously low. In Kosar's opinion, as well as my own, this is a perverse incentive indeed.

In telling its tale, *Failing Grades* both describes and prescribes. It begins with a brief in favor of rigorous standards, describes the rise of education to the top of the national policy agenda, details the reform proposals of previous administrations, and concludes with Kosar's proposals for fine-tuning NCLB. As a work of policy analysis, Kosar's book succeeds. However, if you are looking for a book that situates NCLB in the wider context of American politics and policy making, *Failing Grades* falls short. Another book will need to be written to explain NCLB's place in the broader policy environment. But when it is, *Failing Grades* will serve as an authoritative source on the ironies that characterize contemporary education policy.

DAVID E. CAMPBELL
University of Notre Dame

Popular Efficacy in the Democratic Era: A Reexamination of Electoral Accountability in the United States, 1828-2000 *by Peter F. Nardulli. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 2005. 284 pp. $39.95.*

In an era of widespread political alienation, American voters should take heart. They have more control over their political destiny than they might re-

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alize. That, at least, is one of the insights of *Popular Efficacy in the Democratic Era*, which surveys the linkages between voters and party elites since the onset of mass party politics in America.

Peter Nardulli's goal is to resolve what he terms the "paradox of elected officials" (p. 7). Why are politicians attentive to the concerns of their constituents, given that much social science research has concluded that voters lack the political knowledge and sophistication to make informed electoral choices? If voters are, in V.O. Key's phrasing, "manageable fools," (V.O. Key, *The Responsible Electorate: Rationality in Presidential Voting, 1936-1960*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966, p. 5), why do politicians care what they think? Either the research is wrong, or else politicians "may be laboring under an image of the electorate that is not informed by ... the scholarly literature on political behavior" (p. 7).

To gain traction on his question, Nardulli departs from traditional behavioral approaches that rely on individual-level survey data and paint a dismal picture of the electorate. Instead, he constructs an impressive set of sub-national aggregate data, which includes local-level election returns as well as local and state demographic, economic, and political factors for each of the forty-four presidential election cycles from 1828 to 2000. Using the concept of the normal vote, Nardulli assesses the factors influencing voters' standing vote decisions as well as departures from their normal patterns. The analysis is carefully crafted and grounded in the reigning theories of parties and political psychology.

Nardulli's contention is that when citizens' core political desires (for example, stability, prosperity) are impacted by events outside the political system, they evaluate those events independent of elite interference and alter their vote patterns accordingly. Party elites, he postulates, learn important lessons from this and tend to voter concerns to avoid electoral punishment. He begins his analysis by challenging interpretations of parties as simply tools of political elites. Demonstrating that interest group factors better explain normal voting patterns than factors under elite control, the author establishes election outcomes as more democratically responsive than conventional accounts suggest. Recognizing, though, that normal voting patterns may be more a product of reflexive habit than independent choice, Nardulli finds evidence for his hypotheses by examining departures from normal voting patterns across time and geographic space. His analyses reveal electoral shifts that comport with well-known studies of secular and critical realignments. Additionally, Nardulli finds that despite elite efforts to manage electoral behavior, voters are capable of making consequential electoral changes when their core desires are impacted. The author suggests that the frequency of competitive contests, realignments, upsets, and electoral base shifts teaches strategic elites of the need to be concerned about voter reaction to their stewardship. The take-away finding is this: a reasonable amount of electoral accountability has been built into American politics and will continue to exist as long as core democratic protections and processes are maintained.

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Although Nardulli would be the first to admit that some of his observations "are not particularly profound" (p. 253), his major conclusion counters a great deal of existing scholarship that is less sanguine about the country's democratic functioning. The "paradox of elected officials" turns out to be a problem within political science, not of the real world of politics. Nardulli hopes to influence the way in which social scientists conceptualize and investigate democracy. If researchers change how they approach their work, they might discover genuine political problems and ultimately make better real-world recommendations. But for the general reader looking for real answers to real problems, this hypothetical prospect may offer too little help.

NICOLE MELLOW
Williams College

The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security *by Deborah D. Avant. New York, Cambridge University Press, 2005. 322 pp. Cloth, $75.00; paper, $29.99.*

The proliferation of private security companies (PSCs) in Iraq has drawn public attention to a trend that pre-dates the "War on Terror" by at least a decade. Deborah Avant's thoughtful book shows that in fact, private security forces have a long history, and their recent expansion does not necessarily point to a crisis of legitimate authority in the international system. For Avant, contemporary PSCs are connected to broader globalizing currents, eliciting disruptive but also potentially fruitful "changes in the practice of statehood" (p. 258). After surveying and categorizing cases from Sierra Leone to Zaire to Croatia, Avant concludes: "The privatization of security does not so much transfer power from one institution (the state) to another (the market) as pose challenges to the way both states and markets have functioned in the modern system" (p. 263).

Avant's analysis of PSCs focuses on three dimensions of control: the political, the functional, and the social. The political is the most basic and Weberian—"who gets to decide about the deployment of arms and services" (pp. 5–6). The functional focuses on capabilities that are developed through PSCs, and others that are neglected when these are deployed. The social, perhaps the most elusive, examines the role of values and norms in guiding the use of force—"the degree to which the use of force is integrated with prevailing international values" (p. 6).

The cases in the book show variation in all of these variables. Avant is particularly insightful in examining how the institutional circumstances governing the financing and deployment of PSCs affect the political, functional, and social definitions of control. The careful training and multinational monitoring of PSCs in parts of the former Yugoslavia served the interests of stability much better than did the deployment of PSCs in the "Drug War"

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throughout Latin America. In some circumstances, PSCs provide vital services that no state is willing or able to perform. In other circumstances, they contribute to escalating violence without adequate accountability. Avant argues that in managing the three dimensions of control over PSCs, Britain has been more cautious and effective than has the United States. The South African government, in contrast, has generally avoided the hiring of PSCs, a decision that, according to Avant, has constrained the capabilities of the state beyond its borders. PSCs are vital for force projection in an era of shrinking national military establishments, and effective management of them can protect democratic values.

This argument is a useful corrective to the much more negative assessment of PSCs in P.W. Singer's groundbreaking book, *Corporate Warriors* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003). Avant does not offer the close internal analysis of the PSC industry found in Singer's book, nor does she follow their deployments in the same rich detail. She does, however, examine PSC behavior in broader theoretical terms. Instead of exclusively highlighting the threat that PSCs pose for traditional civil–military relations, as Singer does so well, Avant interrogates how this threat can also become a positive opportunity. Her book provokes the reader to contemplate how globalization is transforming state power, and how PSCs can contribute to new authority structures. The diminishment of the state's Weberian monopoly on force need not destroy the entire edifice of democratic governance. In fact, PSCs might prove much more conducive to civil society than traditional large standing armies.

This is a learned and policy-relevant book that deserves a wide readership, in conjunction with Singer's book and other recent work on the subject. Avant does not offer a clear road map for ensuring the appropriate political, functional, and social controls over PSCs, but she asks the right questions. In Afghanistan, Iraq, and other future theaters of conflict, American leaders and citizens must demand satisfactory answers to these questions.

JEREMI SURI
University of Wisconsin, Madison

Companies, International Trade and Human Rights *by Janet Dine. New York, Cambridge University Press, 2005. 354 pp. $90.00.*

Janet Dine provides a wide-ranging discussion of several issues related to economic globalization, including the global trading system, the impact of multinational corporations on outcomes in the developing world, and the extent to which nation-states or corporations have a responsibility to address basic human rights needs worldwide. *Companies, International Trade and Human Rights* employs a legal and normative perspective, discussing recent works by various normative theorists as well as case law from Britain, the United States, and continental Europe, and international treaty law.

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Throughout, Dine uses particular examples to highlight broader issues. For instance, the global trade regime for sugar (and its particular impact on Barbados) illustrates the bias of current trade rules toward rich-country producers, to the detriment of developing-country producers (and consumers worldwide). Dine stresses the complexity of the global economic system: it is much easier to identify flaws than to formulate simple improvements. Addressing a problem in a particular way may have unintended consequences, thereby allowing a problem to persist in a slightly different form. To wit, including human rights standards in trade agreements may seem to promise rights improvements in developing nations, but such standards could simply be a means to continued protectionism on the part of developed nations.

Overall, *Companies, International Trade and Human Rights* takes a dim view of corporations and of capitalism more generally. Because the liability of corporate shareholders is limited, and because corporations often are spread across multiple jurisdictions, they are able to avoid legal responsibility for many of their actions. Yet the reach of these corporations is vast, in that "very few inhabitants of the planet are untouched by the activities of companies ... " (p. 47). While corporations focus on maximizing responsibilities to their shareholders, defined in terms of profit maximization, they do little in terms of responsibilities to broader groups, on issues such as environmental outcomes, human rights, and labor standards. Dine's hope for the future is that national governments will assign broader responsibilities to corporations in exchange for the rights they receive, that corporate governance reforms will encourage this regulatory broadening, and that national governments will reform the global trading system in a way that is more equitable for developing nations. In many ways, then, the vision is akin to Karl Polanyi's socially embedded market, in which capitalism is subject to a variety of controls and in which many elements are removed from the realm of the market (Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time,* 2nd rev. ed., Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1944 [1957]).

The book says less about the practical means of realizing this vision. For instance, under what conditions would the United States and the EU change their approaches to international trade policy? Is it reasonable to expect rich-nation governments to pursue policies that are inconsistent with the needs of their powerful constituents (agricultural producers, for example)? And to what extent should we expect firms to embrace broader notions of corporate responsibility? The politically feasible course may entail accepting that governments and firms are self-interested and convincing them that policy changes serve their (materialistic) interests. If the failure to ensure minimum working conditions generates a consumer backlash, firms may change their labor practices. If the United States and the EU want to generate new markets for their exported manufactures, they may need to reciprocate by reducing agricultural subsidies. Such a mechanism would run contrary to Dine's critique of self-interested materialism, but it might be the most practical way forward.

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Additionally, Dine's analysis assumes that poverty is largely the result of external factors—the global trading system, the power of multinational corporations, and the ideological biases of international financial institutions. She offers passing references to the internal roots of economic and social outcomes, but largely ignores the influence of domestic political and institutional factors. Moreover, Dine often does not draw clear causal connections between the global economy and domestic outcomes, as much recent research in comparative and international political economy attempts to do. Although Dine's book raises many important questions and advances several provocative claims, it leaves the systematic empirical analysis of these claims for future researchers.

LAYNA MOSLEY
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

Crafting Civilian Control of the Military in Venezuela: A Comparative Perspective *by Harold A. Trinkunas. Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 2005. 312 pp. $24.95.*

For Venezuela, as for most Latin American countries, shifting civil–military relations have defined much of contemporary political history. At the same time, Venezuela provides an invaluable starting point for analyzing broader patterns of civil–military relations. Harold Trinkunas adeptly combines these perspectives in this book, simultaneously using the civil–military lens to explore Venezuelan politics since the 1940s, and using the Venezuelan case, with some comparisons, to develop a systematic model of strategies for civilian control.

According to Trinkunas, successful governments achieve civilian control either through "containment," or limiting the scope of military activities and influence, or through "oversight," which depends on more highly developed regime capacity (p. 18). The author utilizes a strategic choice approach, highlighting leaders' decisions either to directly assume or to delegate control of military affairs; their use of strategies such as appeasement, monitoring, or sanctioning; the breadth of the military's "jurisdictional boundaries"; and the extent to which the armed forces are organizationally divided. For example, using a containment approach, Romulo Betancourt (1959–1964) successfully exercised direct leadership over military affairs, "appeased" the armed forces in terms of salaries and various professional frustrations, and organizationally divided the armed forces to prevent inter-force conspiracies.

Yet some of these strategies could conflict with either long-term democratization or military professionalism, consequences that receive relatively little attention here. For example, direct presidential control over military affairs could delay institutionalizing civilian oversight. This has remained a problem in Venezuela, continuing with Hugo Chávez. Argentine president Carlos Menem (1989–1999) also concentrated decision making, thereby substantially weakening the Defense Ministry. Although Trinkunas classifies Argentina as

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having "civilian control by oversight" (p. 18), because of its civilian defense experts, this civilian control apparently emanates mostly from the military's relative political weakness. With a president whom the armed forces perceived as hostile to their organization, Nestor Kirchner (2003–), the Argentine military became notably less compliant.

"Divide and conquer" is also problematic as a strategy for two reasons. First, although competition between different branches may obstruct coups, it may also impede essential wartime cooperation. Second, divisions between more senior and junior ranks actually help motivate mid-level officers' insurrections. Such horizontal cleavages were central to Venezuelan coup attempts in both 1948 and 1992.

Thus, strategies for civilian control may also have some undesirable and unintended consequences. Furthermore, the success of alternative strategies often depends on other criteria, such as the overall tone of the government's military strategies, or their timing. For example, in the 1960s, the Venezuelan military embraced counterinsurgency, probably because of ideological identification with this mission. However, in both 1989 and 2002, government repression of popular protests generated considerable dissent within the armed forces. In the latter cases, the dissenting sectors identified more with the protestors than with the government, which they already opposed. Similarly, appeasement may have very different results, depending on whether, for example, a government raises salaries and improves the military's professional capabilities as part of an overall defense policy, as under Betancourt, or if this occurs in reaction to military protest, as occurred following the 1992 coup attempts. In a case such as the latter, appeasement may appear to reward rebellion rather than professionalism, thereby weakening civilian control.

If Trinkunas's analysis does skirt over some of these nuances, it nonetheless contributes substantially to the general discussion of how to establish civilian control over the armed forces. Perhaps most important is Trinkunas's emphasis on the importance of competent civilian control over such critical areas as military organization and roles. In the end, successful civilian control means that the military serves as the tool of the civilian government, and tools only serve those who understand them.

DEBORAH L. NORDEN
Whittier College

Mexico's Military on the Democratic Stage *by Roderic Ai Camp. Westport, CT, Praeger Publishers, 2005. 392 pp. $49.95.*

Mexico's long history of uninterrupted civilian rule is unique among third-world countries, but the Mexican military's overt hostility toward investigation has discouraged scholarly research into this topic. Roderic Camp's impressive new book on Mexican civil–military relations from 1876 to the present, there-

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fore, provides an unprecedented look at the sociology of the Mexican officer corps, their relationship with Mexican elites, and their relationship with Mexican society at large.

Camp traces the Mexican military's seven decades of subordination to civil authority back to a rare consensus between civilian and military leaders in the wake of the Mexican Revolution concerning the necessity of military withdrawal from politics. Since then, various legacies of the Revolution have sustained civil supremacy, including a one-party state, a strong social consensus against military intervention, an emphasis on subordination in military education, institutional autonomy from civilians on certain matters internal to the military, and various formal linkages between civilian and military elites.

Although democratization has led to the demise of the one-party state and many of the formal linkages between elites, Camp argues that civil–military relations will remain stable because officers, civilian elites, and masses are all strongly committed to civilian supremacy. For similar reasons, he is unconcerned by the military's recent expansion into non-traditional roles, including national security and anti-drug activity, pointing out that this change was initiated by civilians. In fact, his main concern is that the military is becoming more homogenous and less representative, creating increasing separation between the military and civilian worlds.

Surprisingly, Camp's account is devoid of any conflict between civilian and military authorities, describing a military far more docile than that of the United States. Camp credits this outcome to the extreme importance placed on obedience in all levels of military education, far more so than in other countries. Yet if officers are so well socialized into obedience to civil authority, why does Camp also describe a military struggling with drug corruption, one in which generals work closely with cartels and in which a military unit has even gotten into a firefight with civilian law enforcement?

These tensions stem from the author's conceptualization of civilian control as a binary variable rather than a continuum, leaving him little room to talk about different levels of civilian control on different issues. This leads Camp to state that "there is no question that civilians unquestionably control decision making, and that the relationship favors civilian actors" (p. 274) while also explaining, one page later, that civilians have very little control over matters of "promotion, budget, and criminal accountability" (p. 275). A more nuanced approach to civilian control would have allowed the author to better discuss the give and take inherent in the process.

However, these reservations do not detract from this book's very sizeable empirical contribution to the study of both civil–military relations and Mexican politics. Of particular note are findings drawn from the author's biographic data set of 670 two- and three-star Mexican generals (and their counterparts in the navy and air force), undoubtedly the most comprehensive such archive for any third-world military. Camp uses this data to identify three distinct types of officers who served during the last century and to discuss the implications of

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each type of officer for civil–military relations in Mexico. It is also worth singling out the author's methodical study of promotion patterns within the military, an extremely important topic on which there is little literature in any country. In multiple ways, this study significantly raises the bar for future research in this field.

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

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

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

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



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